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Preface

Proponents of Reformed epistemology claim,

in contrast to

those standing in the long line of natural theology, that belief in
God need not be rooted in argument but can be based, more or less
directly, on experience. One of the results of their suggestion is
that certain beliefs about God are just as rational as beliefs about
perceived physical objects. I argue against this claim here.
Although I am critical of Reformed epistemology in this respect,
there is much of value in its ideas. One central notion is that theis
tic beliefs are rational in ways similar to our nontheistic beliefs. I
view this idea as important to our understanding of theistic belief
and its rationality. But to which nontheistic beliefs are theistic be
liefs similar? My thesis is that beliefs about God are just as rational
as beliefs about human persons, rather than beliefs about non
human physical objects. The theory in which this epistemological
parity can be made out, however, is not foundationalism, as two
of the main Reformed epistemologists argue. Holism is a happier
home for theistic belief. At least so this book suggests.
In certain ways, some of the writings of John Hick and George
Mavrodes are the most recent ancestors of Reformed epistemol
ogy, for they take experience of the divine seriously as part of the
epistemic map that epistemologists of religion need to sketch. The
more recent set of arguments and discussions centers in the work
of William P. Alston, Alvin Plantinga, and Nicholas Wolterstorff.
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It is from Plantinga and Wolterstorff that the "Reformed" in "Re
formed epistemology" comes, since both philosophers are intellec
tually rooted in the Reformed theological tradition (they stand in
the theological line traceable to John Calvin). And so the name
remains. Regardless of what one calls Reformed epistemology, or
who its intellectual ancestors are, its central claims are important
and intriguing.
As always with works of this kind, the author owes much to
many people for a variety of activities. I can hardly separate my
thinking from that of my teachers, J. William Forgie, Francis W.
Dauer, and Burleigh T. Wilkins. They, along with Philip Clayton,
Richard F. Galvin, V. James Mannoia, Shirley A. Mullen, Alvin
Plantinga, and David E. Schrader, read all or parts of the manu
script at several stages too disparate to summarize easily. Each pro
vided helpful comments and suggestions. William P. Alston, as the
series editor, read the manuscript several times and offered valuable
philosophical advice along the way. Although he disagrees with
me on various important points, one could not ask for a more
helpful and fair editor. Director John Ackermann, of Cornell Uni
versity Press, enthusiastically supported the project since our first
contact. Kay Scheuer, Joanne Hindman, and John Thomas im
proved the prose in many ways. As well as those who read the
manuscript, there are those who encouraged its writing. Among
them are Mark Bernstein, Steven D. Fratt, Arthur R. Miller, Stan
ley Obitts, Jeanne Reeseman, James F. Sennett, Saranindranath
Tagore, and Robert Wennberg. They have, in a variety of ways,
cheered the writing on.
I spent five years teaching at Westmont College in Santa Bar
bara, California. My friends and colleagues from that time deserve
thanks, and the following people in particular deserve special men
tion for their contributions. The "Tea Group" was, during much
of the time I was writing, a weekly source of intellectual stimula
tion and moral support that took me beyond my own narrow con
cerns to those of the broader intellectual community. The group
was made up of historians, political scientists, biblical scholars, lit
erary experts, and theologians. Its members were Steven Cook,
A. R. "Pete" Diamond, Robert H. Gundry, Michael McClymond,
Bruce McKeon, Shirley A. Mullen, William Nelson, John Rapson,
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Thomas Schmidt, and Jonathan Wilson. Ned Divelbiss and John
Murray provided carrel space for me to work in the Roger
Voskuyl Library, along with unflagging good cheer. George Blank
enbaker, vice president for academic affairs, arranged faculty de
velopment grants to provide me with summer research time. Lois
Gundry, the secretary for the philosophy and religious studies de
partments, and her staff retyped portions of the manuscript into
the computer from my handwritten changes. Since I moved to the
University of Texas at San Antonio, Thomas Wood, of the Divi
sion of English, Classics, and Philosophy, likewise worked at the
computer for me. Adrian A. Amaya helped me read the page
proofs.
Parts of Chapters 6 and 7 originally appeared as "The Analogy
Argument for the Proper Basicality of Belief in God" in the Inter
national Journal for Philosophy of Religion 21 (1987): 3-20. It is re
printed by permission of Kluwer Academic Publishers. Parts of
Chapter 10 originally appeared as "Can Belief in God Be Con
firmed?" in Religious Studies (1988): 311-23. Parts of Chapter 12
originally appeared as "Passionate Religion: Toward a Theory of
Epistemic Commitment for Theistic Belief' in The Logic of Ra
tional Theism: Exploratory Essays, ed. William Lane Craig and Mark

S. MCLeod (Lewiston, N.Y.: Edwin Mellen Press, 1990).
My niece, Martha Anderson, spent the summer of 1991 in Santa
Barbara with my family and took care of my son while I worked
in the library. Now three years old,

Ian Alexander Malone

MCLeod came along in the middle of my writing. He has grown
into an unsurpassed delight, nothing less than the dance of God in
our living room. Finally, my wife, Rebecca L. M. MCLeod, not
only read the manuscript and was a member of the "Tea Group"
but listened to me talk-endlessly-about the ideas in this book.
She has walked with me the path of truth, joy, and love-but es
pecially love-for over sixteen years. How can I thank her? Words
fail.
MARKS. MCLEOD
San Antonio, Texas
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Introduction: Paradigms,
Theism, and the
Parity Thesis

Few claims are more controversial than that beliefs about God
are rational. Challenges to theism are many and diverse, ranging
from the problem of evil to the meaninglessness of theistic ut
terances. Given this healthy and robust religious skepticism, it is
somewhat surprising and refreshing to discover philosophers who
claim that beliefs about God are not only rational but just as ratio
nal as many nontheistic beliefs that nearly everyone accepts as ob
viously rational. In short, they argue for a kind of epistemic parity
between theistic and nontheistic beliefs.
Perhaps this claim is less surprising in light of twentieth-century
developments in epistemology, philosophy of science, and other
related fields. The profound difficulty of spelling out the rationality
of scientific claims and theories is by now well known among phi
losophers. Not only are scientific claims difficult to pin down vis
a-vis rationality, but the notion of rationality is itself, to understate
the point, less than obviously clear. In fact, it is considered vital
these days to spell out what is meant by the term "rational" before
discussing whether a given belief is rational. Since my topic is the
rationality of belief in God, I should be, accordingly, expected to
do just that. Nevertheless, although I am prepared to point toward
the neighborhoods in which to find the notions of rationality that
are my concern here, I do not provide detailed directions at this
early stage. There are two reasons to be reticent. First, the neigh-
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borhoods are crowded and not well lit. Second, the work of the
philosophical mapmakers in this area is work in progress; many
concepts of rationality are currently being explored, and the two
philosophers on whom I concentrate-William P. Alston and Al
vin Plantinga-are directly in the thick of these explorations. Since
in this essay I consider, as well as extend, the thought of two
working epistemologists, it is important to note that their thinking
on these topics has developed over several years. In short, any map
of the neighborhoods will be quite complex, and thus to point at
this juncture to details would be to run ahead without preparation
into the dark. It is better to let the details unfold as we proceed. Be
that as it may, maps start out only as sketches, and thus it serves us
well if some account of the parity thesis can be given, leaving the
details of description until needed.
I.

The Parity Thesis and Epistemic Status

As noted, some philosophers claim that theistic beliefs (viz. , be
liefs about God or his activity) are as epistemically viable as com
monly held nontheistic beliefs. I call this claim the "parity thesis":
Parity Thesis1 (PT1): Theistic beliefs have the same epi
stemic status as commonly held but obviously rational
nontheistic beliefs.
There are many questions to ask about PT 1• What is epistemic sta
tus? What is rational belief? Which theistic beliefs have the sug
gested status? which nontheistic beliefs? For example, is the belief
that God loves me, formed under conditions often considered ad
verse to the truth of that belief-say, having experiences of great
evil-just as epistemically viable as the belief that I see a computer
while I am looking at a computer and other conditions are normal?
The first issue to note is a point now widely accepted among epis
temologists. The applicability of epistemic notions is context-de
pendent. Thus, any version of the parity thesis must be tied to
specific conditions. So:
Parity Thesis2 (PT 2): Under appropriate conditions, a
theistic belief (of a certain kind) has the same epistemic
status as a nontheistic belief (of a certain kind),
where the "certain kinds" must be specified.
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What does it mean to say that two beliefs have the same epi
stemic status? Alston describes what he calls the "epistemic point
of view. " He writes that "that point of view is defined by the aim
of maximizing truth and minimizing falsity in a large body of be
liefs, " where the qualification about a "large body of beliefs" is
added in order to avoid reaching the aim simply by believing only
what is obviously true. 1 In regard to the epistemic point of view,
there are many important notions that range, on the positive side,
from certainty through knowledge to (something like the inele
gantly stated) not deontologically unacceptable, with many rungs
on the ladder in between. 2 To discover the many related notions,
and understandings of those notions, one can begin considering
philosophers (standing in a long tradition) who think knowledge is
justified true belief. Depending on whom one reads, justification is
understood as anything from epistemic dutifulness to reliability or
coherence. And rationality can be understood as what Plantinga
calls "Foley rationality" after Richard Foley's account in The The
ory of Epistemic Rationality in which rationality is aligned with ac
tion aimed at some goal. 3 Or it can be understood as a deontologi
cal notion dealing with one's noetic duty. As well, rationality can
be thought of in terms of noetic virtue. Finally, some epistemol
ogists use the term warrant. Plantinga, for example, separates
warrant or positive epistemic status (that thing, enough of which,
along with true belief, is sufficient for knowledge) from justifica
tion because the latter term suggests "duty, obligation, permission,
and rights-the whole deontological stable. "4 And, he notes, the
L William P. Alston, "Concepts of Epistemic Justification," in Alston, Epi
stemic Justification: Essays in the Theory of Knowledge (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univer
sity Press, 1989), p. 83; originally in Monist 68 (1985): 57-89.

2. Two points need to be mentioned here. First, perhaps the ladder metaphor
is misleading, unless the ladder is more like a rope web with connections in all
directions. The notions of rationality, epistemic justification, warrant, and truth
are connected in many ways and not in any neat or obvious fashion. See Alston,
"Concepts of Epistemic Justification," and Alvin Plantinga, "Positive Epistemic
Status and Proper Function,"

Philosophical Perspectives 2 (1988): 1-50. Second, I say

"positive," for one might say that there is a range of negative epistemic notions as
well. For example, there is Roderick Chisholm's notion of withholding judgment,

nder appropriate conditions, a
kind) has the same epistemic
ief (of a certain kind),

vard University Press, 1987).

e specified.

4. Plantinga, "Positive Epistemic Status and Proper Function," p. 3- Plantinga
most fully makes the distinction between warrant and justification in Warrant: The

n

as well as all the notions surrounding what is
3. Richard Foley, The Theory of Epistemic

irrational to believe.
Rationality (Cambridge, Mass.: Har
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latter notions do not play a direct role in knowledge at all. In
somewhat the same vein, but for different reasons, Alston argues
that justification is not necessary for knowledge. 5 The important
point is that there is no single nor even a mere handful of central
epistemic notions.
Given that epistemic notions are so disparate, one should won
der how the parity thesis, as described above, is to be understood.
It is difficult to give a general but interesting version of the thesis;
it is better to evaluate detailed and specific versions. But this makes
matters complex, for there are perhaps as many detailed versions as
there are understandings of epistemic notions. As first steps toward
spelling out at least some of these more specific versions, consider
that PT2 remains open in at least three ways: (1). It remains open
with regard to the exact nature of epistemic status. For example, is
it a normative notion or a truth-conducive notion, and, if it is nor
mative, how are we to understand the nature of the normative
account? (2). It remains open with regard to various epistemic fea
tures beliefs falling under it might have. For example, even though
two beliefs might have the same epistemic status with regard to a
normative, permissive justification, they need not have the same
status in terms of other features necessary for knowledge-say,
Plantinga's notion of warrant-or, perhaps, in terms of other kinds
of justification-say, a truth-conducive kind (where a beliefs being
justified comes to something like "more probably true than false"
or perhaps "at least likely to be true"). (3). It remains open not
only with regard to the kind of epistemic status but to the level or
strength of that status. Given, for example, that two beliefs have a
certain kind of truth-conducive justification, one may have more
of that kind of justification than the other. So, although both are
justified, one is more probably true than the other.
Perhaps to close at least this last bit of open-endedness, the parity thesis is best stated in this way:
Parity Thesis3 (PT 3): Under appropriate conditions, a
theistic belief (of a certain specified kind) has at least the
same kind and level of epistemic status as a nontheistic
belief (of a certain specified kind).
Current Debate, and Warrant and Proper Function (both New York: Oxford Univer
sity Press, 1992).
5. See Alston, "Justification and Knowledge," in

Epistemic Justification.
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But since it is not just beliefs with which epistemologists are con
cerned but also the practices that generate them and the people
who form the beliefs and follow the practices, the final general
account of the parity thesis is this:
Parity Thesis: Under appropriate conditions, ( 1) S's en
gaging in an epistemic practice EP, which generates theis
tic beliefs (of a specified kind), or (2) S's believing that p,
where p is a theistic belief (of a specified kind), has the
same level and (specified) kind of epistemic status as (3 )
S's engaging in an epistemic practice EP*, which gener
ates nontheistic beliefs (of a specified kind), or (4) S's be
lieving that p*, where p* is a nontheistic belief (of a spec
ified kind).
This is a very general claim. In order that the parity thesis have
some epistemological teeth, the practices or beliefs on both the
theistic and nontheistic sides of the balance need to be specified and
described in more detail. For example, suppose the thesis claimed
something like this:
Parity Thesissense perceptual: Under appropriate conditions,
theistic beliefs about God's presence in my life and the
practices that generate them have the same level of deon
tological epistemic justification as sense perceptual beliefs
and the practices that generate them.
Although one might wish for more specificity yet (e. g. , what are
the appropriate conditions, what exactly is deontological justifica
tion, and what are the inner workings of sense perception and the
theistic belief-forming practice?), at least this version has some bite
and, in fact, is a claim with which many-theists and nontheists
alike-might disagree. It is clear that one cannot decide on the
truth of the parity thesis unless specific versions are laid out for
inspection.
I believe, however, that the general version of the parity thesis
captures something of the spirit of the work of both Plantinga and
Alston and, more generally, of the position sometimes called Re
formed epistemology. This is a self-descriptive term used by some
philosophers associated in one way or another with Calvin College
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and the Reformed tradition in Christian theology. 6 Plantinga and
Nicholas Wolterstorff are two central figures of this group. Alston,
another central figure, is not of Reformed theological background,
at least in the same sense. He has, nevertheless, worked extensively
with Plantinga and Wolterstorff on the epistemology of religion.
For ease of discussion, I simply baptize Alston a Reformed epis
temologist. Although I believe each of the Reformed epistemolo
gists would agree (or would have agreed, given some of their writ
ings) in spirit with the parity thesis, each of them has a different
picture of which theistic beliefs (or practices) and nontheistic beliefs
(or practices) have epistemic parity. As noted, I focus here on the
work of Plantinga and Alston. I take their work as normative of
the approach of Reformed epistemology. 7

2. Paradigms of Rational Belief
If one ignores the claims of global skepticism by turning one's
philosophical back on the skeptic, certain kinds of beliefs emerge as
paradigms of rationally held beliefs-beliefs about medium-sized
physical objects, for example. Indeed, Alston takes such beliefs to
be central when he concentrates on what he calls "perceptual prac
tice" (PP) and its deliverances as paradigmatically rational. 8 It is
rational, he admits, to believe that there is a tree in front of me
only under certain conditions, for example, when the lighting is
sufficient or when my perceptual faculties are operating normally.
But given these conditions, many physical object beliefs-specifi
cally those we form using sense perception and its related epistemic
practices-are paradigm cases of rational beliefs. 9 Alston also pro6. There appears to be no necessary connection between the epistemological
accounts developed by the Reformed epistemologists and the theological tradition
with which they have been identified.
7· Another way to think of Reformed epistemology is to note its reliance on,
and use of, the work of Thomas Reid. All these philosophers, Plantinga, Alston,
and Wolterstorff, appeal at various points to Reid's work.
8. See Alston, "Christian Experience and Christian Belief," in Faith and Ratio
nality: Reason and Belief in God, ed. Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff (No
tre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983).
9. The phrase "physical object beliefs" is much broader than the phrase "per
ceptual beliefs." But many of our physical object beliefs result from the use of our
perceptual capacities. My concern is with physical object beliefs taken in the nar-
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vides a detailed account of the nature of the rationality qua justi
fication he has in mind. Even without considering those details,
one can see clearly, given his comparison of perceptual and theistic
beliefs and practices, that Alston has held some version of the par
ity thesis in several works. 10
Plantinga likewise is concerned with certain paradigm cases of
rational belief He includes cases of perceptual belief such as that I
now see a tree (when I am looking at one), but his range of admis
sible beliefs is larger than simply the set of sense perceptual beliefs.
He suggests that it is perfectly rational to believe that that person is
in pain (when she is writhing in pain before us) and that I remem
ber eating breakfast this morning (when it seems to me that I re
member eating breakfast). Here we see Plantinga's willingness to
include in the set of paradigmatically rational beliefs two other
kinds of belief often held to be problematic for human ratio
nality-memory beliefs and beliefs about other minds. This inclu
sivism, long characteristic of Plantinga's work, is indicative of the
spirit of the Reformed epistemologists.11 Both Alston and Plantinga
have appealed to fairly weak notions of rationality: Alston appeals
to weak, normative justification, Plantinga to proper basicality,
where this notion is to be understood within a normative account
of rationality in which one is permitted to believe, or where one is
within one's rights in believing, a proposition.12 Thus, the parity
thesis emerges.
In the broader work of Alston and Plantinga there are variations
on this theme. The work of Plantinga since about 1986 concen
trates on what he calls "warrant" -as Plantinga says, that thing,
enough of which, along with true belief, gives humans knowledge.
And Alston is well known for his work in general epistemology.
Nevertheless, Plantinga's work on epistemology from about 1979
rower sense of those delivered by perception. Unless a cleaner distinction is called
for, I do not make it.
IO. He moves away from this position in Alston, Perceiving God: The Epistemol
ogy of Religious Experience (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991). I have
more to say about this in Chapter 8.

I r. See, for example, Plantinga, God and Other Minds: A Study in the Rational
Justification of Belief in God (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1967).
12. See Alston, "Christian Experience and Christian Belief," and Plantinga,
"Reason and Belief in God," both in Faith and Rationality.
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through I986 is concerned to evaluate the charge that one cannot
rationally hold theistic beliefs since such beliefs are supposed to be
noetically deficient, whereas perceptual beliefs, memory beliefs,
and beliefs about other minds are not. And in several essays Alston
considers both normative and evaluative accounts of justification
where he appears not to be concerned about knowledge per se. I
use these earlier works, where various accounts of the parity thesis
emerge, as a springboard for a broader discussion that includes
consideration of later developments.
It seems fair to say, overall, that Alston and Plantinga point to
three pivotal kinds of belief as paradigms of rational belief: (percep
tually delivered) physical object beliefs, memory beliefs, and beliefs
about other minds. To facilitate discussion in the remaining pages,
let us take the following as examples of members of the set of
paradigm rational beliefs.

(I) . A tree is there.
(2). That person is in pain.
(J). I ate breakfast this morning.
When I refer to the paradigm beliefs, I have these examples in
mind, although they are simply representative of the set of para
digmatically rational beliefs more broadly construed as the sets
of (perceptually delivered) physical object beliefs, memory beliefs,
and beliefs about other minds.
Given these examples, the parity thesis has the following appli
cation. The beliefs that
(4). God created the world.
(5). God created the flower that is before me.
(6). God forgives my sin.
have the same level and kind of epistemic status as (I), (2), and (J).
Of course, the kind must be specified, and one must leave open the
possibility that other kinds of epistemic status may accrue to either
theistic or paradigm beliefs while not accruing to the others. The
strongest versions of the parity thesis have it that theistic and para
digm beliefs have exactly the same kind and level of epistemic sta-
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tus and that that level and kind are the best (or strongest) kind of
justification available.13 But the central point is that any skepticism
with regard to the specific kind of justification laid at the feet of the
paradigm beliefs is a skepticism to be laid at the feet of the theistic
beliefs, and vice versa. I do not mean to claim, and neither does
Plantinga or Alston, that there are no differences among (1), (2),
and (3) or among (4), (5), and (6). The point is rather that the
general kinds of consideration that go into providing the ratio
nality of the paradigm beliefs also go into providing the rationality
of theistic beliefs, and vice versa.

3. Goals
If the parity thesis captures a central claim of Reformed epis
temology, then Reformed epistemology puts forth an intriguing
claim. That theistic beliefs may have the same epistemic status as
other more commonly accepted nontheistic beliefs is a suggestion
many theists would surely welcome. But do theistic beliefs have
such a status? My overarching goal is to argue that, strictly speak
ing, none of the versions of the parity thesis attributable to Alston
or Plantinga is successful. Each one fails because of a lack of recog
nition of the necessary role of an epistemic base-a set of back
ground beliefs-in the formation and justification of certain kinds
of belie( But I do wish to defend, and work within, the general
spirit of the Reformed epistemological frame work. Insofar as I
have success in the latter task, this is an essay in Reformed epis
temology (i.e., in its spirit) rather than an essay on Reformed epis
temology (i.e., critical of it). Insofar as I have success in the for
mer, this is also an essay on Reformed epistemology.
My aims fall into three categories. First, I wish to contribute to
the ongoing discussion of the rationality of belief in God, for much
disagreement about it remains. It does seem to a great many phi
losophers of religion that belief in God is rational. I throw in my
lot with these. But there is disagreement among philosophers of
religion not only about whether theistic belief is rational but also
IJ. It should be noted that what counts as best may need analysis. One might
ask, best for what-truth, living a peaceful life, being happy?
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about how it is rational. I hope to add at least a modicum of insight
into this latter debate.
My second area of concern is to provide an account and analysis
of various versions of the parity thesis and related suggestions aris
ing out of Reformed epistemology. The claims of Alston and Plan
tinga are my focus, and I present some criticisms of the positions
of each. I believe these criticisms raise some difficult, and overlap
ping, challenges to each of their more or less explicit versions of
the thesis, in particular where epistemic parity is said to exist be
tween sense perception and theistic epistemic practices. But there
are also problems when some of their more recent work is applied
to other versions of the parity thesis, versions that I construct
based on their fundamental strategies. I explore these as well.
I weigh Alston's and Plantinga's various parity theses and find
them wanting. In particular, their accounts of theistic experience
and the epistemic practices that generate theistic belief need refin
ing. Once this is done, the third aim can be fulfilled: to suggest and
defend a version of the parity thesis that does not fall prey to the
criticisms laid against the theses suggested by Alston and Plan
tinga. As well, I draw several important parallels between the two
practices to which this new parity thesis calls attention. Hence, I
attempt to make a positive case for the plausibility of the parity
thesis thus understood. Overall, then, I hope to clarify and defend
the project of Reformed epistemology. 14
14. There are two respects in which I am hesitant to characterize my position as
Reformed. The first is that both Alston and Plantinga take foundationalist posi
tions in their epistemological theories. As becomes clear, I am less sanguine about
foundationalism than either Alston or Plantinga. But Wolterstorffs position is not
(or at least not clearly) foundationalist, and so perhaps my position is not ill-de
scribed as Reformed. Second, both Plantinga and Alston are unabashed metaphysi
cal realists. Since my philosophical youth, I too have been so unabashed. In (what I
hope is only) my early mid-life, I have become unsure of this position. (Do philos
ophers qua philosophers have mid-life crises?) But I need not commit myself to
one position or the other here, since much of what I say is, I believe, compatible
with a metaphysical realist position. Whether or not one's being a metaphysical
realist is a necessary condition of being epistemologically Reformed is not an issue
I enter here.

[
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Alston's Parity Thesis

A version of the parity thesis is clearly seen in Alston's work.
His strategy in some seminal essays is to embed the ju stification of
beliefs in the rationality of what he calls "epistemic (or doxastic)
practices. "1 He then argu es that the kind of ju stification available
for the practice that provides u s with beliefs abou t the physical
world is the same kind of ju stifi cation available for the practice that
generates beliefs abou t God. He fu rther argu es that the level or
strength of ju stification is the same. My goal in the present chapter
is twofold. First, I lay ou t the central tenets ofAlston's argu ment
in "Christian Experience and Christian Belief, " su pplementing
them with some claims made in two other essays and in Perceiving
God. Second, I provide the ou tline of a challenge to Alston' s posi
tion. Althou gh a fu ller and more developed accou nt of this chal
lenge is defended in Chapter 3, I su ggest here that if the challenge
is su ccessfu l, it calls for some distinctions within Alston's accou nt
of epistemic ju stification. These distinctions raise some qu estions
abou t Alston's version of the parity thesis.

1. See Alston, "Christian Experience and Christian Belief," and "Religious Ex
perience and Religious Belief," Nous 16 (1982): 3-14. Of the two listed here, I
concentrate mostly on the first.
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Epistemic Pra ctices a nd Bel iefs

In "Chr istian Exper ience and Chr istia n Bel ief' Alston intr oduces
the notion of an epistemic pra ctice. An epistemic pra ctice, he sa ys,
is "a more-or -less r egul ar and fixed procedur e of for ming bel iefs
under certain conditions, wher e the content of the belief is some
mor e-or -less deter minate function of the conditions. "2 The notion
of a pr actice is more basic tha n the notion of a bel ief insofar as one
consider s epistemic status. If one can show that a pra ctice is justi
fied (or tha t one' s engaging in a pra ctice is justified), then (typ
ically) by extension its del iver ances are justified. So Al ston' s centr al
concer n is whether we ar e epistemicall y justified in engaging in
cer tain epistemic pr actices.
He has two pr actices in mind. The fir st pr ovides us with (ma ny
of our ) bel iefs about the physical worl d; Al ston call s this "per cep
tual pr actice" (PP) or "sense per ceptual pr actice" (SPP or SP). 3 The
second provides (some of) us with beliefs a bout God; he call s it
"Chr istian pra ctice" (CP) and la ter introduces the notions of "mys
tical pr actice (MP) and "Chr istia n mystical practice" (CMP). 4
2.

Epistemic Justifica tion

Al ston cl aims that CP a nd PP ha ve the sa me kind of epistemic
justification.What kind of epistemic justifica tion do they ha ve? He
distinguishes two. Ther e is an evaluative sense of justifica tion, Je·
Her e the concer n is that one' s hol ding of a bel ief be l egitimate vis
a-vis the concer n for attaining truth and a voiding falsity; the con
cer ns are those of what Alston call s the epistemic point of view. If
2. Alston, "Christian Experience and Christian Belief," p. 110. I use "epistemic
practice" and "doxastic practice" interchangeably.
J. He uses PP, SPP, and SP to refer to this practice. I prefer the first, but I use
the other abbreviations when they are more natural in quoting certain essays. The
reason for Alston's shift from PP to SPP or SP is that he later develops arguments
to the conclusion that one can perceive God, or at least that there is no reason to
think one cannot. Once having broadened the category of perception to include
access to God, Alston needed a more specific terminology by which to pick out the
perception of physical objects. The fullest treatment of the possibility of the per
ception of God is in Perceiving God.
4· Again the shift in terminology is at least partly because of Alston's need for
further specificity. The later two terms are introduced in Perceiving God. I use CP
unless another term is needed for ease of exposition.

Al ston 's Par ity Thesis
one is justified in hol din g a belief in this sense, then the cir cum
stan ces in which the bel ief ar e held ar e such that the bel ief is at l east
l ikel y to be true. Al ston admits that there is much wor k to be done
in discover in g what the var ious con dition s for Je ar e. But when
that wor k is don e, he says, what Je boils down to is a kin d of
reliabil ist un der stan din g of r ation ality: a belief is Je when it was
for med or is sustain ed by an epistemic practice that can be gen er
all y rel ied on to pr oduce true r ather than fal se bel iefs. 5
Je is to be con tr asted with a n or mative un der stan din g of justifica
tion , ]m which is n ormative in that it deal s with how well a per son
does in l ight of the n or ms requir ed of us simpl y in vir tue of bein g
cogn itive bein gs. We have, in shor t, some obl igation s an d duties
with respect to bel ief an d bel ief for mation because of the fact that
we are seekers of truth. Jn an d Je can be con tr asted in this way.
Consider a naive member of an isolated primitive tribe who, along
with his fellows, unhesitatingly accepts the traditions of the tribe.
That is, he believes that p wherever the tr aditions of the tribe, as
recited by the elders, in clude the assertion that p. He is ]n in doing
so, for he has no reason whatsoever to doubt these traditions.Ev
ery one he knows accepts them without question, and they do not
conflict with anything else he believes.And yet, let us suppose, this
is not a reliable procedure of belief formation; and so he is not ]c in
engaging in it. Conversely, a procedure may be in fact reliable,
though I have strong reasons for regarding it as un reliable an d so
would not be ]n in engaging in it; to do so would be to ignore those
reasons and so would be a violation of an intellectual obligation.•
Ther e is, then, a clear differ en ce between Jn an d Je·
A fur ther distin ction within the n or mative con cept of justifica
tion runs r oughl y par all el to the two position s taken in the William
James-W. K. Cl iffor d debate on the ethics of bel ief. Sin ce our goal
as epistemic bein gs is to seek the truth, Cl iffor d deman ds that one
ought n ot hol d a bel ief unl ess on e has adequate reason s for so do
in g. James den ies this cl aim, suggestin g that on e can hol d a bel ief
5· A fuller account of evaluative justification is available in Alston, "Concepts
of Epistemic Justification," and "An Internalist Externalism," in Epistemic Justifica
tion (the latter originally in Synthese 74 [I988): 265-83). I return to these essays in
Chapter 4·
6. Alston, "Christian Experience and Christian Belief," p. II5·
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unless one has some reason not to hold it. In effect, Cl ifford de
mands that we avoid as much error as possibl e, whereas James
affirms the search for as much truth as possibl e. These parall el a
strong version Gns) and a weak version G nw) of normative justifica
tion. The strong version has it that one is justified in engaging in a
practice if and onl y if one has reasons for thinking the practice
rel iabl e. On the weak version, one is justified in engaging in a
practice when there are no reasons for regarding the practice as
unrel iabl e. Some important rel ationships hol d among Je, ]ns• and
Jnw· Perhaps the most important of these is that if one sets out to
discover whether a belief or practice is Je then one is setting out to
discover whether one coul d be Jns in hol ding that bel ief or engag
ing in that practice.
Al ston makes two central claims. First, one is neverJns in engag
ing in either PP or CP because one cannot have adequate reasons
for supposing either practice to be Je· (It does not follow that one
or the other cannot be Je but onl y that one has no adequate reasons
to think it is. ) Second, both PP and CP can be Jnw for a person.
The answer to the question with which this section began-what
kind of epistemic justification do PP and CP share? -is, then, that
CP and PP share Jnw· Al ston' s version of the parity �hesis might
thus be described:
Parity ThesisAlston (PTA): Under appropriate conditions,
both S's engaging in CP and S's engaging in PP are Jnw·
There is a natural extension to bel iefs:
Under appropriate conditions, both S's bel ief that p,
where p is a theistic belief, and S's bel ief that p*, where
*
p is a perceptual bel ief, are Jnw· 7
7· This extension, although tacit in Alston's suggestions in "Christian Experi
ence and Christian Belief," is perhaps incautious. Alston argues elsewhere that one
must be careful not to confuse levels when dealing with epistemological concerns;
what applies at one level may not at another. Although he writes in his earlier
essays that a belief is justified if and only if the practice that generates it is, as his
ideas develop it becomes clear that, although it may be rational for someone to
engage in a practice, that in itself does not entail that the beliefs generated by the
practice are justified. Rationality entails neither justification nor reliability. Alston
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Al ston does not intend his claims to be weak-kneed. First, PP
and CP have the same l evel (weak) and kind (normative) of justi
fication, and al though either CP or PP may be Je one cannot have
adequate reasons to think either is. 8 Second, he aims his sights
higher than simpl e epistemic neutral ity for PP and CP.His general
goal is to consider the "possibil ity that one' s experience can pro
vide justification sufficient for rational acceptance."9 Thus, al
though both PP and CP are epistemically permissible practices, this
kind of justification is intended to be understood as sufficient for
some sort of positive epistemic status. Epistemic permission to en
gage in a practice and, by extension, to hold beliefs thereby del ivered
is sufficient for epistemic acceptance of the delivered bel iefs, even
though one has no adequate reasons to take the practice to be Je·
3· The Justification of Perceptual Practice
Al ston describes the basic accounts phil osophers have given in
trying to show that PP is Je· He does not discuss any of these in
detail but notes their general fail ure to win the phil osophical day.10
Thus, the prospect of PP being Jns is not good. Furthermore, he
argues, in a later essay I discuss in Chapter 4, that if one practice can be shown to
be reliable they all can. Justification is easily had for just about any practice and
hence just about any belief Alston therefore shifts the question he asks about prac
tices away from the issue of justification to the issue of their rationality. This shift
allows him to evaluate the relative strength of our doxastic practices. It turns out,
then, that engaging in an epistemic practice should be evaluated in terms of ratio
nality and not justification, and thus some important questions need to be raised
about the "natural" extension suggested above or, perhaps better, about PTA itself.
To begin with, is it appropriate or worthwhile to speak of the justification of
practices (as opposed to beliefs)? Should we not rather speak of the rationality of
practices? And what does this mean for beliefs?
8. Perhaps PTA should include a clause noting that CP and PP share at least ]nw
in order to recognize that they both might be Jc· But Alston seems to suggest in
"Christian Experience and Christian Belie£'' that our knowledge that an epistemic
practice is Jc is limited and therefore that the strongest claim we can legitimately
make is that CP and PP are ]nw· See Chapter 4 for an explanation of Alston's
apparent change of mind on this matter.
9· Alston, "Christian Experience and Christian Belief," p. II 1.
10. There is a fuller discussion in Perceiving God and an even fuller discussion in
Alston's forthcoming book on general epistemology (the latter of which is noted in
Perceiving God).
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suggests that as far as he knows no one has come up with any
good reasons to think PP is unreliable. There being, apparently, no
good reasons, PP is Jnw·
At this point Alston refers the reader to Thomas Reid' s work.
Reid suggests that the Creator endows human beings with a strong
tendency to trust their belief-forming practices, noting that no
practice can be provided noncircular reasons for accepting it as reli
able. Thus, if we "are to have any chance of acquiring knowledge,
we must simply go along with our natural reactions of trust with
respect to at least some basic sources of belief, provided we lack
sufficient reason for regarding them as unreliable. "11 Furthermore,
any appeal to one or another of those practices as more basic than
the others, with the goal in mind of justifying the less basic by the
more basic, is illegitimate. We have no reason to single out, for
example, the practice delivering self-evident beliefs as providing
more accurate access to truth than PP. D escartes' s strategy of pick
ing out one practice and using it to justify others is arbitrary. 12 PP
is Jnw and this, Alston claims, gives us at least some chance at
knowledge about the physical world.
4· The Justification of Christian Practice
D oes CP have the same kind of justification as PP? Is CPJnw? By
the nature of the case, one need not produce some set of reasons to
show that CP is Jnw · Nevertheless, CP is often not accepted as Jnw •
so some kind of account can be helpful. The best that can be done
is to present PP, which we accept as Jnw • alongside CP in order to
compare the two. If there are no differences signifi cant vis-a-vis
epistemic justification, then if one accepts PP as Jnw one can accept
CP as Jnw · 13 Alston argues that there are no such differences and in
effect, therefore, argues for the truth of PTA .
II. Alston, "Christian Experience and Christian Belief," p. II9.
I2. Alston does not wish to suggest that one cannot check what might be called
"subpractices" by a larger practice in which a subpractice is embedded. One might,
for example, check the reliability of a thermometer by the larger perceptual prac
tice.
I 3. One might think there is some sort of argument from analogy here, but I do
not think this is the case. Alston's comparision is merely a comparision; it is not
intended as an argument from the justification of one practice to the justification of
another.

Alston's Parity Thesis
Epistemic situations are often analyzed in the following way. In
stead of having empirical information pl ain and simpl e, it appears
that what we have is, on the one hand, a datum such as "I am
being appeared to in a computerish way" or "I seem to see a com
puter" or "A computerish sense datum is in my visual fiel d" and,
on the other hand, bel iefs such as that there is a computer in front
of me.How does one l egitimatel y move from the content of one' s
mental l ife to a cl aim about the (independentl y) existing physical
real ity? Supposedl y, the (independentl y existing) computer gen
erates the datum via some psychophysical process. Thus the em
pirical cl aim, "There is a computer in front of me, " is a hybrid
resul ting from the datum and an expl anation (via the mysterious
psychophysical process). But now we are in the difficul t position
with PP of having a bifurcation between experience and expl a
nation. Simil arl y with CP, the suggestion goes. One has certain
kinds of experience, such as it seeming to one that God cares for
us, and theol ogical expl anations, such as that God does care for us.
How is one to overcome either of these bifurcations?
Al ston registers his skepticism about the two standard ways by
which phil osophers attempt to overcome the bifurcation for PP.
Some try to show that the existence of the physical worl d is the
best expl anation of the data we have. But, says Al ston, it is un
l ikel y that one can "specify the purel y subjective experiential data
to be expl ained without rel ying on the 'independent physical
worl d' scheme in doing so, " and thus the expl anation route seems
cl osed.14 Neither does the phenomenal ist approach of taking physi
cal object bel iefs to be bel iefs about actual and possibl e sense expe
rience fare well , according to Al ston. The best move is to reject the
bifurcation al together and seek to justify the cl aim that we are in
direct contact with the objects of the physical worl d. He suggests a
parallel strategy for CP:
The question concerns the justifiability of a certain practice-the
practice of forming physical-object beliefs directly on the basis of
perception rather than as an explanation of what is perceived or ex

perienced.Another way of characterizing the practice in q uestion is
to say that it is a practice of using a certain conceptual scheme (the
"independently existing physical object" conceptual scheme) to spe
cify what it is we are experiencing in sense perception.If I may use

14. Alston, "Christian Experience and Christian Belief," p. 109.
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the term "objectification" for "taking an experience to be an experi
ence of something of a certain sort," then we may say that the prac
tice in question is a certain kind of objectification of sense experi
ence, an objectification in terms of independently existing physical
objects.Let us use the term "perceptual practice" (PP ) for our famil
iar way of objectifying sense experience. In parallel fashion I will
... use the term "Christian practice" (CP ) for the practice of objec
tifying certain ranges of experience in terms of Christian theology. 15

In the ca se of PP, the experience is taken to be a n experience of the
object itself a nd not merely a psychologica l da tum. Alston a lso
sa ys the believer takes himself to be directly a wa re of the object; he
does not cla im tha t the subject is directly a wa re. Further, Alston
suggests tha t we should understa nd our forma tion of physica l ob
ject beliefs simply by our "objectifica tion" of a ra nge of experience
in terms of certa in concepts. On his suggestion, the datum of the
experience generating physica l object beliefs is not expla ined by
reference to objective entities but is simply understood as a n expe
rience of those entities.
A brief detour is necessa ry here. In "Christian Experience a nd
Christia n Belief' Alston uses the la nguage of one' s ta king a n expe
rience to be a n experience of a certa in sort as opposed to the cla im
tha t one's experience is of a certa in sort. In his more fully orbed
theory of perception, however, he makes the following cla ims:
As I

see the matter, at the heart of perception (sensory and other
wise ) is a phenomenon variously termed presentation, appearance, or
givenness. Something is presented to one's experience (awareness ) as
so-and-so, as blue, as acrid, as a house, as Susie's house, or what
ever. I take this phenomenon of presentation to be essentially inde
pendent of conceptualisation, belief, judgment, "taking," or any
other cognitive activity involving concepts and propositions. It is
possible, in principle, for this book to visually present itself to me as
blue even if I do not take it to be blue, think of it as blue, concep
tualise it as blue, judge it to be blue, or anything else of the sort.

Thus Alston dista nces his theory of perception from those in which
the object of the experience is sa id itself to be constituted in pa rt or
in whole by the conceptua l fra mework a nd beliefs of the perceiver.
15. Ibid.
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Never theless, Alston's claims about pr esentation do not really af
fect his claims about PP and CP. In fact, Alston goes on to say:
"No doubt, in mature human per ception this element of pr esenta
tion is intimately inter twined with conceptualisation and belief, but
presentation does not consist in anything like that. " So, although
Alston holds that the object of per ception is a given, one' s concep
tual scheme can never theless influence how one takes the given:
It is essential not to confuse what appears with what it appears as.
My conceptualised knowledge and belief can affect the latter but not
the former. If to perceive X is simply for X to appear to one in a
certain way, and if the concept of appearance is unanalyzable, then it

would appear that we can enunciate no further conceptually neces
sary conditions for perception. But that does not follow. In declar
ing the concept of appearance (presentation) to be unanalyzable I
was merely denying that we can give a conceptually equivalent for
mulation in other terms; I was not denying that conceptually neces
sary conditions can be formulated in other terms.

Alston' s realism about the given should not be confused with the
suggestion that the given itself is all that is necessar y for per ceptual
exper ience. 16
Let us retur n now to consider PP. Alston' s point is that the data
of the exper iences gener ating physical object beliefs are not ex
plained by refer ence to objective entities but r ather such experi
ences ar e simply understood as experiences of those entities. So it
goes with CP as well. Alston is car eful to distinguish between "ex
periences in which the subject takes himself to be dir ectly aware of
God" and other inter esting cases in which someone is "simply . . .
disposed to believe . . . that what is happening in his exper ience is
to be explained by God' s activity. "17 How does the account of these
exper iences go? As we have lear ned, Alston uses the ter m "objec
tify" to stand for "taking a cer tain kind of exper ience as an exper i
ence of something of a cer tain sor t. " In the physical object case, we
take sense exper iences as experiences of physical objects (r ather
than psychological data). He suggests, then, that just as we for m
r6. Alston, "Experience of God: A Perceptual Model," paper delivered at the
Wheaton Philosophy Conference, Wheaton, Illinois, October 1989, pp. 2-4. A
fuller treatment of this topic is found in Alston, Perceiving God, chap. r.
17. Alston, "Christian Experience and Christian Belief," p. 107.
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physical object bel iefs directl y on the basis of perception so we
form theistic bel iefs directl y on the basis of theistic experience.
There is not to be, presumabl y, any inference from the one to the
other; the formation of bel ief is immediate. Thus, whenever we
have perceptual experiences, we take oursel ves to be in contact
with physical objects. Just so, whenever we have theistic experi
ences, we take oursel ves to be in contact with God or at l east his
activities. But how are we to understand "theistic experience"?
Alston says that a certain range of experience is objectified in
certain terms. What is this range of experience in the real m of
theistic bel ief? He suggests that there are certain Christian or rel i
gious experiences that can be objectified. He del imits the experi
ences about which he is concerned by setting aside what are typ
icall y called mystical experiences-those experiences sometimes
had by saints and ascetics. He is concerned more with experiences
open to the typical , l ay Christian. 18 He al so sets aside experiences
that might be described as visions. He does not wish to set aside all
sensory mediation-for exampl e, seeing the gl ory of God in the
mountains. Neverthel ess, he limits his final concern to what we
might call direct experiences of God. These experiences need not
be in the forefront of one' s consciousness, but they are not experi
ences from which one infers the presence of God. God is somehow
(to be taken as) directl y present, just as the tabl e to my l eft is (taken
by me to be) directly present.
Given this range of experiences, and Alston' s acc ounts of PP and
CP, how does the argument for PTA go? Clearly, PP is Jnw· It is
often suggested, however, that CP is significantly different from
PP, and these differences show that CP and PP do not have the
same kind of epistemic justification. Al ston writes:
I believe that many people are inclined to take CP to be discredited
by certain ways in whic h it differs from PP, by the lack of certain
salient features of PP. The se include the f ollowi ng:
I. Within PP there are standard ways of checking the accuracy of
any particular perceptual belief. If, by looking at a cup, I form the
18. This remains true even in Perceiving God, where Alston uses the rubric
"mystical practice" to name the subject of his concern, although at least some of
his examples in this more recent work are from what is thought of more stan
dardJY as the mystical literature. Still, his concern is not experiences of unity with
God but rather with experiences where God is taken to be present, in a sense
Alston specifies, to the experiencer's consciousness.
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belief that there is coffee in it, I can check this belief for accuracy by
smelling or tasting the contents; I can get other observers to look at
it, smell it, or taste it; I can run chemical tests on it and get other
people to do so.
2. By engaging in PP we can discover regularities in the behavior
of objects putatively observed, and on this basis we can, to a certain
extent, effectively predict the course of events.
3· Capacity for PP, and practice of it, is found universally among
normal adult human beings.
4· All normal adult human beings, whatever their culture, use
basically the same conceptual scheme in objectify ing their sense ex
perience.19
Alston responds in both a negative and a pos1t1ve way to these
supposed disanalogies between PP and CP. Only the negative re
ply need concern us for the present.
The conclusion of the negative reply is that PP's possession of
features I-4 is best seen "as a rather special situation that pertains
specifically to certain fundamental aspects of that particular practice
in this particular historical-cultural situation rather than as an in
stance of what is to be expected of any reliable epistemic practice."20
Alston's argument is roughly that although I-4 are features that
one might desire to have attached to an epistemic practice, it does
not follow that a practice's failing to have them is a reason to reject
the practice's claim to reliability. In fact, PP's possession of I-4
does not give us a reason to take PP as reliable.
To simplify matters, let us consider features 1 and 2 together and
then 3 and 4· Features I and 2 have the common focus of calling
attention to predictability, whereas 3 and 4 have the common focus
of calling attention to the universal human participation in the
practice.12 So first, I and 2. PP is what Alston calls a "basic prac
tice." It is a practice that "constitutes our basic access to its subject
matter. We can learn about our physical environment only by per
ceiving it, by receiving reports of the perceptions of others, and by
carrying out inferences from what we learn in these first two ways.
We can not know anything a priori about these matters, nor do we
19. Alston, "Christian Experience and Christian Belief," p. 121.
20. Ibid., p. 128.
21. This observation is made by Peter Van lnwagen in the abstract "Abnormal
Experience and Abnormal Belief," Nous 15 (1981): 13-14.
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have any other sort of experiential access to the physical world. "
Thus, if one tries to take features I and 2 as reasons for judging PP
to be reliable, one is involved in a "vicious circularity. "22 So no
adequate reason can be given.
As an alternative, Alston suggests that, although I and 2 do not
provide us with reasons for the reliability of PP, perhaps they be
token or manifest reliability. Thus, the first part of the anti-CP
charge reduces to the claim that I and 2 manifest reliability but that
CP lacks I and 2. Their absence is supposed to be a reason to reject
the reliability of CP. But surely it is not. If I and 2 are not neces
sary conditions for reliability, as Alston argues, then the only alter
native left for the anti-CP challenge is that I and 2 are general
features of reliability, features such that the absence thereof pro
vides at least prima facie reason to reject a practice as not reliable.
In response, Alston offers one central reason why we should not
think I and 2 are general features of reliable practices. This reason
is hinted at by the practice of pure mathematics. The practice of
pure mathematics does not allow for predictability precisely be
cause it does not deal with changing objects. This example indi
cates that "whether a practice could be expected to yield predic
tion, if reliable, depends on the kind of subject matter with which
it deals. "23 He then suggests that it is only accidental and not neces
sary to PP that predictability is built into it.
As for features 3 and 4, not everyone engages in the practice of
pure mathematics, so the claim that everyone engages in the same
epistemic practices is not true; universal participation need not be a
feature of a reliable practice. Also, it is not at all clear that all peo
ple of various cultures objectify experience in the way Western
people do. Alston admits that this is a controversial area, but since
the issue is unclear and, I might add, not even clearly decidable,
perhaps it should not be pressed on either side.
Given these considerations, although the presence of features I4 may be cognitive desiderata, their absence does not give us a
reason to reject the reliability of a practice failing to have them. PP
and CP thus have, according to Alston, the same kind of epistemic

22. Alston, "Christian Experience and Christian Belief," pp. I 17, 124.
23. Ibid., p. 127.
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justification, Jnw· Just as we have no reason to reject the reliability
of PP, so we have no reason to reject the reliability of CP.
5· Alstonian Theistic Experience
In the next section I introduce a challenge to PTA which I draw
from some recent philosophical work on the epistemic value of
my stical experiences.To develop the challenge, however, I need a
clearer explanation of Alston's account of experience. Experience,
whether in PP or CP, is such that the object of one's experience is
taken to be directly present.Alston resists any bifurcation of one's
belief formation into parts, claiming that one simply takes one's
experience to be of a certain object; one objectifies one's experience
immediately into the categories appropriate to that experience.
Sense experiences are objectified into phy sical object beliefs via the
independently existing phy sical object scheme. Theistic experi
ences are objectified into theistic beliefs via the (Christian) theo
logical object scheme.How should one understand the experiences
that the theist objectifi es into theistic belief?
Since the belief formation is noninferential, one expects the con
tent of the experience to be relevant to the content of the belief.
But what is the content of the experience? Here there appears to be
a certain looseness in Alston's presentation in "Christian Experi
ence and Christian Belief." Although he indicates early in his essay
that he does not want to rule out experiences in which one might
see the glory of God in majestic natural scenes or hear God speak
in the words of a friend, he later specifies that he is restricting
himself
to experiences in which the subject takes himself to be directly
aware of God, rather than simply being disposed to believe, how
ever firmly, that what is happening in his experience is to be ex
plained by God's activity. Thus if after responding to the Gospel
message, I find myself reacting to people in a different kind of way,
I may firmly believe that this is due to the action of the Holy Spirit
on my soul; but if I do not seem to myself to be directly experienc
ing the presence of the Holy Spirit, if I am not disposed to answer
the question "Just what did you experience?" or "Just what were
you aware of?" with something that begins "The Holy Spirit . .,
.

"
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then this experience does not fall within our purview . . . . No
doubt, this is often a difficult distinction to make. 24

The first examples indicate a certain overlap in experience be
tween theist and nontheist. For example, presumably both theist
and nontheist (can) see the natural scene and both (can) hear the
voice of the friend.In the remaining example, the nontheist pre
sumably does not react to people in a way different than before
hearing the gospel.This is an experience to which the nontheist has
no access.The question is whether Alston can include both kinds
of example-those in which there is an overlap of experience be
tween theist and nontheist and those in which there is no overlap.
In the cases in which a theist and a nontheist appear to be having
the same experience-viewing the beautiful mountains-but
where only the theist forms the belief that God made them or that
they reveal the glory of God, it may appear that there is an experi
ential overlap. But I think this is not the case. Insofar as Alston's
suggestions go, it seems that there must be two separate experien
tial contents, for if the experiential contents were the same for both
theist and nontheist then the difference in beliefs would need to be
explained either by a difference in inference and explanation added
to the experience or by the nontheist's failure to have a theistic
conceptual or belief framework. An inferential addition is not al
lowed by Alston's own case; the objectification is to be immediate.
And the failure of the nontheist to have the theistic conceptual or
belief framework seems at best an unlikely explanation. Presum
ably both theist and nontheist take the mountains to be present in
Alston's objectification sense. Furthermore, it is unlikely that the
theist confuses the presence of mountains with the presence of
God. Even if the theist has some theistic conceptual or belief
framework the nontheist lacks, the theist needs some additional
(and different) content in her experience to objectify it legitimately
in theistic terms.It seems at least prima facie clear that the content
of the experience should be related to the content of the belief gen
erated. Just as I would deny , under normal circumstances, that
there is a tree in front of me while I am in a room with no view of
trees (i.e., while not having any experiences whose content in24. Ibid., pp. 107-8.
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eludes what I take to be a tree), so the theist should deny, under
normal circumstances, that she is in direct contact with God while
not having an experience the content of which she takes to be
theistic. The mere presence of mountains and a theistic framework
is not enough for the generation of a justified theistic belief.
Some comments from Perceiving God can help us here. Alston
writes:
What distinguishes perception from abstract thought is that the ob
ject is directly presented or immediately present to the subject so that
"indirect presentation" would be a contradiction in terms. To tease
out a concept of directness that has an opposite within the_ category
of presentation, let's go back to sense perception ....We can distin
guish directly seeing someone from seeing her in a mirror or on tele
vision. We have presentation on both sides of this distinction. Even
when I see someone in a mirror or on television, the person appears
to me as such-and-such, as smiling, tall, or smartly dressed. That
person can be identified with an item in my visual field.This con
trasts with the case in which I take something as a sign or indication
of X but do not see X itself (X does not appear anywhere within my
visual field), as when I take a vapor trail across the sky as an indica
tion that a jet plane has flown by. Here I don't see the plane at all;
nothing in my visual field looks like a plane. Let's call this latter
kind of case indirect perceptional recognition, and the former kind (see
ing someone on television) indirect perception. We can then say that
indirect is distinguished from direct perception of X by the fact that
in the former, but not in the latter, we perceive X by virtue of
perceiving something else, Y. In the indirect cases I see the person,
T, by virtue of seeing a mirror or the television screen or whatever.
On the other hand, when I see T face to face there is nothing else I
perceive by virtue of perceiving which I see T.25
Here Alston distinguishes between direct and indirect perception.
How do the two kinds of examples I noted from "Christian Expe
rience and Christian Belief' fit into the scheme from Perceiving
God? Alston says in Perceiving God that he once thought cases of
indirect perception and indirect perceptual recognition could not be
distinguished, as far as the object of the perception (or recognition)
was God. This indicates that when he wrote "Christian Experience
and Christian Belief' he meant to focus only on direct experiences.
25. Alston,

Perceiving God, pp. 2o-21.
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But Alston also tells us in the later work that some seminar stu
dents convinced him that, if God could appear to him as loving or
powerful or glorious when he is not sensorily aware of a field of
oats (or whatever), then God could appear to him as loving or
powerful or glorious when that comes through his sense percep
tion of the field of oats. Alston continues by noting that he has
nothing to say against this possibility.62
What is of importance here is that Alston now thinks that cases
in which God appears through something else, rather than directly,
can be classified as cases of indirect perception and need not be
classified as cases of indirect perceptual recognition. Nevertheless,
he makes it clear that his focus in Perceiving God is the possibility of
direct perception of God rather than the more complicated indirect
perception.His reason is that the former is a simpler phenomenon
than the later. Given this historical information, I believe it is safe
to suggest that Alston' s examples of experiencing God when hear
ing a friend' s voice or seeing a natural scene are best understood as
cases of indirect perception and that we are therefore right here to
understand Alston' s main concern to be the direct type of experi
ence of God. But we also learn that my way of passing over the
more complex cases of indirect perception of God may be too
easy. Perhaps there is something more going on in cases in which
one experiences God through hearing a friend' s voice or a beautiful
scene than some kind of inference or explanation added to the ex
perience.27
One way of spelling out Alston' s notion of direct experience
is the following.28 Suppose Alston is right and we do objectify
26. Ibid., p. 28.
27. I have more to say on this in Chapters 6 and 7, for I take Plantinga's exam
ples of experiencing God to be of this type, rather than the direct type. In short, I
attempt later to do some of the work on the more complex cases of indirect per
ception which are not Alston's focus.
28. Alston goes into some detail in accounting for various levels of immediacy
of perception in Perceiving God. He sums up his position by noting three grades of
immediacy: "(A) Absolute immediacy. One is aware of X but not through any
thing else, even a state of consciousness. (B) Mediated immediacy (direct percep
tion). One is aware of X through a state of consciousness that is distinguishable
from X, and can be made an object of absolutely immediate awareness, but is not
perceived. (C) Mediate perception. One is aware of X through the awareness of
another object of perception" (pp. 21-22). (A) is exemplified by awareness of a
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our experiences. He seems to have in mind a range of experience
united by some commonality; for example, in the physical object
case it is sensory experience that is common and, it seems, in the
theistic case the commonality is a sort of "theistic sense. " Although
Alston does not explicitly take note of it in "Christian Experience
and Christian Belief, " on analysis it appears that there is a kind of
link between sense perceptual experiences and physical object be
liefs, for example, between "I am appeared to treely" and "I see a
tree. " 92 This link need not and perhaps cannot be one of belief, at
least insofar as beliefs generate inferential beliefs, but there is a link
of the following sort. No one forming the belief "I see a tree"
would deny that she is being appeared to treely.The link is a sort
of linguistic or conceptual one.
Now, according to Alston's claims in "Experience of God: A
Perceptual Model" and in Perceiving God, the given in an experi
ence is not dependent on the perceiver's concepts or beliefs. Thus
caution is called for here. This linguistic-conceptual link to which I
am calling attention need not imply an antirealist theory of percep
tion or, for that matter, an antirealist metaphysic. Alston may be
right that in principle a tree may be present to me even if I do not
take it to be a tree, think of it as a tree, conceptualize it as a tree,
judge it to be a tree, or anything else of the sort.Nevertheless, it
seems true enough that, if I form the belief that I see a tree, I will
not deny that I am appeared to treely. 30 Thus, in distinguishing be
tween direct experiences and experiences of other kinds it is helpful
state of consciousness. (B) is exemplified by being aware of Reagan as he comes
within one's perceptual range. (C) is exemplified by being aware of Reagan's im
age on the television screen. I believe that what I have to say in the main text
provides one account of direct experience that could be spelled out in terms of
mediated immediacy or direct perception.
29. He does note the difficulty in specifying purely subjective experiences with
out reference to "schemes" in doing so; see "Christian Experience and Christian
Belief," p. 109.
30. A brief explanation of the terminology used in this context may be in order.
In this case, the "adverbial" construction is intended to call attention to the linguis
tic nature of the link without committing me to any existence claims. In its
broader use in epistemology, the point is to emphasize how I am appeared to rather
than how things appear to me; see Roderick Chisholm, Theory ofKnowledge, 2d ed.
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1977), pp. 29-30, for a more detailed ex
planation of this terminology.
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to note that one can appeal to the language used to describe the
content of direct experiences. 3 1 It is a language relying on the phys
ical object conceptual scheme itself. If I take myself to see a tree
and go on to describe the experience underlying the formation of
the corresponding belief ("I see a tree" ), I use language such as "I
am appeared to treely. " The description of the experience makes
covert reference to the tree or, to make the point more general, to
the physical object. Let us give this link the name "lingo-concep
tual link. "
Now, one might suggest that there need not be a lingo-concep
tual link. For example, the experience could be described in terms
of patches of greenishness falling into certain patterns or having a
certain shape. But this seems an unlikely account. Our experience
is gestaltlike and does not seem reducible to the more basic compo
nents. At least, when asked why one thinks she sees a tree the reply
is something like "I am appeared to treely" and the account is not
typically given further analysis.
If there is a range of experiences picked out by the terms "theis
tic experience" or "Christian experience" (understood as direct ex
perience), one might surmise that the existence of a similar link can
be discovered in theistic belief formation. When the belief "God
wants me to love people more fully" is formed, the description of
the experience underlying it would, one might expect, make co
vert reference to theistic language-"being appeared to theistically. "
Thus the range of experiences to which Alston can point, given the
objectification scheme he describes, seems not to overlap in con
tent with the experiences of the nontheist. 32 Alston' s suggestions
seem to rule out understanding his examples as allowing both the
ists and nontheists to have the same experiential content in their
3 r. This seems true enough for beliefs expressed by perceptual verbs. But what
of straight physical object beliefs that might, as Alston suggests, be based on expe
rience, for example, "Suzie's house needs painting"? The link here is perhaps not as
direct, but there still is one. If my belief that Suzie's house needs painting is based
in experience, I must be looking at (or have looked at) Suzie's house. So "Suzie's
house needs painting" is linked to "I see (saw) Suzie's house needing paint," which
in tum is linked to "I am (was) appeared to in a Suzie's house-needing-paint-like
manner."
32. Whether it is best to describe such experiences as one experience with two
contents or as two experiences, one of which occurs at the same time as the other,
is not important here.
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experiences. So the experiences objectified by theists into theistic
belief are experiences only the theist has- or, at least if had by a
nontheist, they are ignored, explained away, or otherwise not ob
jectified.

6.

A Challenge to the Alstonian Parity Thesis

Two sorts of questions can be distinguished in a consideration of
perception-like theistic experiences. The first is whether the experi
ence is veridical as opposed to hallucinatory. The second is what
the experience (whether veridical or hallucinatory) is an experience
of, what the object of the experience is. The second question is
relevant here.
In an essay on mysticism, J. William Forgie isolates the phenom
enological content of the experience from other background beliefs
and "items of knowledge" which he calls the "epistemic base. "
When seeking to identify a person one sees, he argues, one must
make reference to the epistemic base. For example, to identify the
young man next door when one knows that identical twins Tom
and Tim Tibbetts both live there, one must rely on other back
ground information such as the fact that Tom is out of town this
week. Since experiences of both Tom and Tim Tibbetts are phe
nomenologically the same, knowing Tom is out of town allows
one to identify this young man as Tim Tibbetts. Thus a purely
phenomenological description of the experience could not take the
form "It was an experience of Tim Tibbetts." Such a description
must rely on the epistemic base.There is nothing in the phenome
nological experience that guarantees that this is an experience of
Tim rather than Tom, "or for that matter any of a number of other
things- a third 'look-alike, ' an appropriately made-up dummy,
or even a cleverly devised hologram- an accurate perception of
which could be phenomenologically indistinguishable from the ex
perience in question. "33
To show that no experience can be phenomenologically an expe
rience of God-that is, to show that "it's of God" cannot be a true
phenomenological description of any experience-Forgie employs
33. J. William Forgie, "Theistic Experience and the Doctrine of Unanimity,"
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion I 5 (1984): 13-30, quotation p. 14.
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"divide and

conquer"

st rat eg y . "God "

either a (disguised) d e finit e d es cri pti on

can be understood to be
or a proper name:

If it is a proper name, then if an experience is to be phenome
nologically of God, the content of the experience must guarantee
that its object is a certain unique individual, the one named by
"God, " and not any other. It must not be possible, that is, for the
experience to constitute an accurate "perception" of some individual
other than God. . . . On the other hand, if "God" is a description,
meaning (let us suppose ) "the all-powerful, all-knowing, all-good
creator of the heavens and the earth, " then a theistic experience need
only be phenomenologically of some individual or other-it doesn't
matter which one-who satisfies that description. In this case it is
required only that it not be possible that the experience constitute an
accurate perception of something that fails to satisfy the description. 34

The first option, taking "God" to be a proper name, d oes not
provid e an account of how one could have a phenomenological
experien ce that guarantees that it is an experi ence of God. For such
a guarantee to be possible, one would have to i denti fy the object of
the experienc e as having what Forgie calls a "uniquely instantiable
property [UIP]." The only likely candidates for such pro pe rt i es are
those such as "being Socrates" or, in the t heis tic cas e, "bei ng
God. " But neither of thes e properties is giv en as part of a phenom
enol ogi cal e xpe rien ce itself, just as it is not given in the experi ence
of the young man next door that he is Tim rather than Tom Tib
bet ts. F orgie says that the point about sense experien ce can be put
in two ways:
(r) At best sense experiences are phenomenologically of things
that appear in a certain way, but since properties of the form "being
something that looks (sounds, feels, etc. )-or is capable of looking
(etc. )-this way" are not UIPs, sense experiences are not phenome
nologically of individuals.
(2) If a sense experience is to be phenomenologically of an indi
vidual, it is not enough that that individual have a UIP. It must have
a UIP of the form "being something which appears-or which is
capable of appearing-in a certain way. " It is because no object of
sense experience seems to have a UIP of that form that no sense
experience is phenomenologically of an individual.
34. Ibid., p. 16.
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Forgie admits that if mystical (theistic) experiences are radically un
like perceptual experiences then perhaps his argument is not rele
vant. Nevertheless, insofar as the analogy is accurate his point
seems to stand. Forgie also admits that he cannot provide an argu
ment to conclude that there are no UIPs of the sort in question.
Nevertheless, it seems at least unlikely that such UIPs are in the
offing given the following intuition: for any allegedly phenome
nological experience of God, there is a possible world in which
"the causal laws pertaining to the relations between possible objects
of 'perception' and the 'perceivers' of those objects are such that
some individual, not identical to God, is capable of appearing in
just the way displayed in the experience in question." In short, if
"God" is a proper name, then experiences that phenomenologically
guarantee that their object is God are not possible.35
The second possibility, taking "God" to be a disguised definite
description, fares no better. What is needed here for a phenome
nological experience to guarantee itself as an experience of God is
not that it be an experience of an individual but only that it be of
something having certain properties. In God' s case the properties
could be all-knowing, all-powerful, and so forth. Forgie first
makes the Humean observation that causation, whether of one
event causing another or of some agent causing some event or
some substance, is not phenomenologically in the experience. If
this is true, then there are difficulties with the suggestion that any
one could recognize something as having certain properties having
to do with powers or beliefs- all-powerful, all-knowing, and so
forth. Whether the properties have to do with powers or belief,
ultimately one's recognition of them depends on recognition of
causal relations:
The best candidate for an experience which is phenomenologically
of something having certain powers and beliefs is one which is phe
nomenologically of something manifesting those powers or expres
sing those beliefs.I f there can be no experience which is phenome
nologically of some power, or some belief, by itself, ... perhaps an
experience can be phenomenologically of something manifesting a
power or expressing a belief. I f so, then an experience itself could
guarantee that its object is something manifesting, and hence pos
-

35. Ibid., p. r8.
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sessing, that power, and also something expressing, and so having,
that belief. But here is where the earlier point about causation is
important. If causation is not phenomenologically presentable then
neither is agency. If some agent is manifesting a power or expres
sing a belief, that agent is causing something to happen, producing
some state of affairs. But if no experience is phenomenologically of
someone's causing or producing a state of affairs (as opposed to that
state of affairs simply co-existing with the agent or coming into
existence while the agent is present ), then no experience will be phe
nomenologically of someone manifesting a power or expressing a
belief. So the best candidate for an experience which is phenome
nologically of something having certain powers or beliefs turns out
not to be up to the job.36

ge ne ra l poi nt is tha t there i s nothi ng i n the phenomenologi ca l
the experience a lone tha t enti tles the perceiver to clai m
tha t i t i s an e xpe rien ce of God, whether "God" i s understood to be
a di sgui sed defini te descri pti on or a proper na me .
Ba sed on the kinds of suggesti on s Forgi e makes, I propose the
followi ng ch a llen ge to PTA. PP a nd CP do not ha ve the sa me
strength of e pi ste mic justi fica ti on, si nce CP, unlike PP, requi res
a role for ba ckground beliefs for the gen era tio n a nd jus ti fica ti on
of i ts delivera nces. Thi s specia l role for CP' s ba ckground beli efs
wea kens the level of strength of justi fica tion for CP-genera ted be
li efs. Thi s is not to say tha t beli efs deli vered by CP a re not justi
fied, nor even tha t they a re not Jn · Nevert he les s they a re not as
st ro ngly justified a s PP-deli vered beli efs. Ca ll thi s the "ba ckground
be lief ch a llen ge . "
Thi s ch a llen ge suggests tha t, i nsofa r a s Alston mea ns for his a c
count of belief forma ti on to be a n a ccount of noninferentia l belief
forma ti on in vol vin g only a n objecti fica ti on of e xperien ce, then
perha ps there i s a need for more cla ri ty a bout the noti ons of "non
inferential" and "objecti fica tion" to whi ch Alston a ppea ls . Thei sti c
beli efs a ppea r to depend i n some wa y o n a set of ba ckground be
liefs. The ba ckground belief cha llenge suggests tha t any ti me one
forms a G ustified ) belief a bout a n i ndivi dua l qua epistemi ca lly i den
tifia ble i ndi vi dua l (as well, I thi nk, a s about a n i ndi vi dua l' s a ction
qua uniquely a ttri buta ble to tha t i ndivi dua l), the belief is inferentia l
or i nterpretive; or a t lea st, i f noni nferentia l, i t relies in some epi The

aspect of

,

36. Ibid., pp. 20-2 1 .
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stemical ly significant way on backgrou nd beliefs as opposed to re
ly ing merely on the application of a conceptu al scheme. 37 I argu e
below that some of ou r doxastic practices do indeed involve an
epistemically significant place for backgrou nd beliefs, bu t where
the backgrou nd beliefs do not form an inferential basis for the be
lief generated.
A second issu e arises in connection with the backgrou nd belief
challenge. Let u s grant that CP does involve backgrou nd beliefs. Is
the same not tru e for the generation of PP beliefs? And if so, are
not the teeth of the challenge removed? Alston himself presents
several way s in which backgrou nd beliefs may enter into PP. I
argu e in Chapter 3 that there is a special position for backgrou nd
beliefs in CP that PP does not requ ire, thu s defending the chal
lenge. Bu t first there are distinctions and observations to be made.
In most of ou r waking hou rs, we find ou rselves engaged in PP.
The beliefs it generates tou ch mu ch of what we believe in general
and virtu ally all we believe abou t the phy sical world and its fu rni
tu re. PP delivers beliefs abou t all kinds of phy sical objects: hou ses,
rocks, trees, elephants, cars, onions, compu ters, and sweet pota
toes, to name only a minu scu le nu mber. It also delivers beliefs
abou t particu lar hou ses, rocks, trees, elephants, cars, onions, and
sweet potatoes. In many cases, the beliefs generated by PP come
and go, and the objects we form beliefs abou t are not important
enou gh for u s to name or otherwise identify so as to be able to
reidentify them. For example, if I am in a new city , being driven
throu gh its streets, PP may lead me to believe all sorts of things
abou t the new phy sical environment in which I find my self. For
the most part, however, I do not pay enou gh attention so that later
I might be able to sort ou t one hou se from another, as far as my
beliefs abou t them are concerned. Unless, in short, there is some
thing spectacu lar abou t a given phy sical scene or u nless I have
some specifi c reason or need to remember information abou t a
given bit of the phy sical environment, I simply do not form beliefs
abou t objects which are focu sed on allowing me to reidentify the
object. Still, I may be forming many beliefs via PP as I drive
37· Alston himself allows for the possibility of mediate or indirect justification
of beliefs by their relation to other beliefs. And not all these need be inferential. See
"Concepts of Epistemic Justification," p. 101.
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aroun d the city, an d these beliefs classify the objects of my experi
en ce in to kin ds of thin gs with certain properties n ot shared with
any others.
What I wish to emphasize is n ot the classificatory type of belief
just n oted but what I call "epistemically un ique in dividual beliefs"
(where it is the object of the belief that is in dividual, n ot the be
liefs). I mean by the term "epistemically un ique in dividual" n ot
simply on e of a kin d but on e of a kin d with certain un shared prop
erties an d iden tifiable an d r eiden tifiable as such. CP delivers beliefs
about such an object.The focus of CP is on ly on e kin d of thin g, a
divin e en tity.An d CP delivers beliefs about the on ly member of its
kin d, God.38 (Note the pr omin en t place of discussion of proper
n ames an d defin ite description s in Forgie' s argumen t.) The central
ity in CP of a un ique in dividual who is (taken to be) iden tifiable
an d reidentifiable is d ear. But n ot on ly is he cen tral, the en tire
epistemic practice is oriented toward formin g beliefs about this sin 
gle in dividuaP9
This is quite differen t from PP, where beliefs are gen erated
willy-nilly about coun tless thin gs (an d even countless kin ds of
thin gs), man y of which we do n ot bother to iden tify as the un ique
in dividuals they are but rather on ly classify as members of a certain
kin d. Contrast "I see the white rock n ext to the oak in my fron t
yard" with "I see a rock." The latter can be un derstood merely to
classify the object of my experien ce as bein g a member of a certain
kin d or, in so doin g, to attribute certain properties to the object.
The former picks out the object of my experience as the in dividual
rock it is-the white on e beside the oak in my fron t yard. Pre
sumably, beliefs gen erated by CP are closer to the latter than to the
former, that is, closer to epistemically un ique in dividual beliefs
than to classificatory beliefs. On e reason for this may simply be
that there is on ly on e divin e in dividual, God.40
38. God may not be the member of a kind; if he is not, then CP does not deliver
beliefs about any kind of thing, but about a very special thing.
39. This is not to say that no other individual would ever play a role in CP. I
might sense that God wants me to love my wife more, for example. The point is
that God is the focal point of CP.
40. Even in classificatory beliefs one is classifying a unique individual as a rock,
tree, or something else. But the point is the focus or emphasis of the beliefs con
tent, not simply the object of the belie£
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There i s much more to say about thi s di fference between PP and
CP, but for now we can mer ely i ntroduce the i ssues that ar e the
focus not only of the di scussi on of PTA but of the challenge to
Refor med epi stemology's emphasis on pari ty i n gener al. The dif
fer ence between CP and PP is that the for mer i s solely ori ented
towar d beliefs about an epi stemi cally unique i ndi vi dual, the latter
i s not so ori ented. This di ffer ence requir es, i n tur n, a speci al epi
stemi c r ole (yet to be fully speci fied) for backgr ound beliefs i n the
gener ati on of CP's deliverances.Thi s speci al place for background
beli efs i s absent i n the gener ati on of a good many, if not all, of
PP's deli verances. D o backgr ound beli efs have a speci al positi on i n
CP that they do not have i n PP, and i f so, i s thi s posi ti on epi
stemi cally i mportant? I tackle these questi ons i n r ever se or der,
postponi ng a full i nquir y into the for mer question unti l the next
chapter.For now, let me assume an affir mati ve answer to the fir st
questi on and go on to di scuss an answer to the second.
Let us assume that PP and CP differ on the place of backgr ound
beliefs i n the gener ati on of G usti fied) beli efs.As a preli mi nary r un
towar d getti ng at the suspi ci on that the di fferi ng r oles of back
gr ound beliefs ar e epi stemi cally i mpor tant, let us di sti ngui sh be
tween thr ee ki nds of belief for mati on. The fir st i s that of Alston's
objecti ficati on; these beli efs ar e the result of a li ngo-conceptual
scheme alone being applied noni nfer enti ally to experi ence. Let us
call these "conceptual-r eadi ng beli efs" and their correspondi ng
pr acti ces "conceptual-reading practi ces. " The second ki nd ar e those
beliefs for med i nferenti ally; these beli efs ar e the result of consci ous,
di scur si ve (deducti ve, i nductive, or i nter pretive) reasoni ng.Let us
call these "i nferenti al beliefs" and their correspondi ng practi ces "i n
ferenti al pr acti ces. " The third ki nd i s noni nferenti al but where
somethi ng more than concepts ar e appli ed to experi ence; concepts
and substanti ve beliefs ar e appli ed, albei t noni nferenti ally, to expe
rience. One's epi stemi c base includes backgr ound i nfor mati on (i n
the for m of beli efs) that i s used, along wi th concepts, to generate
beli efs. Let us call these "noni nferenti al medi ated beli efs" and the
corr espondi ng pr actices "noni nferenti al medi ated pr acti ces. "
Although we can allow that all these modes of belief gener ati on
can pr ovi de us wi th justified beliefs, i t mi ght still be the case that
conceptual-r eadi ng beli efs have a pri vi leged posi ti on. We are, in
fact, attracted to these noni nferenti al, merely conceptually read be-
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l iefs. We give them a special place in our epistemic hierarchies. The
reason for this is a kind of Cartesian worry about inferences or
interpretations. Conceptual -reading bel iefs simpl y have the l east
chance of going astray. In cases of inference, the l onger and more
compl icated the reasoning, the more l ikel y one is l ed down the
epistemic garden path. One thus suspects that, even where the rea
soning is not inferential or even conscious, the more compl icated
the intell ectual moves, the more l ikel y one is to go astray. Further
more, the bel iefs required for the inferences and interpretations of
ten, perhaps al ways, themselves need justification. Shoul d we not
suspect that any bel iefs required for Al ston' s CP objectifications
al so need to be justified (or have justification), whereas our basic
conceptual schemes, as used in PP, do not? What then of the non
inferential mediated bel iefs? I suspect that these are in a sort of
hal fway house between conceptual-reading and inferential bel iefs.
The epistemic justification for noninferential mediated beliefs, al 
though not as strong as the justification for conceptual -reading be
liefs, is not as weak as the justification for inferential bel iefs. N one
of this is to say that any of these three kinds of bel ief is not justi
fi ed; it is onl y to note a ranking of strengths of justification.
According to Al ston, the objectification of perceptual experience
via a conceptual scheme does not invol ve discursive reasoning, ex
pl anation, interpretation, or any appeal to background bel iefs, at
l east in a l arge number of cases. In contrast to this, as I argue l ater
(see Chapter 3 , Section 2), forming bel iefs about Tom and Tim
Tibbetts or God always invol ves at least a noninferential role for
background bel iefs. The l atter seem to be, once again (see Chapter
8, Section 1), at l east sl ightl y l ess high on the epistemic l adder than
the former, and bel iefs about epistemically unique individuals (at
l east where these do not derive from PP)41 therefore do not appear
to have the same epistemic status as bel iefs formed via Alston's
objectification. According to PTA the two kinds of bel iefs (percep
tual and theistic), given appropriate circumstances, not onl y have
the same kind of epistemic justification but also the same l evel or
strength of that kind. It seems that the justification attached to con
ceptual -reading bel iefs may be (sl ightl y) stronger than that attached
41. PP can give us beliefs about epistemically unique individuals, but these do
not require background beliefs. At least that is what I argue in Chapter J.
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to noninferential mediated beliefs. But then, if PP prov ides a non
inferential conceptual reading of experience whereas CP does not,
then CP and PP do not share the same epistemic lev el.And this is
true ev en if they share the same kind of justification, namely, Jn·
Ev en granting this initial description of the two kinds of case, is
this argument not just a quibble ov er matters of little significance?
Perhaps beliefs deliv ered v ia noninferential mediated belief genera
tion are, for all intents and purposes, Jnw · Since Jnw merely de
mands that there not be reasons to reject the epistemic practice as
unreliable, discov ering that a practice appeals to background beliefs
does not show that the practice is not Jnw· T he definition of Jnw
simply makes no reference to how the practices work. Perhaps by
the letter of the law Alston is correct and PTA is true. Nev erthe
less, the distinctions noted here seem to indicate some need for a
more finely tuned notion of Jnw and the parity thesis in which it is
embedded. Are there not further gradations of justification within
the weak v ersion ofJn? And do these not rely on the internal work
ings of the practices? Alston himself hints at such a possibility
when he admits that features 1-4 (those attached to PP but not to
CP) are "desiderata for an epistemic practice. If we were shaping
the world to our heart' s desire, I dare say that we would arrange
for our practices to exhibit these features. . . . T hings go more
smoothly, more satisfyingly, from a cognitiv e point of v iew where
these features are exhibited. Since PP possesses these v irtues and
CP does not, the former is, to that extent and in that way, superior
from a cognitiv e point of view."42
T his cognitiv e superiority does not push PP beyond Jnw· Neither
does CP' s lack of it keep CP from being Jnw · In fact, after this
suggestion Alston goes on to argue that the features that generate
or allow for this cognitiv e superiority are not necessary for re
liability. But surely Alston' s comment indicates the possibility of
some ranking within Jnw · Within this possibility it is natural to
suggest that noninferential mediated practices do not share the
same strength as conceptual-reading practices, at least, one can say,
from a cognitiv e point of v iew. T hus, although PTA is true as a
general claim, further refinement indicates a ranking within Jnw by
which CP turns out to be less attractiv e than PP. Is this lack of
42. Alston, "Christian Experience and Christian Belief," pp. 123-24.
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attractiveness more than a cognitive issu e? Is it an epis temic one? I
have sugges ted an intu itive cas e for its being epis temic bu t have
not dev eloped the idea fu lly. Let me s imply s tate here that I believe
the issu e is an epis temic one becaus e the backgrou nd beliefs need
jus tifi cation.
The issu e of whether backgrou nd beliefs need jus tification is an
important one, bu t I pos tpone a dis cuss ion of it, and s ome fu rther
refinements of the notions of conceptu al-reading and noninferential
mediated practices and beliefs , u ntil Chapters 6 and 7· For now,
assu ming that that promiss ory note is su ccess fu lly paid, and that
PP and CP do in fact differ on the role of backgrou nd beliefs , we
can su gges t that PTA is , s trictly s peaking, fals e, for there are cogni
tive and epis temic rankings within Jnw that PTA does not recog
nize. In the next chapter I argu e that PP and CP do differ on the
role of backgrou nd beliefs .

[

3

]

The Role of Background Beliefs

The background belief challenge to PTA is that, whereas CP in
volves an epistemically important position for background beliefs,
PP does not, and therefore PTA is false. I have two goals for this
chapter. The first is to explore the role of background beliefs in PP
and CP and, by doing so, to defend the background belief chal
lenge. Second, I consider two possible rejoinders Alston might
make to the challenge and argue that neither is successful.
I.

Alston on Background Beliefs in Perceptual
Practice

Is the working assumption of the last section in Chapter 2 cor
rect; do PP and CP differ on whether background beliefs enter into
the generation and justification of beliefs? It would be neat and tidy
if one could simply say that CP does involve background beliefs
whereas PP does not. But philosophy is rarely neat and tidy.
In Perceiving God, Alston's central thesis is that "putative direct
awareness of God can provide justification for certain kinds of be
liefs about God. " 1 One might thus surmise that Alston defends a
parity thesis in this work. He does not, however, but not for the
1. Alston, Perceiving God,

p. 9.
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kinds of reasons I have been suggesting. Alston argues there that
background beliefs sometimes enter into sense perceptual belief
formation, and that they do in several different ways. The same is
true, he says, for CP (or, as he names it there, mystical percep
tion). He suggests that one belief can be partly mediately based and
partly immediately based. He raises the question whether any be
lief is ever strictly immediately based, that is, justified on the basis
of experience alone. His reply is affirmative, but he does recognize
that sometimes, at least, background beliefs also have a function.
He considers three different kinds of beliefs that might play a role
and suggests several ways their functions differ from one another.
Overall, however, he wants to suggest that, although background
beliefs may play a role, it happens far less frequently than is some
times thought and, most important for the thesis that one can per
ceive God, background beliefs need not have a place at all. If Al
ston is right, then as far as PTA is concerned the background belief
challenge fails. But I believe the challenge does not fail, so I also
believe that Alston is not right about the significance of back
ground beliefs in CP and PP.
I noted above that Alston does not defend a parity thesis in Per
ceiving God. He does not do so, for he now thinks that PP and CP
differ because CP runs into problems with religious plurality (as
well as a lesser problem with checking procedures). I return to
Alston's discussion of these in Chapter 8. Our immediate concern
is background beliefs. Nevertheless, if it turns out that Alston is
wrong about the function of background beliefs in CP, that is, if it
turns out that there is a special role for background beliefs in CP
which is absent in PP, then he has one more reason to reject a
parity thesis between PP and CP.
Is there, then, a special role for background beliefs in CP? To
answer this question, we need to consider Alston's position on
background beliefs in PP. He quickly deals first with what he calls
"perceptual cues. " Psychology teaches us that several factors are
involved in the way things appear to us. It is not implausible to
suppose that our psyches take certain cues into account in the for
mation of perceptual beliefs. But it is equally obvious that most of
us are completely, or almost completely, unaware of taking such
factors into account. Still, it is sometimes suggested that, for
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example, "perceptual beliefs Gudgments) of distance are based on
cognitions of factors of the sort just mentioned. "2
How do beliefs about these cues function in the formation and
justification of perceptual beliefs? There are three positions taken
on this. One is that an inference (albeit unconscious) takes place. A
second suggests that the workings are completely causal and not
doxastic. The third falls in between, with the suggestion that there
is a kind of "subdoxastic" taking account of the cues. Alston sim
ply notes, and rightly so I think, that if there are beliefs involved in
such cases they are involved in "a maximally hidden way. " It is,
therefore, difficult to find sufficient reasons to suppose that such
background information is epistemically important.
Alston's second suggestion deals with what he calls "adequacy
assumptions. " His concern is the attribution of nonsimple sensory
predicates to external objects. We make such attributions on the
basis of sense experience, and when we do we are assuming that a
certain pattern of sensory qualities (difficult to describe in detail) is
a reliable indicator of the predicate's applicability. Alston calls such
assumptions "adequacy assumptions (or beliefs). " He writes:
When I take it that X is a house, or your house, or a chair, or the
chair we just bought, or a copy of Process and Reality, or a wave, or
Coit Tower, or my wife, or a primrose, I am, in effect, supposing
that the particular pattern of sensory qualiaX is presenting to me at
that moment is, at least in those circumstances, a reliable indication
ofX's being a house, or your house, or a chair. That being the case,
am I not basing my belief not just on the sensory appearance of X
but also on my belief that a sensory appearance of that sort is a
reliable indication that what is appearing is a house. . . ? Isn't every
case of nonsimple sensory-predicate attribution subject to evalua
tion, at least in part, in terms of mediate justification?'

Furthermore, although our paradigm case of a belief being based
on another is the conscious inference, we must, says Alston, recog
nize other cases in which no conscious inference is involved. For
example, one's belief that Frank is out of town might be based on
one's being told that he is, even though one never infers the former
2. Ibid.,

p. 83.
J. Ibid., p. 84.
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from the latter. Given this broader understanding of the "based
on" relationship, could it be that all our attributions of nonsimple
sensory predicates rely, although not consciously so, on adequacy
assumptions? Even if there are unconscious bases for beliefs, says
Alston, the following two observations still carry a strong negative
presumption against adequacy assumptions being part of the basis.
The first is that perceivers are typically not aware of adequacy as
sumptions being part of the basis for perceptual beliefs. The second
is that in many cases they are not the sorts of things to which one
has access.
The stronger case against adequacy assumptions being part of
the basis is that there is a level confusion lurking in the neighbor
hood. To be justified in an attribution of nonsimple sensory predi
cates one need not be justified in believing the adequacy assump
tions that support the predication. The assumption need only be
true. 4 It is simply not true that "what it takes for a condition, C, to
be sufficient for P (call this 'what it takes' 'A') must itself be part of
any sufficient condition for P. The fallacy is immediately evident
once we see that if A is satisfied, then, by the very terms of the
example, C is sufficient for P by itself, and A need not be added to
it to get sufficiency. "5 Alston's point is not that adequacy beliefs
never play a role in the justification of perceptual beliefs but simply
that they ne�d not do so.
The third kind of belief that can be relevant in perceptual belief
formation Alston calls "contextual beliefs. " There are three types
of contextual beliefs: beliefs about the setting, beliefs about posi
tion, and beliefs about normality. The first of these deals with spa
tiotemporal issues. Many houses look alike, and my knowing I am
on Elm Street, rather than some other, may be a factor in my
identifying the house that is the object of my experience. Beliefs
about position are concerned with angle of view, distance from the
observer, and state of the medium. Finally, Alston explains beliefs
about normality by example. Suppose that I thought people, trees,
dogs, and tables were constantly annihilated but replaced with ex
act replicas. This would lead me to form somewhat different be4· There is much to be said about and for Alston's concern with level confu
sions. I return to this theme in the next chapter.

5· Alston, Perceiving God, p. 86.
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liefs on the basis of the sensory array that meets me each day. Do I
thus have, contrary to the supposition, an assumption about the
relative constancy and permanence of physical substances as part of
the basis for my normal perceptual beliefs? Such an assumption
Alston calls a "normality assumption. "
In the position and normality cases, says Alston, we are not
aware of background beliefs, if we have them, at least in the ma
jority of cases. And if such beliefs do play a role it is not required
that they be part of the basis but only that they be true, just as with
adequacy assumptions. But Alston admits that the case for situa
tional beliefs being part of the basis for perceptual beliefs is stron
ger. In many cases one's location does seem important. For exam
ple, in identifying the large body of water to the west as the Pacific
Ocean, one's being in California seems to be significant. But Al
ston thinks this is not the normal case. "Even if just after forming
the belief ["Those buildings are the World Trade Center"], I reflect
that if I hadn't known I was in New York City I wouldn't have
judged those buildings to be the World Trade Center, it doesn't
follow that being in New York City was part of my basis for the
belief. "6 Other options are possible, including that the reflection in
question calls attention to what would be required for the ade
quacy of the basis, rather than its being part of the basis itself. So,
although situational beliefs may sometimes have a part in the justi
fication of other beliefs, they need not do so in every case.
But the situation is different with contextual beliefs than with
adequacy beliefs:
Here the adequacy assumption is not that the sensory pattern, A, is
generally indicative of the presence of a 0. It is rather that, given an
underlying supposition that A is an adequate basis for an attribution
of 0 only in certain circumstances rather than others, the belief in
question is that the present circumstances are of the former sort.
That gives the belief a greater claim to be considered part of the
basis, for it does indicate something distinctive about this situation
rather than just amounting to a blanket approval of the phenomenal
objective connection. But, by the same token, it offers us a different
kind of alternative to holding that it must form part of the basis.
Remember the point that the justification of perceptual beliefs is al

6. Ibid. , p. 90.

Rationality and Theistic Belief

44]

ways prima facie, subject to being overridden by sufficient indica
tions to the contrary. This gives us another way in which a belief
can be relevant to the justification of another belief. It can be nega
tively relevant by constituting an (actual or possible) overrider or by
ruling out such. 7

Thus the suspicion that such background beliefs are relevant to the
justification of other beliefs is explicable not in terms of their being
required as part of the basis itself but as actually or possibly over
riding the basis or by ruling out overriders.
Alston takes himself to have dealt with both the subject and
predicate components of perceptual beliefs: "In both cases we have
argued that the justification might be either purely immediate or
partly mediate. As for the former, we have suggested that I might
both be able to justifiably take the perceived object to be your
house and be able to justifiably believe of it that it is shingled, just
on the basis of the way it looks. In both cases background beliefs
would normally be playing some role, even if they are not part of
the basis. " Alston goes on to suggest that there may be concern
that object identification poses greater difficulty for immediate jus
tification than does property attribution. He believes, however,
that this concern is unfounded. Object identifications do not pose
greater difficulty, since one can think of object identification in
terms of identifying the subject as one that bears certain properties.
Furthermore, any property that can figure in subject identification
can also figure as a predicate. "Instead of forming the belief that
your house needs painting, I could form the belief that that is your
house, or that that building that needs painting is your house. "8
There may, however, be a difference in degree in the possibility
of purely immediate justification for subject and predicate attribu
tion. "An indefinitely large plurality of unique individuals is out
there to be recognized, whereas there are comparatively few prop
erties we have any real need to distinguish. Hence it is more feasi
ble for us to store relatively fixed ways of recognizing properties
by their appearance than to build up comparably direct ways of
recognizing individuals. "9 This, Alston claims, suggests that in rec7· Ibid.
8. Ibid., pp.

9. Ibid.,

p.

91-92.
92.
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ognizing individuals we usually store up ways of perceptually rec
ognizing distinguishing properties of them and then use what we
have stored to recognize the individuals. We typically do not do
this in cases of property recognition. He says, however, that this is
only a difference of degree. We can and do, he continues, identify
individuals directly from their sensory appearance and sometimes
do recognize properties on the basis of others.
Finally, there is a way in which beliefs attributing certain proper
ties to a perceived object can play a role in the generation and justi
fication of an identificatory belief but not be part of the basis of it.
The belief that so-and-so is round-faced and slightly bent over may
have as its basis a certain look, and that look may be sufficient not
only for the property attribution but also for the subject identifica
tion. In fact, the look by which one identifies so-and-so may be
sufficient for the subject identification only because it is also suffi
cient for the attribution of the property. But one need not have
made the attribution in order to have made the identification.
Thus, concludes Alston, although background beliefs can and
sometimes do function in the justification of PP-delivered beliefs,
they need not do so. Furthermore, it happens less frequently then
is sometimes thought. When it does happen, background beliefs
typically function not as part of the basis itself but in such a way
that their truth is either required for the adequacy of the justifica
tion or is negatively relevant, that is, as potential or actual over
riders.
2.

Christian Practice and Background Beliefs

Alston goes on to suggest that many of the roles background
beliefs play in PP are alive in CP as well. Still, says Alston, it is
important to be clear that, even though background beliefs are
sometimes relevant in the justification of perceptually generated
theistic beliefs, it remains possible that God appears to one as being
0 and, if he does, and that is the whole story, one is immediately
justified in the belief that God is 0. This point is essential for his
thesis in Perceiving God-that direct awareness of God can provide
justification for beliefs about God.
Beyond this, however, beliefs generated by CP may be partly
mediately justified. Just as with PP, adequacy beliefs may be oper-
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ating. In fact, in many accounts of mystical belief formation (that
Alston cites), the predicates applied to God in perceptually gener
ated beliefs go beyond what is explicitly given in the experience. 10
Although positional and situational considerations have limited sig
nificance in CP, since God is not spatially located, normality as
sumptions can come in. One might suspect that one's supposed
experience of God is being artificially induced, or the work of the
devil, or caused by a nervous imbalance. But, on the other hand,
there are some consequences of theistic experience that can indicate
that the belief formation is a normal one. Spiritual and moral
fruits, for example, might show the justificatory efficacy of theistic
experience. Alston also admits that theological or metaphysical
background beliefs can have parts in belief formation and justifica
tion. In none of these cases, however, as with PP and its back
ground beliefs, do these background beliefs have to be part of the
basis, even though they may play epistemically related roles of the
kinds noted.
So, to answer the question with which this chapter began-do
CP and PP differ on the role of background beliefs?-Alston gives
a definite negative reply. Both PP and CP may sometimes have
background beliefs as part of their bases, but they nee� not do so.
If Alston is correct, then, as far as the argument of the previous
chapter goes, even if there are background beliefs involved in CP,
they are not epistemically important as far as distinguishing the
deliverances of CP and PP are concerned. Since in neither case do
background beliefs need to form part of the epistemic basis of the
beliefs generated, it seems one cannot suggest that the deliverances
of CP differ from those of PP in terms of the strength of their
justification because of their background beliefs.
I find myself in disagreement with Alston on this point. Al
though I think a great deal of what he says about the function of
background beliefs is correct, I believe he overlooks some impor
tant features of belief formations dealing with epistemically unique
individuals.
To deal with the suggestion that it is not possible to recognize
directly something one experiences as God, Alston writes:

10. Ibid., pp. 12-20.
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We should not suppose that in order to succeed in perceptually rec
ognizing an object of perception as X (i.e., become perceptually jus
tified in believing, or perceptually know, that the object is X), it is
necessary that the object appears to one as Ill, where Ill is a property
uniquely possessed by X. To perceptually recognize your house, it
is not necessary that the object even display features that are in fact
only possessed by your house, much less features that only your
house could possess. It is enough that the object present to my expe
rience features that, in this situation or in situations in which I gen
erally find myself, are sufficiently indicative of (are a reliable guide
to) the object's being your house. And so it is here. For me to rec
ognize what I am aware of (X) as God, all that is necessary is that X
present to me features that are in fact a reliable indication of their
possessor's being God, at least in situations of the sort in which I
typically find myself. It is, again, not required that these features
attach only to God, still less that they be such that they can attach
only to God. And it is a matter for detailed investigation what sorts
of appearances satisfy that condition, just as in the case of sensorily
perceived objects.11

Alston takes these suggestions to reply to questions such as how
could a nythin g of which I am directly aware uniquely identify the
creator of heaven and earth, an absolutely perfect being of infinite
power and goodness. Such is the kind of question behind the back
ground belief challe ng e to PTA. The challeng e's reply is that one
cannot d irectly experience X as be ing God, since there are no
properties that are both unique to God and capa ble of bein g experi
enced by us. The challenge's position explicitly denies the point
Alston makes. Which is right?
I believe the challenge is closer to the truth. We can get at the
issue here by considering a phrase in Alston's own denial, just
quoted. "It is en ou gh, says Alston, "that the object present to my
experience features that, in this situation or in situations in which I
generally find myself, a re sufficiently indicative of . . . the object's
being your house. " Or, in the case of God, "all that is necessary is
that X present to me features that are in fact a reliable indication of
their possessor's being God, at least in situations ofthe sort in which I
typically find myself." What are these situations? What are the fea
tures that can be sufficiently indicative of the object in question?
"

I I. Ibid.'

pp. 96-97-
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And, furthermore, what connection is there between the situations
and the features?
Let us take PP first. Earlier I suggested that PP gives us both
epistemically unique individual beliefs and classificatory beliefs.
But the two are not unrelated. The very means by which we clas
sify or categorize things-their properties-are also the means by
which we identify them. Alston suggests that there need not be a
unique feature attached to an object by which the object can be
identified. But he does not, I believe, distinguish carefully enough
between what we can call kind features and unique features. Sure,
Suzie's house may share kind features with other houses; they
might have the same floor plan, be the same color, and have the
windows placed in the same locations. But the use of the word
"same" here is not, obviously, intended to pick out features at the
numerically same position. The houses share the features "having
such-and-such floor plan, " "being pink, " and "having windows in
the living room, kitchen, and bedrooms. " But the houses them
selves occupy different spatial locations. What distinguishes the
houses in fact are not the kind features-features many houses
might share-but the unique features which, I suggest, turn out to
be made up of a group of features best understood as a collection
of kind features located at a specific spatiotemporal point. Suzie's
house does have a unique property: the property of "being a pink,
shuttered, . . . bungalow at Fourth and Main. " Thus, not only do
kind features distinguish houses from trees, rocks, and elephants,
as well as one kind of house from another, but those very same
features, located at a spatiotemporal point, are what make this
house the unique one it is.
But Alston does not deny this. He only denies that it is necessary
that the house display such a unique feature. Let us call the collection
of kind features located at a spatiotemporal point the "collective
feature. " Now the question is, does one experience the collective
feature that distinguishes Suzie's house from all others? Alston sep
arates the situation or location information from what is experi
enced when perceiving Suzie's house. Perhaps this is right. Perhaps
it is right because one cannot typically experience, on the basis of
phenomena alone, being in New York or California. 12 But that
12. It may be possible to get this kind of belief out of experience alone. P erhaps
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suggests that this information at best functions in the form of
background beliefs; it is information brought to the experience and
not given in it. But then Alston can admit this and say the role this
information plays is that of the potential or actual overrider rather
than part of the basis for the belief.
I believe, however, that it is a mistake to separate the situational
information from the other features of the experience. It seems to
me that the location information is not part of the belief system
I have when I form the belief (on perception alone) that this is
Suzie's house. Rather, it is part of the conceptual scheme I bring to
the experience. I objectify the experience as Suzie's house-the
pink, shuttered bungalow at Fourth and Main. At least this is true
for what we might call "local situation information, " that is, spatial
information that picks out where I am vis-a-vis the local geogra
phy (this neighborhood or that street) rather than the larger geog
raphy (such as New York City or California). That I am located in
New York or California does seem to be part of my belief system,
and when the generation of one of my beliefs requires that sort of
information then clearly the belief generated is at least partly medi
ate. But that I am in one neighborhood rather than another, on one
street rather than another, is given directly in experience and thus
the identification of Suzie's house is read off the experience rather
than into it via background beliefs. In the local cases no belief
about neighborhoods in required, since that information is built
into the conceptual scheme I bring to the experience.
Thus, as far as object identification within PP is concerned, PP
can be a conceptual reading practice and Alston is correct. Al
though background beliefs do sometimes play a role in the genera
tion of physical object beliefs, they need not do so. He is incorrect,
however, in his claim that for one perceptually to recognize an
epistemically unique object the object need not display a unique
feature. It is not enough for the object to display features that, in
the perceptually given situation in which I find myself, are suffione sees a building or set of buildings, or certain geographic features that are
unique to a certain city. But this would be the exception to the rule. You have to
be in special, well-known geographic locations for this to happen-in Anaheim
outside Disneyland, by the Hollywood sign, or at the Statue of Liberty, and the
like. Being somewhere in a small C alifornia town or on a street in Brooklyn will
not do it.
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ciently indicative of the object's being the unique one I take it to
be. The "perceptually given situation in which I find myself' is
always a spatiotemporally unique one, and the features I perceive
are sufficiently indicative of the object's being the unique one I take
it to be only because I am in that spatiotemporally unique situa
tion. But being in the location is not enough; that location must
also be part of what is given in experience. The feature the object
needs to display and, in fact, that only it can display, is the collec
tive feature made up of certain kind features at a certain (local)
spatiotemporal location. We objectify our experience in exactly
these terms. PP is a conceptual-reading practice.
CP, in contrast, is arguably not a conceptual-reading practice.
There is no spatiotemporally unique situation in which the believer
finds herself as she experiences God. Nor, as has been argued, is
there any feature of God that one can experience which could not
also appear attached to other beings. Alston says that all that is
necessary for one to recognize X as God is that X present to one
features that are in fact a reliable indication of X's being God, at
least in situations of the sort in which I typically find myself. But
what might such features be that could not be duplicated by other
supernatural beings? With PP, the spatiotemporal information al
lows for the possibility of a check against duplicability. With God,
no such check exists, so the mere appearance of godlike features
always leaves one with doubts, or at least with possible grounds
for doubt, as to the identity of the object of the experience. PP
takes care of those doubts with spatiotemporal information given
in the experience.
Here we return to the difference between CP and PP noted ear
lier. With PP one can generate both classificatory beliefs (beliefs
that result from sorting among kinds of things; see Chapter 2, Sec
tion 6) and epistemically unique individual beliefs. With CP no
classificatory beliefs are generated within the practice. One need
not sort out the focus of the practice from other things, since there
is only one kind of thing with which the practice is concerned and
only one member of the kind, God. One need not sort out God
from among other things or kinds of things, since the practice has
no other focus than God. And it is built into the practice itself that
any features attributable to the objects of belief generated by the
practice are features only that object can have. But this raises the
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issue of religious plurality and the host of other practices parallel to
CP, such as Jewish practice, Muslim practice, and the like. What is
to keep one of these other gods from appearing to me with the
same properties of the Christian god? There is no spatiotemporal
grid that can help, and the background belief challenge seems to
stand. There need to be unique properties that can be experienced,
and there are none as far as God is concerned.
To generate the belief that the object of my experience is God,
that is, the god of Christianity rather than one of the others, I must
bring background information to the experience. But this, unlike
local situation information, is not something that is read off the
experience; it is not part of my conceptual scheme. It is, instead,
substantive information I use to read the experience. Is it part of
the basis of my belief? This is a difficult question. Let us answer an
easier question first. Need the information be part of a conscious
inference? No, and this is where noninferential mediated practices
come in. We might have an experience to which we bring both our
conceptual scheme and our substantive beliefs and yet objectify our
experience directly into language contained in the combination of
the two. A noninferential mediated practice is just what its name
suggest, noninferential even though the justification is mediated
through beliefs and not just conceptual schemes. Are beliefs deliv
ered by CP, therefore, partly immediately based and partly medi
ately based? No, not if what is meant by the latter is that a con
scious inference is involved. Are the beliefs part of the basis? No,
not if what is meant is conscious inference; but yes, if what is
meant is that, unless I hold the beliefs, the justification does not go
through. And it will not do simply for the beliefs to be true. They
must be part of my noetic framework. The reason is that the in
formation in the beliefs is needed for the objectification to go
through, and this is not just a matter of justification but of getting
the belief itself generated.
There is more to be said about the position of background be
liefs in CP and their epistemic importance. Nevertheless, enough
has been said to begin to evaluate my tentative suggestion that CP
has a special place for background beliefs that PP fails to have and
thus that PTA is not true. If I am right in the argument of this
section, then CP and PP do differ on the function of background
beliefs. And if this role is epistemically important, as I suggested in
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Chapter 2, then PTA is not true. But there are some po t ential re
sponses and rejo inders to the ac coun t as presented thus far, and we
can consider them n ow.

3.

A Potential Response and Rejoinder

Perhaps Alston could attempt to circumvent this challenge by
suggestin g that in fact one need not use background beliefs in the
formation and justification of theistic beliefs. Instead he might sug
gest an understanding of expe rie nce in which the needed interpre
tive structures and concepts are part of the e xperie nce itself. Such
an approach to my stic al experiences is uncovered and discussed by
J. William Forgie.
After discussing several "hyper-Kantian" interpreters of mystical
experience, Forgie writes:
The picture these writers present seems so far a familiar one. For
Kant, experience is a compound, a product of sensory intuitions.
filtered, as it were, through a priori concepts. . .. But as we will see,
this "rival " view is really [not just Kantian but) hyper-Kantian in at
least two respects:
(1) First, for Kant the a priori concepts, the categories, are twelve
in number and are shared by all mankind. And they are inescapable.
Human beings must experience the world in terms of cause and
effect, and substance and attribute, if they are to experience it at all.
. . . But the rival view extends an experience-shaping role to con
cepts and beliefs which vary from one culture-more pertinently,
one religious tradition-to another. Mystical or religious experi
ences are partially determined or shaped by concepts and beliefs that
are peculiar to the particular religious tradition of the one having the
experience. Let us call these elements which shape experience, but
are not categories, "category-analogues."
(2) Second, experience for Kant is, very roughly speaking, essen
tially judgemental; having experience is inseparable from making
judgements about it. The categories "shape " experience by deter
mining that those judgements will take certain forms. They do not
contribute to the phenomenological content of the experiences they
shape. . .. [However,] category-analogues shape experience by par
tially determining its phenomenological content.13
13. J. William Forgie, "Hyper-Kantianism in Recent Discussions of Mystical
Experience," Religious Studies 21 (1985): 20 5-18, quotation p. 208.
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According to the hyper-Kantians, mystical experiences are a result
of "category-analogues" and "experiential input" working together
so that one cannot, legitimately, separate the two. The phenome
nological content of an experience is a hybrid of category-ana
logues and other sensory (or sensory like) input. Further, unlike
Kant's understanding of experience, according to which all humans
share the same categorical structure and hence have the same expe
rience, mystical experiences are different from one another because
our category-analogue structures are different.
Forgie goes on to argue that, if the hyper-Kantian understanding
of mystical experience is plausible, it carries with it "sceptical im
plications about one sort of evidential value mystical experiences
are sometimes thought to have. "14 He has in mind here the pre
sumption of veridicality typically given to sensory experience and
often extended to mystical experience, namely, that barring special
circumstances, what one seems to experience is what one experi
ences-that one's experiences are, barring special circumstances,
accurate.
Although this presumption of veridicality seems to be true for
ordinary sensory experiences, it is not true for hyper-Kantian expe
riences, whether sensory or mystical. Forgie suggests that the pre
sumption of veridicality is not upset by the Kantian categories, but
it is by the category-analogues. "Suppose I am in the presence of a
supernatural being who acts on some appropriate 'faculty' of mine.
During this encounter certain sensory or super-sensory input gets
mixed with input from the category-analogues, with the result that
I have an experience in which it appears that I am confronting a
personal and loving being."15 Now, further suppose that the suffi
cient cause of my experience of those characteristics is the cate
gory-analogues. After ruling out certain potential confusions about
what this picture entails, Forgie goes on to argue that the hyper
Kantian explanation rules out the presumption of veridicality.
At least that is what we would say in a sense perceptual case.
Suppose one sees the arches in a cathedral as Gothic because of a
category-analogue, when the arches are actually Romanesque. Be
fore discovering the existence of the category-analogue, one would
follow our usual rule suggested by the presumption of veridicality:
14· Ibid., p. 205.
IS. Ibid., p. 2 I 6.
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what one sees is what is there to see. But once discovering the
causal role of the category-analogues, the presumption of verid
icality is no longer granted epistemic weight. In like manner, if we
have an experience of a personal and loving being and the experi
ence of the characteristics is caused by category-analogues and we
know this, then the experience loses its presumption of verid
icality-unless the category-analogues are epistemically justified.
But how could they be? Our categories need no justification, at
least not in a straightforwardly epistemic sense, since they are what
make experience possible. Furthermore, the categories seem not to
be the kind of thing that could be justified. Likewise, it seems,
with category-analogues. With the latter, however, we do not
need them for experience to be possible. So why trust them to give
us veridical beliefs-unless the content of the category-analogues
could be understood in some other way, perhaps as beliefs? But
this is what Alston needs to avoid.
If this argument is correct, the hyper-Kantian understanding of
theistic experience removes any presumption in favor of the expe
rience's veridicality. We can therefore conclude that, insofar as Al
ston might attempt to use a hyper-Kantian approach to defend his
objectification account of theistic experience, there is little if any
presumption in favor of the veridicality of the resulting experience.
Barring other special circumstances or conditions that make it rea
sonable to take the experience as veridical, theistic beliefs formed
via hyper-Kantian experience do not have the same epistemic sta
tus as the deliverances of PP.16 Thus this potential rejoinder is not
successful.
4·

A Second Response and Rejoinder

A second rejoinder to the background belief challenge can be
found in Alston's own work. Alston argues that
r6. One might suggest that this is merely another version of what Alston al

ready rules out, namely, that challenge that calls attention to the lack of universal
objectification of experience. Although nearly everyone usesPP, not everyone uses
CP . But a moment's thought shows that the hyper-Kantian challenge rests on
different grounds, grounds accepted by all in the case ofPP . If we reject instances of
the employment of PP because of hyper-Kantianism, we should surely reject in
stances of CP because of hyper-Kantianism-unless there are special reasons not to.
But it is difficult to see what those reasons might be in this case.
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even if an individual's account of the phenomenology of his/her
own experience is not infallible, it must certainly be taken seriously.
Who is in a better position to determine whether S [the person pur
porting to have theistic experiences] is having an experience as of
something's presenting itself to S as 0 than S? Thus we would need
strong reasons to override the subject's confident report of the char
acter of her experience. And where could we find such reasons? I
suspect that most people who put forward . .. alternative diagnoses
do so because they have general philosophical reasons for supposing
either that God does not exist or that no human being could per
ceive Him, and they fail to recognize the difference between a phe
nomenological account of object presentation, and the occurrence of
veridical perception. In any event, once we get straight about all
this, I can not see any reason for doubting the subjects' accounts of
the character of their experiences, whatever reasons there may be for
doubting that God Himself does in fact appear to them. 17
I have been careful to distinguish between the question of verid
icality and the question about the object of the experience. Further
more, the point of my argument is to deny Alston's claim that
there is no reason for doubting the subjects' accounts. On the phe
nomenological level, I have suggested, one does have at least some
reason to be suspicious of the subjects' characterization of their ex
periences as being of God.
My argument is based on an analysis of what can be given phe
nomenologically in the experience. There is never a direct, concep
tual-reading experience that is phenomenologically of God or any
other epistemically unique person. Belief formations involving
epistemically unique individuals always involve a role for back
ground beliefs or for spatiotemporal information given in the ex
perience. This is true whether the belief formation is inferential or
not. But the only things we can experience as having the requisite
kind of spatiotemporal location are physical objects, and those, for
the most part, only of a certain class-those without intentionality
and free will that gives them the ability to move around (i.e., any
physical thing that is neither a human nor a nonhuman animal).
Thus one cannot experience phenomenologically a uniquely instan
tiable property or any property that is guaranteed phenome
nologically to identify an epistemically unique individual where
17. Alston, "Experience of God," p. 7-
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that individual does not have what we can call "spatiotemporal
rootedness."
Alston claims that the subjects' accounts do exactly what I have
argued they cannot do legitimately:
If our cases are to conform to our account of perceptual conscious
ness, they must (phenomenologically) involve God's appearing to
their awareness as being and/or doing so-and-so. And so our sub
jects do tell us. God is experienced as good, powerful, loving, com
passionate, and as exhibiting "plentitude." He is experienced as
speaking, forgiving, comforting, and strengthening. And yet how
can these be ways in which God presents Himself to experience?
Power and goodness are complex dispositional properties or bases
thereof, dispositions to act in various ways in various situations.
And to forgive or to strengthen someone is to carry out a certain
intention. None of this can be read off the phenomenal surface of
experience. This is quite different from something's presenting itself
to one's sensory consciousness as red, round, sweet, loud, or pun
gent. Isn't it rather that the subject is interpreting, or taking, what she
is aware of as being good or powerful, as forgiving or strengthen
ing? But then what is God experienced as being or doing?'"
Alston considers this issue in his "Perception of God,"19 but he
summarizes his argument briefly in the essay just quoted:
The basic point is that we have different sorts of concepts for speci
fying how something looks, sounds, tastes, or otherwise percep
tually appears. There are phenomenal concepts that specify the phe
nomenal qualia that objects present themselves as bearing-round,
red, acrid, etc. But there are also comparative concepts that specify a
mode of appearance in terms of the sort of objective thing, event,
property or whatever, that typically (normally . . . ) appears in that
way. In reporting sensory appearances we typically use comparative
concepts whenever the appearance involves something more com
plex than one or two basic phenomenal qualities.Thus we say, "She
looks like Susie," "It tastes like a pineapple," "It sounds like Bach."
There undoubtedly is in these cases some complex pattern of simple
phenomenal qualia, but it is usually beyond our powers to analyze
the appearance into its simple components. And so we are typically
thrown back on the use of comparative concepts to report how
18. Ibid.
19. Alston, "TheP erception of God,"

Philosophical Topics 16 (1988): 23-52.
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something looks, tastes. . . . And so it is in our religious cases. Our
subjects were telling us God presented Himself to their experience as
a good, powerful, compassionate, forgiving being could be ex
pected to appear. And so in reporting modes of appearance in the
way they do they are proceeding just as we do in reporting modes
of sensory appearance.'"

One might attempt to use these claims in reply to the back
ground belief challenge to PTA. One might say, for example, that
one has a complex concept of God, and that phenomenologically
describing what one perceives when engaging in CP does not in
volve appeal to background information or beliefs but only to the
concept. I believe, however, that Alston's suggestions cannot be
used in response to the points of my analysis. Suppose that we
grant Alston his distinction between phenomenal and comparative
concepts and we further grant him the point that we use phenome
nal concepts in cases of simple identifications and comparative con
cepts in cases of complex identifications-those cases in which
there is a need for specifying a "mode of appearance in terms of the
sort of objective thing." But identifying a sort of thing-a house,
car, person-is not the same as identifying an individual thing. In
identifying Suzie's house, Tom versus Tim Tibbitts, and God, we
are identifying what I have called epistemically unique individuals,
not sorts. So, although we do make claims such as "It looks like
Suzie's house" or "It looks like Tom," these kinds of appeals are
not, I suggest, comparing one's present experience to concepts of
other houses or people but to one's memory of an earlier (or imag
ined) experience of the epistemically unique individual person or
thing.
But there are two kinds of case with which we need to concern
ourselves: cases where the object involved is spatiotemporally
rooted and cases where the object is not. In both cases memory is
important, since we must be "introduced" to the object. In the case
of spatiotemporally rooted objects, the introduction can be done
simply by our experiencing, for the first time, the object qua the
object-at-this-location (or by "experiencing" the object in our
mind's eye as someone describes the object-at-such-and-such-loca
tion). We then use the local situation information, now "locked
20. Alston, "Experience of God," pp. 7-8.
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into" our conceptual scheme, to form beliefs about the episte
mically unique object when we reidentify it. Here memory func
tions only in the sense that the spatiotemporal information be
comes part of our conceptual scheme.
In the other case, there is no information we can "lock in" that
uniquely picks out, when taken together with the nonspatiotem
poral features, the object in question. Thus there is always an ap
peal, conscious or not, back to our initial introduction, whether
the introduction is a literal one-say, by the human person we are
meeting or by a mutual acquaintance-or some other kind of in
troduction, such as when we meet an animal and give it a name or
otherwise identify it. 21 But, in these cases, when we reidentify the
person or animal we must appeal to background beliefs, since there
is not sufficient information in our conceptual schemes. And the
phenomenological information given in our reidentificatory expe
riences is never enough to identify them, even when we do re
member "what they look like." The possibility of mistaken iden
tity is a live one, since any feature this person has is a feature she
may share with someone else, at least as far as experience alone
goes.
Thus, in this second class of cases, to identify an epistemically
unique spatiotemporally nonrooted individual, we must have
background information of a substantial sort such as "Tim is out of
town. " Unlike the concept of house or person-(comparative) sor
tal concepts-which can be applied successfully in totally new situ
ations, concepts of epistemically unique individuals cannot be. The
phenomena themselves, even when the perceiver has a fully de
veloped conceptual framework, cannot do it. To identify an epi
stemically unique spatiotemporally nonrooted individual, in short,
we must appeal to information other than mere concepts, even if
they are comparative concepts. So there are three kinds of complex
21. There is, perhaps, a kind of continuum involved with spatiotemporal root
edness. A tree is more or less permanently fixed, a house likewise. But animals are
not. Some of them, however, are caged, corraled, or otherwise fixed and thus have
a somewhat stationary location. Other animals are not and are free to go where
they please, barring physical obstacles. Humans, along with certain birds and sea
creatures, are perhaps at the high end of this scale with the least fixed location,
unless jailed, kept in zoos, or otherwise constrained. God, being nonspatial alto
gether, is the paradigm case of an object that is not spatiotemporally rooted.
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identifications, one in which comparative concepts are used to
identify a sort of thing, one in which local spatiotemporal concepts
(initially created in the perceiver in his or her first real or imagined
experience of the object) are used to identify an epistemically
unique but spatiotemporally rooted individual, and one in which
beliefs are used to identify and reidentify an epistemically unique
but spatiotemporally nonrooted individual. Alston does not distin
guish among these three.
Alston is right in calling attention to the distinction between
simple and complex cases of perceptual identification, but this does
nothing to explain how, in the cases of complex individual identi
fication, we identify the object of the perception. Everything in
my argument could be true even if Alston's basic distinction is a
good one: totaling all the experienced qualia does not give us con
clusive grounds for the individual identification, except in cases of
spatiotemporally rooted individuals.
If the arguments of this and the preceding chapter are correct,
some questions about PP and CP still need to be answered, along
with questions about Jnw· Is Alston's notion of Jnw finely tuned
enough? Is there not a difference between a practice that supplies us
with conceptual-reading beliefs and one that provides us with non
inferential mediated beliefs? And does this difference not give us
some cause for concern about whether CP, since it does appear to
rely on background beliefs, is as epistemically secure as PP? Now,
if this difference is a reason to question CP's epistemic strength as
compared to PP's, then PTA fails. But at this stage all that is safe to
conclude is that Jnw is too broad a category and therefore stands in
need of further refinement.

[

4

]

Alstonian Justification Revisited

In Chapters 2 and 3 I presented an Alstonian version of the par
ity thesis as well as a challenge to it. I turn now to consider the
arguments of several of Alston's more recent essays. In particular I
concentrate on those aspects of his thought in which he delineates
his more considered account of epistemic justification as well as the
claim that one can be justified in believing that an epistemic prac
tice is reliable. My argument is that the claims of these later essays
on epistemic justification challenge those of the earlier, raising
again the question of the parity thesis: do sense perceptual beliefs
and the practice that generates them have the same epistemic status
as theistic beliefs and the practice that generates them?1

1. A warning is needed here. Alston's essays with which I deal in this chapter
make several terminological and substantive shifts from "Christian Experience and
Christian Belief." Although I believe the development of Alston's thought to be
quite consistent, with a clear and fundamentally unchanging understanding of epi
stemic justification and rationality, his use of terms and emphasis do change occa
sionally. I attempt to keep the shifts straight and to do so I introduce, by way of
suggestion, where I believe his terms and their references overlap. When it is not
clearly possible to do so, I note that and let Alston's usage stand while atttempting
to work around any unclarity to which so doing gives rise.

Alstonian Justification Revisited
1.
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Epistemic Justification Again

In "Concepts of Epistemic Justification" Alston delineates two
different kinds, and several subkinds, of epistemic justification.
The broad categories for that discussion are what he calls "deon
tological epistemic justification" and "evaluative epistemic justifica
tion":
Deontological Epistemic Justification (Jd): S is Jd in be
lieving that p if and only if in believing that p S is not
violating any epistemic obligations.
Evaluative Epistemic Justification Ue): S is Je in believing
that p if and only if S's believing that p, as S does, is a
good thing from the epistemic point of view.
The "as S does" in the second account is intended to call attention
to the particularity of this believing rather than believings of p un
der any conditions.
In a note, Alston points out that he was convinced by Alvin
Plantinga that "deontological, " rather than "normative, " is a more
accurate term for what Alston strives to describe in the first ac
count above. This suggests that his account of deontological justi
fication is an extension of the accounts of normative justification
provided in his earlier essay. To avoid bogging down in exegetical
arguments about shifts in terminology, I simply present Alston's
arguments in the new terminology. Thus, in the remainder of this
section I spell out in further detail Alston's accounts of ]d and Je,
and related issues, returning later to consider his explanation of
how a person can be justified in believing that an epistemic practice
is reliable.
Alston rejects the claim that ]d. or any version of it, is the best
understanding of justification from the epistemic point of view. To
understand the central point of Alston's argument against ]d, it is
best if we get before us what he takes to be the strongest candidate
from among the deontological competitors for epistemic justifica
tion. After rejecting a voluntarist account of ]d (because most of
our beliefs are not under our direct voluntary control), he suggests
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two possible accounts of an involuntarist ]d· 2 The first, where the
subscript "i" stands for "involuntary":
Involuntary ]d Od;): S is ]di in believing that p at t if and
only if there are no intellectual obligations that (1) have to
do with the kind of belief-forming or sustaining habit the
activation of which resulted in S' s believing that p at t, or
with the particular process of belief formation or suste
nance that was involved in S's believing that p at t, and
(2) which are such that (a) Shad those obligations prior to
t; (b) S did not fulfill those obligations; and (c) if S had
fulfilled those obligations, S would not have believed that
p at t.
The second is the same as the first, but (c) is replaced, for reasons I
leave up to the reader to fill in, by
(c') if S had fulfilled those obligations, then S's belief
forming habits would have changed, or S's access to rele
vant adverse considerations would have changed, in such
a way that S would not have believed that p at t.
Alston rejects the deontological understanding of epistemic justi
fication, for "Jdi does not give us what we expect . . . . The most
serious defect is that it does not hook up in the right way with an
adequate, truth-conducive ground. " In other words, "I may have
done what could reasonably be expected of me in the management
and cultivation of my doxastic life, and still hold a belief on outra
geously inadequate grounds. " There are several possible sources of
this discrepancy. One might have grown up in "cultural isolation, "
following the noetic leadership of the authorities of one's tribe and
not having any reasons to reject their authority as reliable. Yet the
tradition of the tribe might be very poor reason for believing that
p. Or one might be deficient in cognitive powers or have poor
training one lacks the time or resources to overcome. Alston
writes:
What this spread of cases brings out is that ]di is not sufficient for
epistemic justification; we may have done the best we can, or at
least the best that could reasonably be expected of us, and still be in
2. Alston, "Concepts of Epistemic Justification," pp. 89, 94, 95, 99·
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a very poor epistemic position in believing that p; we could, blame
lessly be believing p for outrageously bad reasons. Even though )di
is the closest we can come to a deontological concept of epistemic
justification if belief is not under direct voluntary control, it still
does not give us what we are looking for.
,

So Alston rejects deontological justification as the best understand
ing of epistemic justification; it falls short of what is wanted from
the epistemic point of view. 3
What account of Je does Alston give in "Concepts of Epistemic
Justification"? Here Je is an internalist notion with an externalist
constraint. Consider the internalist aspect first. There are, says Al
ston, two popular ideas about what internalism is. The first takes
justification to be internal in that "it depends on what support is
available for the belief from 'within the subject's perspective, ' in
the sense of what the subject knows or justifiably believes about
the world. " The second "takes the 'subject's perspective' to include
whatever is 'directly accessible' to the subject, accessible just on the
basis of reflection. " To these readings Alston adds a third that con
trasts with both as well as with reliabilist understandings of justi
fication: "What I take to be internal about justification is that
whether a belief is justified depends on what it is based on
(grounds); and grounds must be other psychological state(s) of the
same subject. " He continues: "So in taking it to be conceptually
true that one is justified in believing that p iff one's belief that p is
based on an adequate ground, I take justification to be 'internal' in
that it depends on the way in which the belief stems from the be
liever's psychological states, which are 'internal' to the subject in
an obvious sense. " So Je is an internalist notion. 4
In "lnternalism and Externalism in Epistemology" Alston fur
ther develops these notions, labeling the first "perspectival internalJ. Ibid. , pp. 95-96. See Alston, "The Deontological Concept of Epistemic
Justification," in Epistemic Justification (originally in Philosophical Perspectives 2
(1988]: 257-99), for an extended discussion of his rejection of deontological con
cepts of epistemic justification as the central notion of justification given the epi
stemic point of view.
4· Alston, "Concepts of Epistemic Justification," p. 107. This is in contrast to
Je as Alston describes it elsewhere. In "Christian Experience and Christian Belief,"
p. II5, he claims that Je might, when all the hard work is done, boil down to a
kind of reliabilist understanding of rationality. His more considered judgment does
not, however, ignore reliability, as the next few paragraphs delineate. See note 7
for more detail.
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ism" (PI) and the second "access internalism" (AI). 5 The relation
ship between the two, Alston says, is that "we can think of AI as a
broadening of PI. Whereas PI restricts justifiers to what the subject
already justifiably believes . . . AI enlarges that to include what the
subject can come to know just on reflection . . . . AI, we might say,
enlarges the conception of the subject's perspective to include not
only what does in fact occur in that perspective . . . but also what
could be there if the subject were to turn his attention to it. " Alston
has serious reservations about both PI and AI. He writes that
the only arguments of any substance that have been advanced [in
support of PI] proceed from a deontological conception ofjustifica
tion and inherit any disabilities that attach to that conception. In
deed, PI gains significant support only from the most restrictive
form of a direct voluntary control version of that conception, one
that is, at best, of limited application to our beliefs. As for AI, the
arguments in the literature that are designed to establish a direct
recognizability version [the strongest version where the justifier is
said to be directly recognizable iff S needs only to reflect clear
headedly on the question of whether or not the (justifying) fact ob
tains in order to know that it does] markedly fail to do so!
Reservations notwithstanding, Alston believes that a moderate
version of AI can be supported, although along lines very different
from those he considers and rejects in "Internalism and External
ism in Epistemology . "7 This moderate version of AI is, I take it,
5· In "An Intemalist Externalism," p. 23 3 , Alston adds another type of inter
nalism, which he calls "consciousness internalism" (CI). CI, Alston argues, has
"the crushing disability that one can never complete the formulation of a sufficient
condition for justification. " But we need not concern ourselves with this version of
internalism here. Although Alston distances his own position in "Concepts of
Epistemic Justification" from both PI and AI, in "An lnternalist Externalism" and
in "lntemalism and Externalism in Epistemology" (also in Epistemic Justification;
originally in Philosophical Topics 14 [ 1986]: 179-221) he identifies his position with
a "moderate AI. "
6. Alston, "Internalism and Externalism in Epistemology, " pp. 214, 224.
7· In note 4 I called attention to a shift in Alston's description of Je from
"Christian Experience and Christian Belief' to "Concepts of Epistemic Justifica
tion." In the former essay, p. 115, he writes that "Sis justified in the evaluative
sense in holding a certain belief provided that the relevant circumstances in which
that belief is held are such that the belief is at least likely to be true. In other terms,
being Jc requires that in the class of actual and possible cases in which beliefs like
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a recast understanding of the third account of internalism Alston
notes in "Concepts of Epistemic Justification"-the account mak
ing reference to grounds and psychological states. In the moderate
version of AI, the accessibility of the states that justify beliefs must
not be so demanding as to be unrealistic or so weak as to include
too much:
What is needed here is a concept of something like "fairly direct
accessibility." In order that justifiers be generally available for pre
sentation as the legitimizers of the belief, they must be fairly readily
available to the subject through some mode of access much quicker
than lengthy research, observation, or experimentation. It seems
reasonable to follow [Carl] Ginet's lead and suggest that to be a
justifier an item must be the sort of thing that, in general, a subject
can explicitly note the presence ofjust by sufficient reflection on his
situation.
Alston goes on to note that he does not know how to make this
notion more precise. He summarizes by saying that "to be a justi
fier of a belief, its ground must be the sort of thing whose instances
are fairly directly accessible to their subject on reflection. "8
Alston's defense of this internalist requirement comes as an at
tempt not to prove its necessity but rather to explain the presence
of the requirement. He says that the reason we have the concept of
"being justified" in holding a belief flows from the "practice of
critical reflection on our beliefs, of challenging their credentials and
responding to such challenges-in short the practice of attempting
that are or would be held in circumstances like that, the belief is usually true.
Much needs to be done to work out what kinds of circumstances are relevant, how
to generalize over beliefs, and so on. Pretending that all that has been done, I
would like to suggest that what this boils down to is that the way the belief was
formed and/or is sustained is a generally reliable one, one that can generally be
relied on to produce true rather than false beliefs. " He continues in a note, p. 133 ,
n. 4 : "And not just that the practice has a good track record up to now; rather it is
a lawlike truth that beliefs formed in accordance with that practice, in those kinds
of circumstances, are at least likely to be true." Although his more recent work
does not totally ignore reliabilist considerations, there is an addition to Alston's
reliabilist demands. Another way of reading these claims, of course, is that the
second account of Jc is not intended to be a development of the first. Perhaps,
however, there are too many similarities to make this interpretation likely.
8. Alston, "An Intemalist Externalism, " p. 238.
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to justify our beliefs. "9 Alston is clear that being justified and justi
fying are not the same thing and argues that the former concept
was developed in the context of a demand for the latter. Thus the
AI requirement we all have intuitively is a natural result of the
social practices in which we engage. Thus epistemic justification is
intemalist.
But it carries an extemalist constraint. In "Concepts of Epistemic
Justification" Alston's concern is to tie the notion of justification to
the notion of a truth-conducive ground. He writes that "what a
belief is based on we may term the ground of the belief. A ground,
in a more dispositional sense of the term, is the sort of item on
which a belief can be based. " Furthermore, "we want to leave open
at least the conceptual possibility of direct or immediate justification
by experience (and perhaps in other ways also), as well as indirect or
mediate justification by relation to other beliefs (inferentially in the
most explicit cases). Finally, to say that a subject has adequate
grounds for her belief that p is to say that she has other justified
beliefs, or experiences, on which the belief could be based and
which are strongly indicative of the truth of the belief. "10 So the
goodness of a belief from the epistemic point of view is its posses
sion of grounds of this type. Thus his final account of Je, where the
subscript "g" stands for "grounds":11
Grounds Je Oeg): S is ]eg in believing that p if and only if
S's believing that p, as S did, was a good thing from the
epistemic point of view, in that S's belief that p was based
on adequate grounds and S lacked sufficient overriding
reasons to the contrary.
How is this position extemalist? Alston distances ]eg from a
straightforwardly reliabilist account of justification. He says that
"it may be supposed that ]eg as we have explained it, is just re
liability of belief formation with an evaluative frosting. For where
a belief is based on adequate grounds that belief has been formed in
a reliable fashion. " But to take reliability as a criterion of justifica9· Ibid. , p. 236.
ro. Alston, "Concepts of Epistemic Justification, " pp. Ioo- 101.
1 I. Ibid. , p. 1o6. In this context, a beliefs being "based on" another does not
imply inference; see Alston's discussion on pp. 99-100.
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tion, or simply to identify justification with reliability, would be
mistaken. The internalist character of justification blocks any such
move. Reliable belief formation may occur where the belief is
formed on some basis outside the believer's psychological states. In
fact, "I might be so constituted that beliefs about the weather to
morrow which apparently just 'pop into my mind' out of nowhere
are in fact reliably produced by a mechanism of which we know
nothing, and which does not involve the belief being based on any
thing. Here we would have reliably formed beliefs that are not
based on adequate grounds. "12 Since a belief could be reliably
formed but not be internal in the requisite sense, justification and
reliability are not the same thing. Nevertheless, there is a close
relationship between reliability and justification. Alston claims
"that the most adequate concept of epistemic justification is one
that will put a reliability constraint on principles of epistemic justi
fication. " He continues: "By a 'reliability constraint' I mean some
thing like this. Take a principle of justification of the form: 'If a
belief of type B is based on a ground of type G, then the belief is
justified.' This principle is acceptable only if forming a B on the
basis of a G is a reliable mode of belief formation. On this view, a
reliability claim is imbedded in every claim to justification. " Thus,
although reliability and justification are not the same thing, they
remain intimately connected. 13
This claim is further explicated and defended in "An Internalist
Externalism. " Although there are internalist considerations in what
the grounds for a belief are, Alston rejects the notion that there is
an internalist restriction on the adequacy (as opposed to the exis
tence) of grounds for believing. That the adequacy of the grounds
be internal is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for justi
fication. Taking necessity first, PI restrictions on adequacy run into
the difficulty of requiring an infinite hierarchy of justified beliefs,
for a PI necessary condition would claim something like "one is
justified in believing that p only if one knows or is justified in
believing that the ground of that belief is an adequate one. " Since
no one can fulfill this requirement without having to be justified on
12. Ibid. , pp. 108-9.
13. Alston, "Epistemic Circularity" (in Epistemic justification; originally in Philos
ophy and Phenomenological Research 47 [ 1986]: 1-30), pp. 321-22.
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every new level, a PI restriction cannot be a necessary one. On the
other hand, an AI restriction may be construed in this way: "S is
justified in believing that p only if S is capable, fairly readily on the
basis of reflection, to acquire a justified belief that the ground of S's
belief that p is an adequate one. " This fails to be necessary in that,
although it might be within human capacity to have such justifica
tion, "it is by no means always the case that the subject of a justi
fied belief is capable of determining the adequacy of his ground,
just by careful reflection on the matter, or, indeed, in any other
way." A weaker AI version falls prey to similar difficulties.14
What about sufficiency? Since the AI requirement is weaker than
the PI requirement, it is only necessary, says Alston, to show that
the PI requirement is not sufficient. The PI version of sufficiency
for adequacy states: "S's belief that p is based on an accessible
ground that S is justified in supposing to be adequate. "15 Does this
version ensure truth conducivity; what notion of justification is to
be used here? If it is not truth-conducive, the internalist moves
away from the goals of the epistemic point of view. But it is hard
to see that one can appeal to a truth-conducive notion without its
involving an externalist appeal. Perhaps one can shift the question
to a higher level, but that only weakens the demand momentarily;
at some level one must return to externalist requirements or lose
the epistemic point of view by appealing to non-truth-conducive
grounds. Thus, "in order for my belief that p, which is based on
ground G, to be justified, it is quite sufficient, as well as necessary,
that G be sufficiently indicative of the truth of p. It is in no way
required that I know anything, or be justified in believing any
thing, about this relationship. No doubt, we sometimes do have
justified beliefs about the adequacy of our grounds, and that is cer
tainly a good thing. But that is icing on the cake. " There is, then,
an externalist constraint on epistemic justification. 16
]eg is an evaluative concept, it does not require that beliefs be
within our direct control, it connects belief with the likelihood of
truth, it permits the grounds for belief to be within the subject's
cognitive states, and finally it allows for some "disagreement over
14. Alston, "An Internalist Externalism," pp. 239-40.
15. Ibid. , p. 242.
16. Ibid. , pp. 243-44.
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the precise conditions [ of justification] for one or another type of
belief. "17 Alston concludes that, since ]eg is the only candidate to
exhibit all these desiderata, it is clearly the winner for best candi
date for the notion of epistemic justification.

2.

The Justification of Reliability Claims

My concerns are the nature of epistemic justification and its con
nection to the reliability of epistemic practices and beliefs about the
reliability of epistemic practices. In the previous section I sketched
Alston's account of the former. Since Alston discusses the latter
issue in two different, albeit overlapping ways, it is best if the two
approaches are separated. In the remainder of this chapter I deal
with what I call Alston's "direct approach, " leaving the "doxastic
practice approach" for Chapter 5.
The direct approach is found in "Epistemic Circularity. " There
Alston claims both that one can be justified in reliability claims
about the procedures and mechanisms by which beliefs are gener
ated and that one can justify such reliability claims. In fact, he says,
since reliability claims are imbedded in every claim to justification,
"what it takes to justify a reliability claim will be at least part of
what it takes to justify a justification claim. "18 How does Alston
account for the justification of reliability claims? Relying on the
distinction between being justified in a belief p and justifying one's
belief that p, as well as on the notion that some epistemic practices
are basic epistemic practices, he argues that one can be justified in
reliability claims about practices by appeal to beliefs generated by
those practices. This argument involves a kind of circularity in rea
soning-what he calls "epistemic circularity" -but this is not a
logical circularity and the justification is not thereby vitiated.
Taking sense perception as an example of a source of belief, Al
ston suggests that its reliability cannot be established in a noncir
cular fashion. As he did in "Christian Experience and Christian
Belief, " he continues in "Epistemic Circularity" to call sense per
ception, as well as other epistemic practices (e.g., memory, intro
spection, and deductive and inductive reasoning), "basic practices";
17.
r8.

Alston, "Concepts of Epistemic Justification, " p. I II.
Alston, "Epistemic Circularity," p. 322.
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these are basic sources of belief. He defines basic sources: "0 is an
(epistemologically) basic source of belief = df. Any (otherwise)
cogent argument for the reliability of 0 will use premises drawn
from 0. "19 If sense perception is a basic source or practice, then
one should expect to find the only means of justifying
reliability claims about the practice to be arguments containing
premises generated, at some point, by the practice itself.
Such arguments are not logically circular, on Alston's account of
logical circularity as he narrows down that notion. Logical circu
larity involves the conclusion of an argument figuring among the
premises. In epistemic circularity, however, what is at stake is not
the conclusion (such and such a source of belief is reliable) figuring
in the premises. Rather, it is that certain propositions which are
true and which are derived from the source shown reliable by the
argument are, in foct, from the source in question. The conclusion
itself does not appear in the premises. The issue is the epistemic
status of the premises. Alston's discussion hinges on the distinction
between being justified and the activity of justifying. The premises
are justified, but the conclusion still needs to be justified. Alston
gives the following example:20

(1) 1. At lt. S1 formed the perceptual belief thatpt. and p1•
2 . At t2. S2 formed the perceptual belief that p2, and p2•

Therefore, sense experience is a reliable source of belief.
Here a large number of perceptual beliefs are laid out, and each
belief is reported to be true. Supposing that 97 percent of the be
liefs were true, this inductive argument, says Alston, would allow
its user to become justified in the belief that sense experience is a
reliable source of belief. Of course, that sense experience is a reli
able source of belief nowhere shows up in the premises, for they
are only reports of the formation of sense beliefs and their truth.
But the reliability of sense perception is "practically assumed" by
19. Ibid. , p. 326.
20. Ibid. , p. 327·
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the premises. In using argument (1) to establish that sense percep
tion is reliable, one is already, implicitly or explicitly, taking sense
perception to be reliable. The need for this presupposition does not
result from syntactic or semantic considerations: it is a result of
neither the logical form of the argument nor the meaning of the
premises. It is, rather, the result of our epistemic situation as hu
mans. 21 It is an "epistemic presupposition, " and the circularity to
which it is tied is an "epistemic circularity. "
Arguments such as (I) can be used to justify the belief that sense
perception is reliable only if some principle of justification such as
(2) is true:22
(2)

If one believes that p on the basis of its sensorily appear
ing to one that p, and one has no overriding reasons to
the contrary, one is justified in believing that p.

All it takes to be justified in a perceptual belief, if (2) is true, is that
the belief come from one's experience in a certain way, given the
absence of overriding conditions militating against the truth of the
belief. One need not also be justified in accepting (2) or any related
or similar reliability principle. One does not have to be justified in
believing the conclusion of (I) in order for (I) to provide justifica
tion for one's belief in that conclusion. Thus (I) can be used to
justify one's belief that sense perception is reliable, if some princi
ple such as (2) is true. Furthermore, (I) continues to provide justi
fication even if one moves from implicitly assuming that sense per
ception is reliable to being explicitly aware that one is assuming it.
The force of the argument is not lost by one becoming more clear
about where the force lies, says Alston.
Such epistemically circular arguments cannot be used rationally
to produce conviction that sense perception (or any other belief
source) is reliable. One already has that conviction by practical as
sumption. Nor, says Alston, can one provide what he calls "full
reflective justification, " where he means that not only is a given
belief p shown to be justified but all other beliefs used in the justi
fication of p are shown to be justified. When a belief is fully reflec2 1 . Ibid., p. 328.
22. Ibid. , p. 3 3 r.

Rationality and Theistic Belief
tively justified, "no questions are left over as to whether the subject
is justified in accepting some premise that is used at some stage of
the justification. "23 There are limits on justification; one cannot jus
tify everything at once. To do so, or at least to attempt to do so,
does involve one in logical circularity. To demand full reflective
justification is to demand too much. To recognize the limitations
on our reasoning power is simply to recognize the humble state of
our epistemic situation. It does not commit one to the more radical
forms of skepticism.
Thus, according to Alston, not only can one justify one's belief
that a source is reliable but one can be justified in it. By way of
summary, it is worth quoting Alston at length:
We are interested not only in the prospects of an argument like [(r)]
being used to justify belief in [the reliability of sense perception], but
also in the prospects of one's being justified in believing [that sense
perception is reliable] by virtue of the reasons embodied in the
premises of [(r)]. The distinction being invoked here is that between
the activity ofjustifying a belief that p by producing some argument
forp, and the state of being justified in believing thatp. Of course one
way to get into that state is to justify one's belief by an argument.
We have already seen that this is possible with [(r)]. However, it is a
truism in epistemology that one may be justified in believing that p,
even on the basis of reasons, without having argued from those rea
sons top, and thus without having engaged in the activity ofjustify
ing the belief. Since we do not often engage in such activities we
would have precious few justified beliefs if this were not the case.
Indeed, we have exploited this possibility in claiming that one may
be justified in accepting the premises of [(r)] without having justified
them by argument. If the latter were required one would have to
appeal to [the claim that sense perception is reliable] as a premise,
and the enterprise of justifying [that sense perception is reliable]
would run into logical circularity. It even seems possible to be justi
fied, on the basis of reasons, in believing thatp without so much as
being able to produce an argument from those reasons top. It may
be that the reasons are too complex, too subtle, or otherwise too
deeply hidden (or the subject too inarticulate), for the subject to
recover and wield those reasons. 24

23. Ibid., p. 342.
24. Ibid. , pp. 334-35.
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Alstonian Justification Old and New

What relationships hold between the older accounts of Je, ]nw•
and Jns• on the one hand, and h and ]eg on the other? And what
results can we expect for the claims of "Christian Experience and
Christian Belief' and, in particular, the parity thesis, given the ar
guments of "Epistemic Circularity" and "Concepts of Epistemic
Justification"?
I do not think a detailed correlation between the older notions
from "Christian Experience and Christian Belief'-and the
newer-from the other essays I have considered-is easy to pro
vide. There are, however, some more or less general correlations.
For example, Jn is clearly the ancestor of ]d, since both are ex
plained in exactly the same terms. We can thus take Alston's con
cern in "Christian Experience and Christian Belief' to be the same
as that in "Epistemic Circularity" and "Concepts of Epistemic Jus
tification"; that is, we can work on the premise that the former
essay takes Jns and Jnw as accounts of justification which are in com
petition with ]eg· All are possible accounts of the justification of
beliefs from the epistemic point of view.
What follows from this alignment? First, the arguments showing
that ]di is not the best candidate for justification from the . epi
stemic point of view seem to apply equally well to Jnw· This point
does not, however, refute the argument of "Christian Experience
and Christian Belief." One might still be Jnw in holding a belief p
even though one does not have the best kind of epistemic justifica
tion. And Je may remain out of the believer's reach.
In the earlier work, however, Alston claims that one could never
have sufficient reasons for taking a practice or its deliverances to be
Je (even though they might be Je). He concludes there that, al
though PP and CP could both be Je, the best we can have is Jnw for
engaging in either of them. Thus Alston writes that, "if we are
to have any chance of acquiring knowledge, we must simply go
along with our natural reactions of trust with respect to at least
some basic sources of belief, provided we lack sufficient reason for
regarding them as unreliable."25 We must, that is, take Jnw as the
best we can do and trust that it will lead us to the right practices25. Alston, "Christian Experience and Christian Belief," p. 1 19.
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practices that are in fact Je· But why should we take Jnw beliefs and
practices to move us toward Je? Other than that we have nowhere
else to turn, Alston gives no reason in the earlier essay. He seems
to have shifted his position on this matter in "Epistemic Circu
larity, " however, for he argues that one can both justify a belief
that a practice is reliable and be justified in such a belief (even if one
has not attempted to justify it). And this is done, importantly, on
the basis of reasons.
If Alston is right in the claims of "Epistemic Circularity" and
"Concepts of Epistemic Justification, " then perhaps his claim in
"Christian Experience and Christian Belief' that one cannot be Jns
in engaging in a basic practice is incorrect. One can, according to
his later argument, have good reasons to engage in a basic practice,
even though those reasons are circular. And Alston himself says
that, "if I set out to discover whether a practice is Je, that is,
whether it is reliable, then I will also be investigating the question
of whether one could be Jns in engaging in that practice. "26 Once one
discovers that there are reasons to think the practice reliable and
that those reasons are one's own, then surely one finds not just that
one could be Jns in engaging in the practice but that one is Jns in
engaging in it, that is, unless Jns requires that the reasons for sup
posing a practice reliable be somehow outside the practice itself. It
is possible that Alston did think, at the writing of the earlier essay,
that the reasons must not be circular, that they must be outside the
practice. The whole notion of a practice being basic relies on the
presence of circularity in attempts at justification. But even if Al
ston did think that at an earlier time, he apparently became con
vinced that some kinds of circularity-such as epistemic circu
larity-are acceptable means to epistemic justification.
So it appears that one can be Jns in engaging in a basic practice
that is, that one has some reasons for taking a basic practice to be
reliable. And it is a clear inference from "Epistemic Circularity"
and "Concepts of Epistemic Justification" that one can be Jns in a
practice, at least as far as having reasons is concerned. What is not
clear is whether one has met the normative demands of Jns simply
by having reasons or whether some further conditions need to be
met. I suspect there are further conditions, but Alston does not
26. Ibid.,

p. II7.
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specify what they are. But even if he did, would it be worth find
ing out about those conditions if, in fact, normative or deontologi
cal accounts of justification do not give us what we desire in terms
of the epistemic point of view? If one could provide reasons for the
claim that a practice is reliable, would one not want to understand
those reasons as providing evaluative justification for the practice
rather than normative or deontological justification? I believe so.
The really important question, from the epistemic point of view, is
whether one can be }eg in a belief that a practice is reliable. I believe
Alston provides the structure that permits an affirmative reply to
this question.
How would the basic structure of arguments for a belief that
some practice is reliable look? Generalizing from Alston's example,
such an argument would rely on some principle such as this:
(3) If S believes that p on the basis of p's being delivered to S
by epistemic practice EP, and S has no overriding reasons
to the contrary, S is justified in believing that p.
Given the truth of (3), S can justifiably hold propositions such as
this:
(4) At t, S formed the EP belief that p, and p.
Now, S need not be justified in holding the epistemic principle (3).
Such a requirement would lead to logical circularity. But because
of that principle, S can be justified in holding propositions having
the same form as (4). But then S can string together propositions
in the form of (4) to produce an inductive argument to the conclu
sion that EP is reliable.
But what happens if the justification being demanded is of the }eg
type? Let us call the belief that some practice is reliable R. For S to
be }eg in believing R, it would have to be the case that S's believing
that R, as S does, is a good thing from the epistemic point of view,
in that S's belief that R is based on adequate grounds and S lacks
sufficient overriding reasons to the contrary. This is simply an ap
plication of Alston's general account of }eg· Let us assume that
there are no overriding conditions. Thus what is important is that
S have adequate grounds for believing R. According to Alston's
account, to have adequate grounds for a belief such as R, one need
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only have adequate (although epistemically circular) reasons. So let
us say that at t1 the practice in question generates belief Pt. at t2 it
generates p2, and so on. Suppose further that 97 percent of these
beliefs are true. S can thus conclude that the practice is reliable, and
hence S is justified in believing R.
Now, what we are after is whether this justification is the kind
specified by the account of ]eg· It is as long as inductive reasoning as a
source of belief is in fact reliable. Is it? One way to answer that ques
tion is to explore whether the belief that it is reliable is Jeg· But
one's initial justification of R does not rely on whether one has
justified the further belief that induction is reliable. One need only
be justified in that belief. So it appears that one can be ]eg in a belief
that a practice is reliable.
Not only can one be ]eg in the belief that the practice is reliable,
but by extension it seems that one can be ]eg in engaging in the
practice itself. Here is an account of Jeg applied to practices rather
than beliefs:
Grounds* Je (J�) S is J� in engaging in an epistemic prac
tice EP iff S's engaging in EP, as S does, is a good thing
from the epistemic point of view, in that S's engaging in
EP is based on adequate grounds and S lacks sufficient
overriding reasons to the contrary.
Here something needs to be said about the notion of adequate
grounds for engaging in an epistemic practice. Alston says that a
ground for a belief is "the sort of item on which a belief can be
based. " But basing a belief on a ground is not obviously the same
as basing one's engaging in a practice on a ground. Nevertheless,
perhaps it is enough if we piggyback the notion of grounds for
engaging in a practice on the grounds for a belief that that practice
is reliable. (Here we have a sufficient but perhaps not a necessary
condition for grounds for engaging in a practice. There may be
other ways of having grounds for engaging in a practice besides a
[ justified] belief that the practice is reliable. ) So, the sort of thing
that one can base one's engaging in a practice on is a belief that in
turn has grounds. Add to all this that these latter grounds are ade
quate and by extension that the grounds for engaging in a practice
are adequate. In the case under consideration, what would the ade-
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quate grounds be? Surely by Alston's own account, if one is justi
fied via an argument that rests on reliably formed beliefs (even if it
is epistemically circular) in the belief that the practice is reliable,
then one is justified in engaging in the practice. This all seems con
sonant with Alston's claim that "a particular belief is justified if and
only if we are justified in engaging in a certain epistemic practice. "Zl
Although this claim does not demand that one is justified in a belief
p if and only if one is justified in the second-order belief that the
practice that generates p is justified, my argument shows that one
can both justify and be justified in holding the second-order belief
and thus that engaging in the practice believed to be justified is
justified and hence that beliefs generated by the practice, such as p,
are justified. Although not required by his claim, the justification
of the second-order belief (in the reliability of the practice) seems
to show that one is justified in engaging in the practice and thus, to
borrow Alston's metaphor, is icing on the epistemological cake.
So it appears on this interpretation that one can be )eg in the
belief that a practice is reliable. By extension, one can be J� in
engaging in that practice. I noted above that the question of Jns
may be less important than "Christian Experience and Christian
Belief' suggests, given that we could have )eg for a practice. Nev
ertheless, it seems that one could also be Jns in engaging in a basic
practice. One already has the reasons needed. All that is required
beyond those reasons is whatever it takes to meet the normative
demands. Given that those are met, one could have Jns for the be
lief that a practice is reliable. Thus one could be Jns in engaging in a
practice and thus, according to Alston's own argument, one could
be Jns in engaging in PP. This is quite a different result from that
suggested in "Christian Experience and Christian Belief. " So, by
Alston's later arguments, one could be both J� and Jns in engaging
in PP, not only Jnw in so doing.
This conclusion raises several questions about PTA. Although
the original version may be true-both CP and PP may be Jnw
(here I am ignoring the background belief challenge)-much of
our interest in PTA derives from the supposition that neither PP
nor CP can do any better thanJnw· It appears that PP can do better,
by Alston's own argument. Now the question is whether CP can
27. Ibid.,
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do as well. Can a person be Jtg or Jns in engaging in CP? Could
Alston suggest a new, and stronger, version of the parity thesis?
Let us consider Jtg, since Alston claims that its near relative, ]eg• is
the understanding of epistemic justification that has the most going
for it from the epistemic point of view. Might Alston suggest, for
example, the following:
Parity ThesisAlston Strong (PTAs): Under appropriate con
ditions, both S's engaging in CP and S's engaging in PP
are J1g.
Might he then continue by claiming that PTAs is true? PP, it has
been argued, can be Jtg. CP's having the same status rests on the
provision of reasons for the reliability of CP. Can such reasons be
given?
4·

A Challenge to Alston's Strong Parity Thesis

One challenge to PTAS can be seen if we return to the argument
presented above for the claim that one can be ]eg in believing that a
practice is reliable and apply it to the question of CP's reliability.
The resulting argument looks like this: for S to be ]eg. in believing
that CP is reliable, it would have to be the case that S's believing
that CP is reliable is a good thing from the epistemic point of
view, in that S's believing that CP is reliable is based on adequate
grounds and S lacks sufficient overriding reasons to the contrary.
Assuming that there are no overriding conditions, what would the
adequate grounds have to be for S's belief that CP is reliable to be
]eg? One needs adequate (albeit epistemically circular) reasons. So
let us say that CP produces beliefs p1, p2, p3, and so forth, and that
these beliefs (or a large percentage of them) are true. At this point
the argument appeals to induction to move from these beliefs to
the general belief that CP is reliable.
But here the argument runs afoul. With PP a large number of
beliefs are generated, literally tens of thousands, so that the induc
tive base for the general conclusion that PP is reliable is sufficiently
strong to support the conclusion. But one must wonder, just when
does an inductive argument become a strong one? How many be
liefs does one need in the inductive base? Is there a sufficiently large
base of beliefs generated by CP? In some cases perhaps there are,
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but one suspects that often the inductive base is not strong enough.
How often does the Christian believer employ CP (or how often
does CP work in her)? And does the believer trust her ability to use
CP well enough to trust its deliverances? These are important is
sues, but there are more pressing questions to ask.
First, it appears that any attempt to produce an overall justifica
tory argument for the reliability of a practice appeals to an induc
tive subargument; that is, the inductive subargument is essential to
the overall argument. No substitution is available. Second, the ap
peal to induction assumes that the belief-forming practice is some
thing we can test by applying it more than once. Third, the use of
induction rests on the assumption that the things about which the
induction is made are regular and predictive. Since the last two
points are intimately connected, I deal with them more or less to
gether.
Of the first point, let me say that Alston's subargument is an
inductive track-record argument. Is the inductive track-record sub
argument essential? The first point to make is that, even if it is not,
Alston's argument uses one. As far as the argument I have con
structed (and now criticize) follows Alston's reasoning, if my argu
ment is successful, I have at least shown that PTAs cannot be de
fended by that kind of argument. But then how could it be
defended? There needs to be some positive argument. Perhaps
there are other kinds of inductive arguments to which one might
appeal-an inference to the best explanation, for example. But the
points I make here about God's unpredictability seem to infect all
inductive subarguments, of the track-record variety or not. And so
I cast the following comments in general terms about induction.
What of noninductive arguments? It is hard to see what they
might be, in this case. To avoid logical (but allow epistemic) circu
larity, it is hard to see that any premise that allows a deductive
move to the needed conclusion is forthcoming. Alston begins with
a practical assumption of reliability, and this gets the argument off
the ground. But if one begins with practicality alone, one ends
with practicality alone if the logical moves are deductive. So it
looks as if an inductive subargument of some type is needed.
Induction is an epistemic practice in which we appeal to past
states of affairs and infer that these will continue into the future or
we appeal to the presence of certain qualities or properties in ob-
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jects and infer that these will be present in the future, and the like.
In other words, induction assumes that the objects with which
it deals do not change, at least radically, from one moment to
the next, or that the changes themselves are regularly repeating
changes, and that a good case can be made from the past into the
future. PP likewise deals with objects (or changes) that are regular
and predictive. It is natural, in fact, to link our practice of induc
tion to the practice of perception, understanding the two as rising
together in our cognitive past. Although not the same thing, in
duction and PP make similar assumptions about their subject mat
ters. The key assumption for our purposes is that the objects with
which they deal are predictable. Thus, since both PP and induction
work well in their dealings with the physical world, the appeal to
inductive principles to show the reliability of PP is both natural
and, it seems, legitimate. It is, as Alston admits, built into PP that
the objects that are its central concern are the kind of objects about
which predictions can be made. Predictions are likewise the heart
beat of induction. With these predictions we can anticipate and
control, to some extent, physical objects.
With CP, however, the connections with induction are much
less clear. If, for example, the applicability of induction to a set of
objects assumes that those objects do not change (in important
ways) over time, or that any changes are predictable, and yet God
does change (at least in unpredictable ways in his actions toward
us), of what use is an inductive argument to show that the practice
through which we have access to God-CP-is reliable? The issue
here is really one of the nature of the practice as well as of the
objects the practice supposedly accesses. With PP, the practice's
ostensible predictive nature cannot be separated from the ostensible
nature of the objects with which it deals. Of course one can safely
infer from the past activity of this or that physical object to its
future; that is part and parcel of the conceptual scheme of PP. On
the other hand, if the nature of the practice is so intimately tied to
the nature of its objects, and God is not predictable, then why
would CP be predictable? It is not, as Alston admits. But then in
what way can one appeal to an inductive argument to show that
CP is reliable? Unlike stones and trees, God is not predictable; we
cannot assume he will be or act in the future as he was or did in the
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past or that CP will give us access to him in the future as it has in
the past. God and his activities are not capable of being anticipated
or controlled. 28
Does this mean simply that one does not have, or at least that
one cannot count on, a large number of generated beliefs from
which to infer inductively a claim of reliability, as I suggested ear
lier? No, my suggestion here is stronger than that. I mean to say
that no induction from the past engagements of CP can be used
legitimately as an inductive base. It is part of the understanding of
the world that is embedded in CP (or in which CP is embedded)
that God does not have to give us any information. In fact, Alston
argues that, given the assumptions that God is somewhat myste
rious and that he has made us such that we cannot discern regu
larities in his nature and activities, then "if an epistemic practice
were to lead us to suppose that we had discovered regular patterns
in the divine behavior or that divine activity is equally discernible
by all, that would be a reason for regarding the practice as unreli
able. "29 If the assumption about the indiscernibility of regularity in
God's nature and activities is correct, then how could one safely
infer from the past deliverances of CP that it is reliable? And if the
inductive subargument is irreplaceable in the overall justificatory
argument, then a belief that CP is reliable cannot be justified by
that larger argument.
Alston has suggested in correspondence that my discussion does
not take into account that, whereas "induction concerns the rela
tions between beliefs and facts that make the beliefs true (where
they are true), what is unpredictable is the object the beliefs are
about. So that it is one thing that is unpredictable (God) and an
other thing that is the topic of the induction (truth about beliefs
28. There is a potential problem with this suggestion, since it is a mainstream
belief of Christians that God is constant and dependable. How is one to square the
(apparent) nonpredictability of God with his purported dependability and con
stancy? I do not know how to resolve this problem except to suggest that, even if
God is ultimately or finally dependable, nothing we know about him gives us
insight into how he will carry out this dependability. It does not, in short, seem
obviously contradictory to say that God is dependable but nonpredictable or that
he is faithful but full of surprises. My challenge deals only with the apparent ele
ment of surprise in God's ways of dealing with humanity.
29. Alston, "Christian Experience and Christian Belief," p. 1 29.
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about God when formed in a certain way). "30 This distinction is a
good one. Let us see how it affects my argument.
An inductive subargument for the reliability of CP, following
Alston's pattern, looks something like this:
(5)

1.
2.

At ft. S1 formed the CP belief that Pt. and p1.
At t2, S2 formed the CP belief that p2, and p2•

Therefore, CP is a reliable source of belief.
Alston's note calls attention to the fact that the basis for the induc
tion is the relationship between the conjuncts of the premises, and
the issue is not, therefore, one of predictability or nonpredic
tability. The move to the generalization is not based directly on the
facts about the object of the belief (in this case God) but on the fact
that the beliefs generated by CP are true. So it does not matter, for
the efficacy of the induction, whether the objects of the beliefs are
predictable or not.
Although I agree with Alston's basic point that the induction
itself is based on the relationship between the conjuncts of the
premises, there remains something curious about CP. This feature
of CP calls special attention to the object of the beliefs generated
by CP in an inductive argument supporting CP's reliability. PP is a
practice over which we have some control. If we do not wish to
form visual beliefs, we can close our eyes. If we do not wish to
form auditory beliefs, we can plug our ears. And so forth. Even
though we are constantly bombarded, during our waking hours,
with sensory information, there are certain measures we can take
to control how PP works with that information. The corollary to
this point is that generally the objects about which PP generates
beliefs are always present to us. They are constant and predictably
so. Thus we know what to do to engage in PP. We also know
perfectly well what it would be to use PP to generate beliefs and
then to reuse PP to validate those same beliefs. But it is less than
clear that we know the same about CP. Even if we do have beliefs
30. Personal letter dated November 26, 1 990.
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delivered to us by CP, it, unlike PP, is not the kind of practice we
can call up on demand. We cannot simply turn our head in the
right direction and use or apply CP. Having received some infor
mation by sight, I can return again to that spot and use sight to
validate the original belie( But what do I do having received the
information that God wants me to spend most of my time on
philosophical theology rather than other philosophical concerns?
How do I reuse CP to test that belief?
Perhaps there are certain things the Christian can do. For exam
ple, one subpractice of CP may be reading Scripture. Insofar as it
is, the Christian can pick up the Bible and read it, just as with PP
one can open one's eyes and look again. When we open our eyes
and turn our head in the right direction we can, more or less, trust
that our sight gives us the information needed to validate our ear
lier belief. But God need not reveal himself to us today when we
read the Scriptures, and thus the testability of CP lacks the kind of
repeatability of PP. And this brings us to my main reply to Al
ston's criticism. The objects of beliefs generated by PP do not do
anything to lead us to engage in PP. There is no conscious decision
or motivation on their part to initiate PP for us. This is not true
with CP. Presumably God must initiate CP. The unpredictability
of God, therefore, indicates that no inductive move from CP-gen
erated beliefs and their corresponding truth-making facts can pro
vide sufficient grounds for concluding that CP is reliable (or will
be reliable in the future). CP may work in entirely different ways
each times in operates. A lack of predictability on God's part does
lead to the failure of the inductive argument needed to show CP
reliable.
Furthermore, the predictability of the objects of PP beliefs is pre
cisely what makes the repeatability of our engaging in PP possible.
This repeatability allows for a kind of commitment to PP's re
liability that in turn gets the inductive argument going. Here I shift
to discuss the premises of Alston's argument, and hence it is Al
ston's "practical assumption" that is at stake. The move from the
generation of true perceptual beliefs (from experience and PP) to
the claim that PP is reliable depends on the practical assumption
that PP is reliable. This assumption must only be practical, of
course; otherwise one is involved in a logical rather than epistemic
circle. But how can one make even the practical assumption? We
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make it, I believe, because the deliverances of PP are so well con
firmed by the past predictive power of induction and PP. It is thi�
(predictive kind of) confirmation that "indicates" ("betokens, "
"manifests") PP's reliability in the first place. 31 But this confirma
tion is internal to the practice itself: induction seems either part and
parcel of PP or so intimately connected that one cannot engage in
induction without relying on PP (or other practices dealing with
predictable objects) and its internal assumptions. Thus one should
not view the (predictive) confirmation of the practice's deliverance�
as independent grounds or reasons for taking the practice to be
reliable. Nevertheless, confirmation may generate an initial trust in
the practice and hence the practical assumption is not irrational. I
am sure Alston would not take just any practice-let us say my
taking the pain in my knee to indicate that a Canadian hockey team
will take the Stanley Cup-as a practice one can practically assume
to be reliable. The presence of a reliability indicator is what sug
gests the practical assumption in the first place.
So, in addition to the move from the premises to the conclusion
relying on the predictive nature of the objects, the internal (predic
tive) confirmation of beliefs also depends on the regularity of the
objects over which the practice generating those beliefs ranges.
With CP such (predictive) confirmation appears not to be present.
The objects of the practice (God and his activities) are not regular
or predictable. Insofar as they are not, the practical assumption
does not seem plausible. There is no indicator of reliability to sug
gest that one make a practical assumption. So, although one need
not go on to show that induction itself is a reliable source of belief,
one must have an argument with a strong enough set of beliefs to
make a sound inductive move. CP appears to lack such a base, for
the practical assumption of CP's reliability does not have the net
work of confirmation that the related PP assumption has. Thus,
although PP is J�-one can generate an inductive, albeit episte
mically circular, argument for the reliability of PP-CP appears not
to be, since the requisite argument slips in some assumptions about
the nature of CP and its objects which are not true of that practice.
3 r . See Alston, "Christian Experience and Christian Belief, " p. 1 25, for a full
explanation of these terms. See Chapter IO, and Mark S. MCLeod, "Can Belief in
God Be Confirmed?" Religious Studies 24 ( 1 988): 3 1 1-23, for further developmen1
of this and a nonpredictive kind of confirmation.
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I am suggesting, then, that although there may be an argument
justifying the belief that PP is reliable, insofar as that argument
rests on induction there can be no parallel argument for CP. There
are two points to my argument. First, because of the unpredictable
nature of the object of CP, one cannot go from the premises
(which contain truth claims about CP's deliverances) to the conclu
sion about CP's reliability. Second, not even the initial practical
assumption about CP's reliability is well founded, since, once
again, the nature of the object of CP does not allow for the internal
confirmatory platform that would lead one to make the practical
assumption in the first place. These two issues are connected, be
cause both rely on the unpredictability of God. So what suggests a
lack of force behind the practical assumption for CP turns out ulti
mately to challenge the move from the premises, even if true, to
the conclusion.
Does Alston have a response? He admits (and, in fact, makes
"epistemological hay out of') the fact that PP has confirmation and
predictive power whereas CP does not. On the basis of this kind of
observation, says Alston, some have rejected the reliability of CP.
He goes on to argue, however, that although confirmation and
predictive power are indicative of reliability, they are not necessary
for reliability. Can Alston use a related response against my sug
gestions, claiming, for example, that CP need not have confirma
tion and yet can still be legitimately practically assumed to be reli
able? I think not. It is true that a practice could be reliable and its
deliverances not be confirmed. Still, the argument under consid
eration, taken as a whole, relies on induction. Inductive arguments
can have success only where the base allows a predictive move
from the past to the future. With a well-confirmed base such
moves are plausible. As we have seen, this issue arises at two
stages, with the practical assumption and with the move from
premises to conclusion. With CP, however, the predictive applica
tion to future cases appears risky both with regard to the main
argument and with regard to the initial confirmation that might
suggest the practical assumption in the first place. The predictive
repeatability simply seems absent. What other reliability indicator
is available? None, and thus, insofar as Alston's argument requires
induction, we cannot make an appeal to the argument to show that
CP is Jfg. Alston's move earlier to ignore CP's lack of confirma-

Rationality and Theistic Belief

86 ]

tion, and his subsequent claim that CP can be Jnw' does not rely on
an inductive argument. In fact, Jnw does not rely on argument at
all. In the case of Jnw' Alston's concern is with reasons against the
reliability of CP, and lacking confirmation and predictability does
not constitute a reason against reliability. But with J!g the case is
different, for now we are dealing with a lack of reasons for re
liability. J!g demands positive reasons and those simply are not,
and perhaps cannot be, provided by CP. So PTAS appears not to be
true.
Alston does say that CP has its own internal self-support. Does
this help him with PTAs? CP's self-support comes in terms of spir
itual development which, Alston suggests, is internal to the prac
tice. What is spiritual development?
CMP [CP], including the associated Christian scheme that has been
built up over the centuries, generates, among much else, the belief
that God has made certain promises of the destiny that awaits us if
we follow the way of life enjoined on us by Christ. We are told that
if we will turn from our sinful ways, reorder our priorities, take a
break from preoccupation with our self-centered aims long enough
to open ourselves to the sanctifying work of the Holy Spirit, then
we will experience a transformation into the kind of nonpossessive,
nondefensive, loving, caring, and sincere persons God has destined
us to become.
This brief account does not do full justice to the notion of spiritual
development. Nevertheless, some Christians do develop in these
ways, and this provides some type of self-support for CP. Even so,
if we pay attention to the ways Christians treat their spiritual
development, we note that there is no predictive guarantee that
someone will mature as a Christian believer. Alston himself writes
that this development happens "not immediately and not without
many ups and downs. 32 This is no surprise, for we are dealing with
humans and their foibles, as well as with a God about whom even
believers are hesitant to predict things. And there is, of course,
much more to be said here.
But the main point is that spiritual development is also un
predictable and that this indicates the unlikelihood that even an
32. Alston, Perceiving God, p. 252.
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inductive argument bolstered with spiritual development as inter
nal support can be used to move one to a justified belief in re
liability.
Since the inductive argument is so prominent in the overall justi
ficatory argument, its absence effectively kills the justificatory ar
gument and hence the claim that one can be ]eg in a belief that CP
is reliable. Can one use the self-support of spiritual formation as an
indicator of reliability, that is, as enough for a practical assumption
of reliability? Perhaps, for spiritual development does occur among
those involved in CP, and there is a kind of confirmation that at
taches to CP because of the spiritual development of its practi
tioners. This is not a predictive kind of confirmation, however,
and an inductive argument based on it would be shaky at best. I
have more to say about the notion of a nonpredictive confirmation
in Chapters 10 and 1 1 , and I postpone detailed discussion until
then.
I believe it is safe to conclude that PTAs is false. What about the
Jns of CP? For the reasons presented against the ]eg of CP, its Jns
must be rejected as well. Thus although PP may be, according to
some of Alston's work, Jns• CP cannot be. And in the case of CP,
one cannot know that it is ]eg·
I have argued that some of Alston's more recent work militates
against the conclusions of his earlier work. A stronger parity thesis
emerges from this more recent work. But PT AS fails because of a
lack of inductive support for CP's reliability. There is one final
consideration that raises serious questions about PT AS· I turn to
explore Alston's doxastic practice approach to epistemology in the
next chapter.
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The Doxastic Practice Approach

We have thus far considered two different versions of the parity
thesis. Neither of them is successful, or so I have argued. There is a
third possibility, however, one that emerges from some claims in
Alston's "A 'Doxastic Practice' Approach to Epistemology." My
goals in this chapter are to explain Alston's doxastic practice ap
proach, to explain the parity thesis that emerges from that ap
proach, and to show how the background belief challenge applies
to it. This is the last of the parity theses I mine out of Alston's
work.
I.

A Doxastic Practice Approach to Epistemology

In the essay in question, Alston suggests a second approach to
the issue of being justified in a belief that a practice is reliable. He
distinguishes between metaepistemology and substantive episte
mology. The former is "a view about epistemology, its nature,
conduct, methodology, and prospects-rather than a position de
veloped in the prosecution of the discipline itself."' The latter is the
doing of epistemology proper-the discovery of epistemic prac
tices, exploring how they are structured, what the criteria of justiI. Alston, "A 'Doxastic Practice' Approach to Epistemology," in Knowledge
and Skepticism, ed. M. Clay and K. Lehrer (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1989),
p. 24.
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fication or rationality are, and so forth. The distinction is impor
tant for my argument, for one cannot decide about the viability of
the parity thesis without understanding the connections between
epistemic justification and reliability, and one cannot understand
these connections without understanding at what level one's ques
tions about them arise.
So, in "A 'Doxastic Practice' Approach," a metaepistemological
essay, Alston gives an account of the rationality of engaging in an
epistemic practice with an eye on the issue of whether an epistemic
practice is reliable. This contrasts with the epistemological essay,
"Epistemic Circularity," in which Alston defends, using the more
direct approach considered in Chapter 4, the thesis that one can be
justified in believing that a practice is reliable. How do these ap
proaches fit together? The burden of this section is to outline Al
ston's argument in "A 'Doxastic Practice' Approach" with a view
to explaining how that argument impinges on the conclusions of
"Epistemic Circularity. " In particular, I aim at spelling out the
connections Alston thinks there are among rationality, justifica
tion, and reliability, for we cannot get clear about the final version
of Alston's parity thesis unless we are clear about these connec
tions.
The central question of"A 'Doxastic Practice' Approach" is how
one is to determine which, if any, epistemic principles are adequate
or, in other words, what it takes to be justified in accepting a prin
ciple of justification. That, of course, depends on what justification
is. Alston works here with the truth-conducive account discussed
in Chapter 4· Given this account, to show that a principle is accept
able one must show that it specifies a reliable mode of belief forma
tion. But to do this is to rely, at some point, on a circular argu
ment, since every mode of belief formation belongs to a basic
practice. As we have seen in "Epistemic Circularity," Alston ar
gues that not all circular arguments are logically so and in particu
lar argues that one kind of circular argument can lend support to
beliefs about reliability. In short, "epistemic circularity does nQt
prevent one from showing, on the basis of empirical premises that
are ultimately based on sense perception [where sense perception is
his example of an epistemic practice], that sense perception is reli
able. " The problem with this, as he puts it, is that "whether one
actually does succeed in this depends on one's being justified in
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those perceptual premises, and that in turn, according to our as
sumptions about justification, depends on sense perception being a
reliable source of belief. In other words, if (and only if) sense per
ception is reliable, we can show it to be reliable. But how can we
cancel out that if?"2
The problem, otherwise stated, is that, given this approach to
justifying reliability beliefs, any belief-forming mechanism or prac
tice can be validated, on certain assumptions:
If all else fails, we can

simply

use each belief twice over, once as

testee and once as tester. Consider crystal ball gazing. Gazing into
the crystal ball, the seer makes a series of pronouncements: p, q, r,

s....

Is this a reliable mode of belief-formation?

shown as follows.

The

Yes.

That can

be

gazer forms the belief that p, and, using the

same procedure, ascertains that p.By running through a series of be
liefs in this way, we discover that the accuracy of this mode of be

is 100%! . . . Thus, if we allow the use of mode of
M to determine whether the beliefs formed by M
are true, M is sure to get a clean bill of health. But a line of argu
ment that will validate any mode of belief-formation, no matter
how irresponsible, is not what we are looking for. We want, and

lief-formation

belief-formation

need, something much more discriminating.3

This "retesting" approach for showing a practice reliable appears
to be what Alston advocates in "Epistemic Circularity," although
there he fills in the details of how the argument might go. If I am
correct about this, then Alston is between a rock and a hard place.
On the rocky side, he has to show why my suggestions about the
unavailability of the retesting for CP do not vitiate the skeptical
claim that all practices have "trivial self-support" (as Alston later
calls it) and therefore why we should not use the retesting ap
proach to evaluate a practice's reliability. On my account, PP turns
out to be epistemically superior to CP. In other words, even given
the antecedent assumption of reliability needed for the soundness
of the argument (to the conclusion that a practice is reliable and
hence justifiably engaged in), there are some practices for which
trivial self-support is not forthcoming. CP is one such practice.
But Alston rejects the possibility of using the retesting approach to
2. Ibid., p. 3·
J. Ibid.
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the end of showing a belief in reliability justified. He instead claims
that all practices appear to have this trivial self-support, and thus
that we need some other way of adjudicating between practices in
terms of their reliability.
Which brings us to the hard place: PTAs appears to be trivially
true. If all practices can be shown to be reliable via this trivial self
support, then not only is PTAs true, but a parity thesis stating that
all practices have J.; is true. This is obviously not the case, as Al
ston clearly assumes in the essay under consideration. Neverthe
less, let Alston's point stand, and let us see how he makes out his
case in answering the question he sets before us: how are we to
adjudicate among epistemic practices in terms of their reliability? I
return to this rocky terrain in the next section.
What is the doxastic practice approach? Alston relies on the
work of Wittgenstein (stripped of its verificationist assumptions)
and Reid to help him out. Several aspects of their thought are help
ful. First, "we engage in a plurality of doxastic practices, each with
its own sources of belief, its own conditions of justification, its
own fundamental beliefs, and, in some cases, its own subject mat
ter, its own conceptual framework, and its own repertoire of pos
sible "overriders. "' These practices, although distinct, are not
wholly independent and are engaged in together rather than sep
arately. Furthermore there are "generational" and "transforma
tional" practices, the former producing beliefs from nondoxastic
inputs, the latter transforming belief inputs into other beliefs. Each
of the generational practices has its own distinctive subject matter
and conceptual scheme. Second, "these practices are acquired and
engaged in well before one is explicitly aware of them and critically
reflects on them." Practice thus precedes theory: first we must
learn to engage in a practice, and only then can we reflect on its
nature. Third, practices of belief formation develop in the context
of wider spheres of practice. For example, "we learn to form per
ceptual beliefs along with, and as a part of, learning to deal with
perceived objects in the pursuit of our ends. " Finally, "these prac
tices are thoroughly social: socially established by socially mon
itored learning, and socially shared. "4
So far, says Alston, this is just cognitive social psychology.
4· Ibid., pp. s-s.
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What has this to do with epistemology? Here he shifts to an indi
rect approach. Rather than asking how psychology helps us deter
mine which epistemic practices are reliable-in other words, a
question about epistemic justification-he asks what resources the
approach gives us for determining whether a given practice is ratio
nally accepted or engaged in.
There are, says Alston, two positions one might take on the
connection between psychology and epistemology. The first, "au
tonomism,""holds that epistemology is autonomous vis-a-vis psy
chology and other sciences dealing with cognition. It holds that
epistemology is essentially a normative or evaluative enterprise,
and that here as elsewhere values are not determined by fact." The
difficulty with this position is just that there appear to be no nonar
bitrary standards by which to carry out an evaluation of epistemic
practices. To evaluate epistemic practices one must engage in
them. According to "heteronomism," in contrast, "if the epis
temologist is to escape such arbitrariness, he must content himself
with delineating the contours of established doxastic practices, per
haps neating them up a bit and rendering them more internally
coherent and more consonant with each other. He must give up
pretensions to an Archimedean point from which he can carry out
an impartial evaluation of all practices. "5 There is, then, an antin
omy between autonomism and heteronomism.
Alston's solution to the antinomy is twofold. First, he notes that
neither side does full justice to epistemology. Autonomism has the
difficulties already noted and is forced to recognize that the attrac
tiveness of certain principles lies simply in the fact that we learned
to engage in practices in which those principles are embedded and
we did so before reflecting on the practices. On the other side, the
heteronomist fails to recognize that to relegate epistemology to a
corner where its only task is to tidy up its principles is to overlook
the nature of epistemology as a philosophical enterprise, an enter
prise that asks general questions. Second, he distinguishes between
"a more or less tightly structured practice with more or less fixed
rules, criteria, and standards, on the one hand, and a relatively free,
unstructured "improvisational" activity on the other." The former
1s more or less narrowly confined by antecedent rules and pros. Ibid., pp. IO-II.
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cedures that constitute the practice (although not everything is in
variable). The latter calls for an exercise of "judgment" that relies
on "no established rules or criteria [that] put tight constraints on
what judgment is to be made in a particular situation." Philosophy
falls on the second side of the contrast and so the resolution to the
antinomy is as follows:
The epistemologist, in seeking to carry out a rational evaluation of
one or another doxastic practice, is not working within a particular
such practice. Nor need she be proposing to establish a novel prac
tice, the specifications of which she has drawn up herself in her
study. On the other hand, she need not abjure everything, or any
thing, she has learned from the various practices she has mastered.
She makes use of her doxastic skills and tendencies, not by follow
ing the relatively fixed rules and procedures of some particular prac
tice, but by using all this in a freer fashion. 6
Thus, the doxastic practice approach to epistemology recognizes
the importance of what we learn at our mother's knee but also
the value of critical reflection on what we learn. This leaves un
answered the question with which Alston set out: how can we go
about justifying epistemic practices as reliable? We cannot establish
reliability for one practice without establishing it for all. But if we
shift the question to, what is the rational attitude toward epistemic
practices? some progress can be made. Rejecting the view that radi
cal skepticism with regard to epistemic practices is viable, Alston
notes that we can take all socially established practices to be prima
facie rational; that is, we can take all socially established practices as
"rationally engaged in, pending sufficient reasons to take any of
them as unreliable, and pending any other sufficient disqualifying
considerations, if any. "7 Why limit the scope to the socially estab
lished rather than opening it to all practices? Simply put, eccentric
practices such as Cedric's consultation of sun-dried tomatoes as an
indicator of stock market activity do not have a track record. Only
when a doxastic practice has persisted over many generations does
it earn the right to be considered seriously. There is a presumption
in favor of socially established practices which idiosyncratic prac
tices do not have.
6. Ibid., pp. 12-14.
7· Ibid., p. 16.
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If we are to evaluate practices then, we have to do it in terms of
a negative approach. Which practices disqualify themselves? That
depends on the kinds of considerations taken into account as po
tential disqualifiers. Alston suggests three. First, a practice can be
disqualified by "persistent and irremediable inconsistency in its
output." This counts as a disqualifier because massive inconsis
tency is a sure indicator of significant falsehood in one's set of be
liefs. Second, a massive and persistent inconsistency between the
outputs of two practices indicates that at least one of them is
faulty. Alston suggests that we follow a conservative route at this
point, taking the more firmly established practice over the less. His
reason? It seems to him to be"the only principle that . . . [is] both
unchauvinistic and eminently plausible. "8
Alston's final suggestion"has to do not with a ground for defini
tive rejection, but with something that will strengthen or weaken
the prima facie acceptability. The point is this. A practice's claim to
acceptance is strengthened by significant 'self-support,' and the
claim is weakened by the absence of such." How can Alston turn
to self-support, since he has rejected epistemically circular consid
erations? There are, he says, different sorts of self-support. The
sort of self-support in which the same belief is used both as tester
and testee is too easy and provides only trivial results. Not all
kinds of self-support are so trivial:
Consider the following ways in which SPP [sense perceptual doxas
tic practice] supports its own claims. (r) By engaging in SPP and
allied memory and inferential practices we are enabled to make pre
dictions, many of which turn out to be correct, and thereby we
are able to anticipate and control, to some considerable extent, the
course of events. (2) By relying on SPP and associated practices we
are able to establish facts about the operations of sense perception
that show both that it is a reliable source of belief and why it is
reliable. These results are by no means trivial. It can not be taken for
granted that any practice whatever will yield comparable fruits. It is
quite conceivable that we should not have attained this kind or de
gree of success at prediction and control by relying on the output of
SPP; and it is equally conceivable that this output should not have
put us in a position to acquire sufficient understanding of the work
ings of perception to see why it can be relied on. To be sure, an
8. Ibid. , p. 17.
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argument from these fruits to the reliability of SPP is still infected
with epistemic circularity; apart from reliance on SPP we have no
way of knowing the outcome of our attempts at prediction and con
trol, and no way of confirming our suppositions about the workings
of perception. Nevertheless, this is not the trivial epistemically cir
cular support that necessarily extends to every practice. Many prac
tices can not show anything analogous; crystal ball gazing and the
reading of entrails cannot. Since SPP supports itself in ways it con
ceivably might not, and in ways other practices do not, its prima
facie claims to acceptance are thereby strengthened; and if crystal ball
gazing lacks any non-trivial support, its claims suffer by compari
son.•
This does not mean that we should expect all practices to be self
supported in the SPP way, for example, by predictive capabilities.
Such requirements are neither necessary nor important for other
practices. But we can and should look at other practices to consider
their fruits and whether they are appropriate to the aims of those
practices. The basic point is, however, that practices may or may
not have self-support of this epistemically circular but nontrivial
sort and thereby be strengthened or weakened from the point of
view of their overall rationality.
Alston closes the essay by considering the relationship between
rationality as he construes it and the original issues of reliability
and justification. As it turns out, the prima facie rationality of en
gaging in a practice entails neither the reliability of the practice nor
a justification for a belief in its reliability. This is true, in part at
least, because the notion of justification cum reliability is an "ob
jectivist " notion whereas the notion of rationality is an "subjec
tivist " one, the former applying to beliefs, the latter applying to
practices. Why the distinction?
The short story is this. I have tried to be objectivist as long as possi
ble. But the difficulties in establishing justification (rationality) for
beliefs in an objectivist sense drives us (sooner or later, and why
make it any later?) to appeal to an internalist rationality for prac
tices. If one still wonders why we couldn't have used an internalist
conception of justification for beliefs in the first place . . .
. . . the answer is quite simple. So long as we consider beliefs in
9. Ibid., pp. 18-19.
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isolation, we have no sufficient basis for an internalist judgment of
rationality. . . . We come onto something really helpful only when
we take the mode of belief-formation concretely, as an aspect of a
practice that is socially established and that plays a central role in
human life. Then, and only then, do we find reasons for a judgment
that it is reasonable to engage in the practice.
What then is the connection between the rationality of a practice
and its reliability?"To accept some doxastic practice . . . as rational
is to judge that it is rational to take it as a way of finding out what
(some aspect of) the world is like; it is to judge that to form beliefs
in accordance with this practice is to reflect the character of some
stretch of reality. " This move does not imply an entailment of re
liability by rationality. But logical entailment is not the only kind.
There is pragmatic implication, for example, such as that found in
belief; in believing p one is taking p to be true. But the belief in p
does not entail p's truth, and neither does rationality entail re
liability. Nevertheless, judging a practice to be rational seems to
imply that one soundly judges it to be reliable and also that one
soundly judges it to be justifiably engaged in. 10
2.

Alstonian Justification Old and New Once More

How are Alston's various versions of justification and rationality
related? We have seen some relations. My interest, however, is in
connecting the conclusions of"A 'Doxastic Practice' Approach " to
the two versions of the parity thesis I have suggested. One way
to approach this task is to ask how Alston's notion of rationality
is related to the notions of Jns and Jnw as originally construed in
"Christian Experience and Christian Belief. " Alston's original intu
itions were to suggest that Jnw is the best we can do from the epi
stemic point of view, since Je is out of reach. This leaves us with
only a prima facie notion of justification. As we have seen, later he
argues that ]eg is possibly attainable and that in fact it is the most
desirable from the epistemic point of view. Later yet, he suggests
that, although we may have the better kind of epistemic justifica
tion, full reflective justification is not possible. This leaves us with
a notion of rationality spelled out in terms of what is prima facie.
IO. Ibid. , pp. 2 1-2].
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Perhaps Alston's shift to the doxastic practice approach is con
nected to his original intuition-that Je is not within our reach, or
at least not fully so. Because Alston shifts ground when moving
from justification to rationality, we end up not with ]eg plain and
simple but ]eg understood through the doxastic practice approach
that in turn leaves us with prima facie judgments as to the J� of a
practice and thus the ]eg of its deliverances.
In the previous chapter I noted that much of our interest in PTA
derives from the supposition that both PP and CP are only Jnw·
Since it looks as if PP is capable of being more strongly supported
(from the epistemic point of view) than CP-for example, to the
level of J� rather than just Jn-PTA is not so interesting. We want
something more than prima facie justification if we can get it, so
PT AS comes out as worthy of consideration. But now that we
know that J� must be, so to speak, filtered through a doxastic
practice approach, should we not recast Alston's parity thesis in
terms of prima facie rationality? Since, according to Alston, all
epistemic or doxastic practices can be shown to be reliable (using
the trivial methodology he suggests and the assumption it makes),
the interesting claim that a practice is reliable is disabled; no sorting
among practices seems epistemically promising. The move to the
question of rationality resurrects the possibility of sorting among
practices. Although a judgment that it is rational to engage in a
practice includes a sound judgment that the practice is reliable, the
former entails neither that the practice is reliable nor our needing to
show that the practice is reliable.
Given this suggestion, a new parity thesis emerges:
Parity Thesis'tston (PT:x): Under appropriate conditions,
both S's engaging in CP and S's engaging in PP are prima
facie rational.
Understood in this way, Alston's parity thesis avoids the problems
presented above but once again needs evaluation. Is it true?
The first thing to note is that PTX does not fall prey to the
charge that CP lacks indicators of reliability whereas PP does not,
where this is taken to show that one is rational whereas the other is
not. This charge is not successful against PTX for the reasons Al
ston develops in defending CP's Jnw in "Christian Experience and
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Christian Belief." Unlike PTAs• where positive reasons are needed
to show reliability, prima facie rationality and Jnw are explained in
terms of negative conditions, namely, that a practice is prima facie
rationally engaged in (or Jnw) unless there are reasons not to take it
as rational (or justified). So a lack of confirmation or, for that mat
ter, a lack of any indicator of reliability does not remove the prima
facie rationality needed for PTl
But what Alston says does allow for various levels of strength of
rationality beyond the prima facie when he points to various kinds
of self-support for an epistemic practice. Significant self-support
adds to the overall rationality of engaging in a practice. The trivial
testee-tester type of self-support cannot help us distinguish among
various strengths of rationality, for such support is, says Alston,
available for all doxastic practices. But other kinds of self-support
are not. For example, the predictability engendered by SPP, its
usefulness in anticipating and controlling the course of events, and
the fact that we can use SPP to understand how it operates provide
self-support of a kind that not every practice has. Crystal ball gaz
ing and the reading of entrails have neither these features nor any
thing analogous. Since SPP supports itself in ways it might not
have, and in ways that other practices do not, its claims to ratio
nality are stronger than they might otherwise have been.
But there is an important warning to consider here:·
We must be careful not to take up another chauvinistic stance, that
of supposing that a practice can be non-trivially self-supported only
in the SPP way. The acceptability of rational intuition or deductive
reasoning is not weakened by the fact that reliance on the outputs of
these practices does not lead to achievements in prediction and con
trol. The point is that they are, by their very nature, unsuitable for
this use; they are not "designed" to give us information that could
serve as the basis for such results. Since they do not purport to
provide information about the physical environment, it would be
unreasonable in the extreme to condemn them for not providing us
with an evidential basis for predictive hypotheses. Similarly, I have
argued in . . . ["Christian Experience and Christian Belief'] that it is
equally inappropriate to expect predictive efficacy from the practice
of forming beliefs about God on the basis of religious experience,
and equally misguided to consider the claims of that practice to be
weakened by its failure to contribute to achievements of this ilk. On
the other hand, we can consider whether these other practices yield
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fruits that are appropriate to their character and aims. And it would
seem that the combination of rational intuition and deduction yields
impressive and fairly stable abstract systems, while the religious ex
periential practice mentioned earlier provides effective guidance to
spiritual development."
The lack of predictive efficacy of a practice does not show that
the practice is unreliable. And we must not expect all practices to
have the kind of nontrivial self-support that separates the non
trivially supported from the trivially supported in terms of ratio
nality. Nor must we expect all kinds of nontrivial self-support to
be alike. There are then at least two classes of doxastic practices:
those that are trivially supported (all practices fall into this class)
and those that have additional, nontrivial support (a subclass of the
larger).
Can the differences among the nontrivial kinds of self-support
allow us to divide the subclass into further subclasses in terms of
strength of overall rationality? Perhaps, but Alston suggests no
way to do this. In fact, one might make the following argument
against such an adjudication. Since it is not the case that the result
of SPP (its help in our getting around in the physical world) is
epistemically superior to results of other practices (the building of
stable abstract systems or spiritual development), how could one
adjudicate between them? These goals and results are not epistemic
but practical, and on that point the goals and results of each prac
tice may simply be different. When the practices work well they
are self-supported in a way that distances them from those that do
not work well-those that are merely trivially self-supported-and
thus strengthened in their claim to rationality. But once moved
into the inner circle of nontrivially self-supported practices, further
adjudication on epistemic grounds seems unlikely. For the goals
and results are internal, as is the judgment that those goals are met
by the results. It is the internal nature of the judgment that appar
ently disallows epistemic comparison of the winning practices.
Thus it seems unlikely that one can successfully make out an argu
ment that PP is more strongly nontrivially self-supported than CP
on epistemic grounds. A challenge to PT� based on that approach
does not seem to have a high likelihood of success.
I I.

Ibid.' p. 19.
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But this argument needs to contend with two issues. First is the
issue of evaluating CP and PP in terms of the closeness of the cog
nitive connection between the experiences and the beliefs generated
by the practices. Recall that CP and PP seem to differ on whether
they are conceptual-reading practices or noninferential mediated
practices. I argued that PP is the former, CP the latter, and that
Alston needs to refine further the notion of Jnw· Taking prima facie
rationality and its connections to epistemic justification and re
liability as further refinements of the general idea behind Jnw• or at
least of Alston's initial intuition that Jnw is the best we can do epi
stemically, perhaps it can be suggested that there are levels of
strength within the winning circle of epistemic practices. Would
such adjudication among levels be an epistemic adjudication? I be
lieve so, but I postpone the detailed argument for this point until
Chapter 8.
Second, if, as Alston says, the features of predictability, univer
sal engagement, and like conceptual schemes are "desiderata for an
epistemic practice " from a cognitive point of view, then PP is su
perior in that way to CP and to all other practices that fail to have
those features, by his own admission.12 Of course, that things "go
more smoothly, more satisfyingly, " from the cognitive point of
view when certain features are present does not in itself show that a
practice with those features is reliable. On this point Alston seems
quite correct. But it does show, on Alston's terms, that a practice
failing to have those features, or analogous features, does not have
as strong a rational claim. This is indicated by Alston's unwilling
ness to accept those doxastic practices that are idiosyncratic or not
socially accepted, such as Cedric's sun-dried tomato approach to
the stock market or the use of entrails for teaching us about politi
cal events. These idiosyncratic practices lack the significant self
support of the predictable SPP, for example.
But can we rank practices within the subclass of the nontrivially
self-supported by kinds of self-support? We can, given Alston's
admission that, "if we were shaping the world to our heart's de
sire, I dare say that we would arrange for our practices to exhibit
these features [e. g. , predictive power, universal engagement, and
12. See Alston, "Christian Experience and Christian Belief," pp. 123-24, for
details.
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so forth]," after which he goes on to argue that CP and PP are
both Jnw even though the former lacks the features whose presence would
increase its cognitive attractiveness. 13 But this ranking is done from the
cognitive point of view, and one wonders what cognition has to
do with epistemic justification. Being cognitively more satisfying
does not provide evidence of reliability and hence does not provide
evidence of justification either. Perhaps the best we can say is that
the cognitive attractiveness influences only one's rational engage
ment in a practice. And, as Alston argues, rationality and justifica
tion are not the same thing. But that cognitive attractiveness influ
ences the rational acceptance of a practice does at least indicate our
preference for certain kinds of practice over others (e. g. , predictive
practices over nonpredictive), and accordingly we can rank prac
tices in terms of their desirability from a rational-cognitive point of
view. The more desirable a practice is from the cognitive point of
view, the more rational it is to engage in that practice. This point
links to the first issue, for surely it is more desirable from the cog
nitive point of view to have our beliefs closely read off our experi
ences; the distinction between conceptual-reading and noninfer
ential mediated practices becomes important at precisely this
juncture. Insofar as a practice puts our beliefs more directly in
touch with the experiences that generate them than not (that is,
insofar as a practice is a conceptual-reading practice rather than a
noninferential mediated practice), it is more rational to engage in
that practice.
Is there a direct connection between the nontrivial self-support
to which Alston points (predictive power or spiritual formative
power) and conceptual-reading versus noninferential mediated
practices? If being conceptually read is more cognitively satisfying
than being noninferentially mediated, then one might suggest that
only practices that are the former are also predictive or universally
engaged in. But this is not the case, since there are epistemic prac
tices that seem to be neither conceptually read nor predictive,
for example, pure mathematics. Pure mathematics, it would seem,
should rank fairly high in terms of our rational engagement
therein. Nevertheless, just as we would construct the world, if we
could, in such a way that our experiential epistemic practices had
IJ. Ibid., p. 124.
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the features of predictability, universal engagement, and so forth,
so we would construct the world such that our experientially based
practices were of the conceptual-reading sort. Such a world is more
desirable from the cognitive point of view. That we have such a
wish allows for a ranking of strengths of rationality on the simple
ground that one practice more immediately connects the beliefs it
generates to the experiences on which it rests than others.
Thus the ranking of practices from within the subclass of ratio
nal practices is quite complex. It involves ranking certain features
dealing with the internal goals of a practice to its deliverances (e. g. ,
does the practice aim to be predictive and is it? vs. does the practice
aim to develop its participants's spiritual formation and does it?).
But it also involves sortings on the basis of whether a practice
is experientially based (pure mathematics vs. PP or CP) as well as
rankings among experientially based practices in terms of how
closely connected the beliefs it delivers are to the experiences that
generate those beliefs. This last ranking seems to involve a signifi
cant epistemic aspect, for the noninferential mediated generation of
beliefs involves other background beliefs that stand in need of epi
stemic justification, an issue to which I return in Chapters 7 and 8.
What does all this have to do with PT�? I am suggesting that
one can rank practices within the subclass of the nontrivially self
supported from a cognitive point of view and that, although some
practices rank higher than others, this does not show that the lower
are not prima facie rational. But then even though PT� may be
true, it stands in need of further refinement, just as PTA does. Al
though it is interesting that CP and PP are both prima facie ratio
nal, if there are further levels of strength of rationality to which we
have access, then we ought to consider those. Although PP and CP
may have the same kind of rationality-PP with its predictive self
support and CP with its spiritual development self-support-the
former has a stronger level of self support; PP is a conceptual
reading practice and CP is only a noninferential mediated practice.
As such, the former ranks more highly in terms of its overall ratio
nality. Thus although PT� is, left without refinement, true, a
closer analysis indicates that PP and CP do not have the same level
of rational strength beyond the prima facie level, and a more cir
cumspect statement of the parity thesis needs to indicate that dif
ference in level.
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The original thought behind the parity thesis was that PP and
CP have the same kind and level of epistemic justification. Alston's
epistemology seems to indicate that ultimate judgments of re
liability, and hence justification, can only be done (in any helpful
way) from the point of view of rationality.14 Does PT'X fulfill the
original aims of Alston's project in comparing religious and non
religious beliefs and practices? Insofar as one's judgment that one's
engaging in a practice is rational is a judgment that one's engaging
in it is justified and that the practice is reliable, then yes it does.
And perhaps that is the best we can do-a sort of meta
epistemological thesis that CP and PP are on a par. But even un
derstood in metaepistemological terms, PT'X stands in need of fur
ther refinement because of the various strengths of the claims to
rationality beyond the merely prima facie level.
In this and the previous several chapters I have argued that Al
ston's initial parity thesis stands in need of further clarification and
that a stronger version based on his later work is not true. In
Chapter 2 I raised difficulties based on distinctions between nonin
ferential mediated belief formation and conceptual-reading belief
formation. Applying those distinctions, I have suggested that, al
though noninferential mediated beliefs (or practices) and concep
tual-reading beliefs (or practices) might be Jnw• the former are not
as strongly justified as the latter. The distinction on which that
argument rests was uncovered by considering the problems of
identifying individuals. Such identifications require, following the
background belief challenge, a special role for background beliefs
(beyond mere concepts) in the generation of beliefs about spatio
temporally nonrooted individuals. The failure of the stronger ver
sion of the parity thesis (PTAs) rests on a lack of inductive evidence
for the claim that CP is reliable. This lack of evidence is traceable
in part to a lack of regularity and predictability of the object the
beliefs are about and hence a lack of confirmation for the deliv
erances of CP. But a further account of the parity thesis (PT'X) is
developed in which the emphasis is shifted from epistemic justifica
tion to prima facie rationality. Here too there are various rankings
14. Internal judgments of reliability can be made within the practice on the basis
of evidence.
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beyond the prima facie one can give to practices and thus, although
PT'X is more refined than PTA• it still needs to include a reference
to the various ways a practice may be ranked. Once that is done,
CP and PP, although both minimally prima facie rational, can also
be shown to have different levels of strength beyond the prima
facie. But we are primarily interested in the account of the stron
gest kind and level of rationality (cum justification) we can have,
and we therefore want the parity thesis to reflect that strength.
Since CP and PP can apparently be ranked beyond the prima facie
level, and they turn out, if my argument is correct, to have differ
ent levels of strength beyond the prima facie, PT'X is the strongest
parity thesis we can have. Stronger versions turn out to be false. In
short, PT'X, like PTA• does not reflect what more can be said. It is
misleading in a certain way-leaving us, perhaps, with the false
confidence that since both PP and CP have prima facie rationality
they are equal in epistemic strength. They are not.

[

6

]

Plantinga' s Parity Thesis

Alvin Plantinga's epistemology of religion is no less complex
than Alston's. It can be divided into two parts. The first, both
historically and in the order I consider it here (this and the next
chapter), is Plantinga's development of the notion of the proper
basicality of beliefs; this is his clearest defense of the parity thesis.
In this context, Plantinga's chosen language is that of "epistemic
justification" and "rationality. " This is to be contrasted with the
second part of his epistemology, in which Plantinga develops and
defends his account of "epistemic warrant" or "positive epistemic
status. " There his concern is the quality, property, or thing,
enough of which converts mere true belief into knowledge. In the
essays and books in which he considers these issues, he does not
explicitly consider a parity thesis. Nevertheless, I discuss this as
pect of his epistemology in Chapter 9.
In defending his version of the parity thesis, Plantinga encour
ages us to reconsider epistemic foundationalism and its relationship
to theistic belief. He further urges us to reject evidentialism,
which, he claims, is rooted in a certain version of foundationalism.
In this chapter my initial concern is to introduce Plantinga's earlier
work on rationality, noting the major tenets of his understanding
of foundationalism as well as his arguments against evidentialism
and the particular foundationalist understanding of justification he
claims undergirds it. From this discussion emerges a description of
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Plantinga's version of the parity thesis. I then suggest a challenge
to it.
I. Foundationalism
Plantinga's general concern is whether belief in God, that is, the
belief "God exists, " can be (as opposed to is) rational. To show
how it can be rational, he tries to show how it can be "properly
basic" in a foundational system of justification. On Plantinga's ac
count, epistemological foundationalism is a normative view. 2 One
of its goals is to lay down conditions for rational belief. He writes:
"According to the foundationalist, there is a right way and a
wrong way with respect to belief. People have responsibilities, du
ties and obligations with respect to their believings just as with
respect to their (other) actions. " To be rational, then, "is to exer
cise one's epistemic powers properly-to exercise them in such a
way as to go contrary to none of the norms for such exercise. To
be rational, on this account, is something a person does; it has to
do with one's responsibility or, more broadly, one's following the
norms in epistemic matters. Having stated what it is to be rational,
of course, does not obviously clarify the related issue of epistemic
justification of belief. Here Plantinga is sometimes unclear. He ap
parently uses the terms "rational" and "irrational" interchangeably
with "justified" and "unjustified. " And his claims are, on the one
hand, about beliefs: beliefs are rational (or j ustified) . On the other
hand, he talks about rational noetic structures (or even simply of "be
ing rational, " as in the above quotation) . In the main, his concern
seems to be justified belief. We can, then, pass over the notion of
1

"3

1. Normally, Plantinga speaks not of the belief that God exists but of belief in
God. The latter is to be understood as the former. I follow Plantinga in this conve
nient shorthand. Also, as it turns out, the general concern for Plantinga is beliefs
about God and his activity (e.g., God's creation of the flowers), from which there
is an immediate inference to "God exists." Again, for convenience, I sometimes do
not distinguish between the belief that God exists and other theistic beliefs.
2. At least he thinks this in the account given in the Reformed epistemology
essays published between 1979 and 1985, the essays and ideas around which this
chapter is written.
3. Alvin Plantinga, "The Reformed Objection to Natural Theology," Proceed
ings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 54 (1980): 49-62, quotation pp.
53-54·
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rationality iiberhaupt and concern ourselves with the justification or
propriety of beliefs. We can do this safely because Plantinga's com
ments about rationality are tied closely to his comments about jus
tification, both being normative notions and, presumably, the jus
tification of (most of) one's believings being at least necessary for
the rationality of one's noetic structure or more generally for one's
being (epistemically) rational.
First, then, some comments about Plantinga's notion of noetic
structure. He says: "A person's noetic structure is the set of propo
sitions he believes together with certain epistemic relations that
hold among him and these propositions. These relations include
the basis relation (that I believe p on the basis of q), the supports
relations (that one belief or set of beliefs provides evidential back
ing for another belief), and the propriety of beliefs (those that are
inferential are "properly nonbasic" only if appropriately based on
others, and those that are noninferential are "properly basic" only
if certain hard-to-specify conditions are met). Plantinga also men
tions strength of belief, depth of ingression, epistemic history, and
relations between belief and acceptance as candidates for important
aspects of noetic structures. Of all these aspects of noetic struc
tures, I concentrate on the notion of properly basic beliefs.
Plantinga notes various types of foundationalism and isolates
two in particular: classical (or strong) and weak. He writes: "Sup
pose we say that weak foundationalism is the view that (I) every
rational noetic structure has a foundation [i. e. , a set of properly
basic beliefs], and (2) in a rational noetic structure, non-basic belief
is proportional in strength to support from the foundations . " Clas
sical foundationalism, in contrast, consists of weak foundational
ism plus certain specified criteria for proper basicality. What are
those criteria? "Ancient and medieval foundationalists tended to
hold that a proposition is properly basic for a person only if it is
either self-evident or evident to the senses; modern foundational
ists-Descartes, Locke, Leibniz and the like-tended to hold that
a proposition is properly basic for S only if either self-evident or
incorrigible for S. "5 Plantinga sometimes identifies classical foun
dationalism as the disjunction of ancient and medieval with mod"4

4·
s.

Ibid.
Ibid., pp. 56-57.
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ern foundationalism, but he does not always do so. In places he
treats classical foundationalism simply as modern foundationalism.
Unless otherwise indicated, I use the term "classical foundational
ism" in the broader, disjunctive sense.
The belief that God exists is, of course, neither self-evident, nor
incorrigible, nor evident to the senses. If Plantinga is to show how
belief in God can be properly basic, he must show that classical
foundationalism is false. One of his goals is to accomplish that
task.
2. Evidentialism
By showing classical foundationalism to be false and arguing
that belief in God can be properly basic in some other foundational
system of justification, Plantinga may be able to show how belief
in God can be epistemically justified. But the so-called irrationality
(nonjustified status) of belief in God should not be seen simply as a
problem arising out of classical foundationalism. In a significant
way, says Plantinga, the charge of irrationality-that belief in God
is not justified-is rooted in "evidentialism" and can be generally
stated as the "evidentialist objection to theistic belief.
Evidentialism is the view represented by the following:
"6

(I) There are obligations or standards of excellence with re
spect to belief.
Additionally, Plantinga cites a claim of W. K. Clifford:7
(2) "It is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone to be
lieve anything upon insufficient evidence. "
How are the obligations or standards of (1) to be understood? Plan
tinga's earliest Reformed epistemology essays suggest several dif6. Just as foundationalism is a normative thesis, so is evidentialism. Some of
Plantinga's claims about evidentialism are virtually identical to his claims about
foundationalism. See Plantinga, "The Reformed Objection to Natural Theology,"
p. 53, and "Reason and Belief in God," p. 30.
7. As quoted in Plantinga, "Reason and Belief in God," p. 25; from W. K.
Clifford, "The Ethics of Belief," in Lectures and Essays, vol. 2, Essays and Reviews
(London: Macmillan Press, 1879), originally in Contemporary Review, 1877.
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ferent forms the obligations might assume, but he moves in a later
essay to a model employing the notion of standards rather than
obligations. The motivation for this shift need not concern us here. 8
But perhaps the following captures more of Plantinga's spirit in
characterizing evidentialism:
(2') It is either intellectually wrong or intellectually defective
for anyone to believe anything on insufficient evidence.
We can understand (2') to be a more explicit expression of (2) .
Plantinga gives a list of evidentialists that includes Aquinas, Des
cartes, Locke, Blanshard, Russell, Scriven, Clifford, and Flew.
What common philosophical view is shared by this otherwise var
ied collection of philosophers? In part it is a view about the epi
stemic status that belief in God must have if it is justified. Follow
ing (1) and (2'), they all agree that
(3) It is irrational or unreasonable to accept theistic belief in
the absence of sufficient evidence or reasons.
Some evidentialists also hold a further claim:
(4) We have no evidence or at any rate not sufficient evidence
for the proposition that God exists.
9

Others do not. Here the evidentialist obj ection comes to the fore.
The objection is rooted in the alleged truth of claims (I), (2'), (3),
and (4) and concludes that belief in God is not justified. Thus, all
evidentialist obj ectors are evidentialists, but the converse is not
true. Evidentialism, then, is the view that minimally (I), (2'), and
(3) are true. The evidentialist obj ection is that evidentialism is true,
as is (4). Thus, the belief that God exists ought not to be held or is
noetically unfortunate, untidy, or substandard.
Plantinga disagrees with the evidentialist objector on at least two
8. For obligations, see, for example, Plantinga, "Reason and Belief in God,"
pp. 3 r-34. For standards, see Plantinga, "Coherentism and the Evidentialist Ob
jection to Belief in God," in Rationality, Religious Belief, and Moral Commitment:
New Essays in the Philosophy of Religion, ed. Robert Audi and William J. Wain
wright (Ithaca, N. Y. : Cornell University Press, 1986), p. II r.
9. Plantinga, "Reason and Belief in God," p. 27.
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accounts. First, he thinks there is evidence for the belief that God
exists. Although this disagreement is important, I do not explore
it here. Second, he thinks evidence is not needed for justified belief
in God. The evidentialist responds that nothing is more reasonable
than (3); if there is no evidence or reason to believe in God, one
should not do so on pain of irrationality. But Plantinga does not
mean by his claim that no evidence whatsoever is needed for justi
fied belief in God. What he means by "reason" or "evidence" is not
simply justification in all its varied forms. Rather, he has in mind
discursive justification. We can say that a belief p is discursively
justified for some person S when S holds p because of some other
belief or beliefs she holds. Presumably, the truth of these other
beliefs is taken by S to make p's truth more likely than if they were
not true. Plantinga does not give a complete account of the rela
tionship between the justifying belief(s) and the j ustified belief, but
we can surmise that it must be some sort of inferential relationship.
Discursive j ustification does not include, then, noninferential justi
fication. It does not include justification where p is j ustified by
some sort of experience (e. g., my being appeared to in a certain
way) or by some feature of the proposition itself (e. g., self-evi
dence). Thus, in the typical case, the belief that 2 + 1 = 3 is not
discursively justified but held on the grounds of self-evidence.
When Plantinga speaks of evidentialists holding (3), he attributes to
them the view that belief in God must be discursively justified.
A problem with Plantinga's claims arises here. Claim (2') is that
evidence is needed for any belief to be intellectually nondefective or
intellectually permissible. If Plantinga understands evidence as dis
cursive justification and (2') is true, then every belief must be jus
tified by some other belief. Foundational models of justification
seem to be excluded. But I think this is simply a slip of the pen.
Plantinga need not attribute the stronger view to the evidentialist;
the evidentialist need not claim that all beliefs must be discursively
justified. She need only claim that beliefs that cannot be (or are
not) properly nondiscursive, as far as their justification is con
cerned, must be discursively justified. In fact, Plantinga claims, ev
identialism is rooted in classical foundationalism. Thus, the beliefs
10

ro. See, for example, the ontological argument in Plantinga, God, Freedom, and
Evil (Grand Rapids, Mich. : Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1974), pp. 85-II2.

Plantinga's Parity Thesis

[ III

that are properly basic-those beliefs that are either self-evident,
incorrigible, or evident to the senses-need not be provided evi
dence in the way (2') demands. Claim (2') should be replaced by
(2*) It is either intellectually wrong or intellectually defective
for anyone to believe, on insufficient evidence, any belief
requiring discursive justification.
Naturally, if the evidentialist obj ector's challenge is to make sense,
the belief "God exists" must require discursive justification. Thus,
(3) should be replaced by
(3*) Since belief in God requires discursive justification, 1t 1s
irrational, unreasonable, or unjustified to accept theistic
belief in the absence of sufficient evidence or reasons.
Our corrected picture of evidentialism is that minimally {I),
(2*), and (3*) are true. The evidentialist obj ector believes not only
that evidentialism is true but that (4) is also true. Thus, belief in
God is irrational. Plantinga can now be seen as rejecting (3*) and
(4).
Despite Plantinga's disagreements with (3*) and (4), he does
think (I) is true. He writes that "it seems plausible to hold that
there are obligations and norms with respect to belief, and I do not
intend to contest this assumption."'' Extrapolating from his later
work, I assume he would no longer put forth this claim alone but
instead make appropriate modifications in light of the demands of
noetic excellence or nondefectiveness. 12 Thus, he would affirm
(I*) There are obligations, standards of excellence, or (other)
normative patterns to follow with respect to belief which,
when followed, provide permissive justification for a be
lief.
The evidentialist thus would hold (I*), (2*), and (3*), and the evi
dentialist obj ector would add (4).
r I. Plantinga, "Reason and Belief in God," p. 3 I.
12. Whether (2*) is something Plantinga believes is not clear. I presume he
would not obviously disagree, but I suspect he would be hesitant to say that there
is a class of beliefs whose members noetically demand discursive justification.
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Two aspects of Plantinga's thought deserve special attention.
First, his account of epistemic justification is an account of a nor
mative notion of epistemic justification. 13 Although he does not
spell out the details of the position, the notion ofjustification with
which he is concerned is in the neighborhood of permissive justi
fication, that is, what one is permitted to believe given that one has
done as much as can be expected vis-a-vis the normative require
ments for belief, whether those requirements are deontologically
based or otherwise. Second, he disagrees not only with the eviden
tialist objector but also with some of the claims of the evidentialist.
Not only is there discursive evidence for belief in God, but even
were there not, belief in 'God could nonetheless be justified. Al
though Plantinga holds that discursive justification for belief in
God can be given, it is not required for justification, at least in the
sense of permissive, normative justification. The evidentialist is
wrong; belief in God does not require discursive justification.
We are not yet in a position to state Plantinga's version of the
parity thesis. We do know that it involves a permissive, normative
notion ofjustification (not unlike Alston's Jnw• in some respects) . It
also includes some reference to the fact that theistic beliefs need not
be nonbasic but can be properly basic.
3.

The Failure of Classical Foundationalism

Plantinga argues in two ways against classical foundationalism. Let
us call these the "incoherence argument" and the "widespread belief
argument. " First, the incoherence argument. Plantinga captures clas
sical foundationalism's criteria for proper basicality in this way:14
(5) A proposition p is properly basic for a person S if and
only if p is either self-evident to S, incorrigible for S, or
evident to the senses for S.
On the classical foundationalist's view, not only is the disjunction
of the criteria sufficient for proper basicality, but it is necessary as
well. Plantinga's concern is with the necessity of the criteria.
13. He may hold other understandings of justification to be plausible as well.
And he certainly holds that normative justification and epistemic warrant are not
the same thing; see Plantinga, "Positive Epistemic Status and Proper Function,"
pp. 2-3·
14. Plantinga, "Reason and Belief in God," p. 59.
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According to classical foundationalism, says Plantinga, beliefs
are either properly basic, properly nonbasic, or not justified. Plan
tinga asks, of these alternatives, which is (5)? To be justified, (5)
must be either properly basic or properly nonbasic. If it is properly
basic it must be either self-evident, incorrigible, or evident to the
senses. It is none of these. It must, then, be properly nonbasic. To
be properly nonbasic, (5) must be supported by a belief from the
foundation. Is it thus supported? It is not easy to see how. In sum
mary the challenge is this. If the statement of the criteria, that is,
(5), cannot be anchored, as it were, by its own expressed criteria,
how is it to be anchored? If it cannot be anchored on classical foun
dationalism's own grounds, it is either noetically substandard or
we ought not believe it. Classical foundationalism is self-referen
tially incoherent.
The widespread belief argument simply has it that, even were it
coherent to believe (5), such an account of epistemic justification
would make many of our beliefs unjustified. Plantinga has in mind
beliefs about the past and other minds. These follow neither de
ductively, inductively, nor on a probabilistic basis from the basic
beliefs allowed by (5) . This shows that (5) is false or at least un
justified, for surely many beliefs about other minds and the past are
justified. Here Plantinga's parity thesis begins to emerge, for the
development of a theory that allows us to hold that these wide
spread beliefs are justified leads to a theory that allows belief in
God to be justified on similar grounds. He concludes that, given
these two arguments, classical foundationalism is in poor shape. It
is not, according to Plantinga, a viable epistemic model for norma
tive, permissive justification.
15

4· Plantinga's Nonclassical, Normative
Foundationalism
The death of classical foundationalism does not signal the end of
all foundational models of justification; Plantinga remains a foun
dationalist. Two further points are relevant in this regard. First, a
beliefs being neither self-evident, incorrigible, nor evident to the
15. I believe he would add that classical foundationalism is not a viable epi
stemic model for many other kinds of justification as well, including that justifica
tion ("warrant") needed for knowledge.
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senses does not rule out its being properly basic. The rejection of
the classical criteria does not leave the foundationalist with no
where to turn. Having shown that the classical criteria do not pro
vide necessary conditions for proper basicality does not entail the
nonexistence of all criteria. Just as the critic of the verification prin
ciple of meaningfulness does not, on showing the principle false,
have to admit that there are no criteria for meaningfulness, Plan
tioga does not have to admit that there are no criteria for proper
basicality after rejecting the classical criteria.
Second, on rejecting a particular set of criteria for proper ba
sicality one need not have a replacement in order to recognize be
liefs as properly basic. One need not know what the criteria are in
order to recognize that some beliefs are properly basic. Also, one
need not know the criteria to recognize that something is not prop
erly basic. Again, just as the critic of the verification principle of
meaningfulness can know that "T'was brillig and the slithy toves
did gyre and gymble in the wabe" is not meaningful, the critic of
the classical criteria can know that some belief is not properly ba
sic, even though neither critic is able to replace the rejected criteria.
One can remain a foundationalist without an explicit account of
the criteria for foundational beliefs.
What of the criteria, then? Are there criteria necessary and suffi
cient for proper basicality? It is less than clear that there are, for
Plantinga's suggested method for discovering the criteria leads to a
much more open understanding of the role of criteria for proper
basicality than that provided by classical models of foundational
ism. He writes in this now oft-quoted passage that
the proper way to arrive at such a criterion is, broadly speaking,
inductive. We must assemble examples of beliefs and conditions such
that the former are obviously properly basic in the latter . . . . We
must then frame hypotheses as to the necessary and sufficient condi
tions of proper basicality and test these hypotheses by references
to those examples. Under the right conditions, for example, it is
clearly rational to believe that you see a human person before you: a
being who has thoughts and feelings, who knows and believes
things, who makes decisions and acts. It is clear, furthermore, that
you are under no obligation to reason to this belief from others you
hold; under those conditions that belief is properly basic for you.
But then (5) . . . must be mistaken; the belief in question, under
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those circumstances, is properly basic, though neither self-evident
nor incorrigible [nor evident to the senses] for you. Similarly, you
may seem to remember that you had breakfast this morning, and
perhaps you know of no reason to suppose your memory is playing
you tricks. If so, you are entirely justified in taking that belief as
basic. Of course it isn't properly basic on the criteria offered by
classical . . . foundationalists; but that fact counts not against you
but against those criteria.
Accordingly, criteria for proper basicality must be reached from
below rather than above; they should not be presented as ex Cathe
dra, but argued to and tested by a relevant set of examples. But there
is no reason to assume, in advance, that everyone will agree on the
examples. The Christian will of course suppose that belief in God is
entirely proper and rational; if he doesn't accept this belief on the
basis of other propositions, he will conclude that it is basic for him
and quite properly so. Followers of Bertrand Russell and Madelyn
Murray O'Hare may disagree, but how is that relevant? Must my
criteria, or those of the Christian community, conform to their ex
amples? Surely not. The Christian community is responsible to its
set of examples, not to theirs.
16

Rather than arbitrarily legislate the criteria for proper basicality, we
must inductively examine our noetic structures. On the basis of
what we take to be properly basic, we must come to agreement on
the criteria. If we disagree on which beliefs ought to be accepted as
properly basic, our criteria are different. This suggests that proper
basicality and its criteria are relative, in some way, person to per
son or community to community.
Plantinga continues by noting that criteria arrived at in the par
ticularistic way he suggests may not be polemically useful. If we
arrive at different criteria when using the inductive procedure, we
may not be able to use those criteria to reject another's examples of
properly basic beliefs. He wants to deny, however, that just any
belief can be properly basic. He says that in fact properly basic
beliefs stand in relation to the conditions in which they are formed,
and this relationship provides justification for properly basic be
liefs. Properly basic beliefs are not, says Plantinga, groundless.

16. Plantinga, "Is Belief in God Properly Basic?" Nous 15 (1981): 41-51, quota
tion p. so.
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It is tempting to raise the following sort of question. If belief in
God is properly basic, why cannot just any belief be properly basic?
Could we not say the same for any bizarre aberration we can think
of? What about voodoo or astrology? What about the belief that the
Great Pumpkin returns every Halloween? Could I properly take that
as basic? . . . If we say that belief in God is properly basic, will we
not be committed to holding that just anything, or nearly anything,
can properly be taken as basic, thus throwing wide the gates to irra
tionalism and superstition?
Certainly not. 17

One thing is clear: Plantinga wishes to reject a certain kind of arbi
trariness; he wants to reject an arbitrariness in which just any belief
can be properly basic, an arbitrariness in which a Great Pumpkin
belief is epistemically j ustified. So, not just any belief can be taken
as properly basic. A belief is properly basic only in certain circum
stances-only when it is grounded. But which circumstances pro
vide grounding?
Plantinga does not provide a formal account of the relationship
between beliefs and the conditions in which they are formed. He
instead provides some hints. I focus on two points. First, if one has
no reason to suspect that a belief is not justified, it is justified (or
perhaps, if one has no reason to doubt one's epistemic practice,
e. g., one's memory, the beliefs it generates are justified). Second,
if one has done all that can be expected epistemically with regard
to a belief, it is justified. Plantinga also provides the following ex
amples. He notes that the conditions in which the beliefs are
formed may be much more complex than the examples suggest,
but nonetheless "I see a tree" is properly basic if I am being appeared
to treely, "that person is in pain" is properly basic when I am aware
of that person displaying pain behavior, and "I had breakfast this
morning" is properly basic if I seem to remember having breakfast
this morning. Since these beliefs are not based on other beliefs, they
are basic. They are not, however, arbitrary or groundless.
18

19

I7. Plantinga, "Reason and Belief in God," p. 74·
I 8. One is tempted to call this arbitrariness "relativism," but that term is surely
a loaded one. To avoid much potential confusion, I continue in my use of the term
"arbitrary" (and its cognates).
I9. I refer to these as the "paradigms" of justified belief or as the "paradigms" of
properly basic beliefs; see Chapter I, Section 2.
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The circumstances vary the conditions in which a belief is prop
erly basic, but if a belief is properly basic there is a true proposition
of the sort:20
(6) In conditions C, S is justified in taking p as basic.
Certain kinds of conditions thus ground certain kinds of belief as
basic. The beliefs are justified by those conditions, although one
does not hold the beliefs on the basis of some other belief. Such
beliefs are nondiscursively justified or properly basic.
Some clarifications are possible here. First, surely some features
can be noted and agreed on which are necessarily shared by all
properly basic beliefs. For example, p is a properly basic belief only
if p is basic (not based on other beliefs) and proper (meets the con
ditions for the proper basicality of p) . These purely formal cri
teria-call them "formal" or "universal" criteria-are not, appar
ently, of concern to Plantinga.
A second level of criteria-call them "material" or "general" cri
teria-can be distinguished. Self-evidence, being evident to the
senses, and incorrigibility are examples. As Plantinga argues, these
examples are neither severally nor jointly necessary for proper ba
sicality. Any belief meeting one of these criteria, however, is prop
erly basic. It may well be possible to complete the set so that a
disjunction of these three criteria and some other criterion (or crite
ria) forms a set necessary for proper basicality. Meeting any mem
ber of the set (or combination of members of the set) would be
sufficient for proper basicality, but at least one of the set must be
met for a belief to be properly basic. This set, one might say, is the
instantiation of the formal criterion of propriety. To be properly
basic, a belief must meet at least one of the general criteria.
Finally, a third level of criteria can be distinguished-call them
"particular" criteria. My having the experience of what I take to be
a blue patch is an example of a particular criterion. This may be a
necessary condition of the proper basicality of the belief "I see a
blue patch, " although not for beliefs in general. Plantinga suggests
that my being appeared to redly is necessary and sufficient for the
proper basicality of the belief "I am appeared to redly. These are
"21

20. Plantinga, "Reason and Belief in God, " p. 79.
21. See ibid. , p. 77·
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the conditions in which "I am appeared to redly" is basic and prop
erly so. The conditions do vary from belief to belief, and perhaps
from moment to moment or person to person, but there nonethe
less are conditions for each properly basic belief which confer on
the belief the status of epistemic propriety. When one goes through
the inductive procedure to discover the conditions in which one's
basic beliefs are properly basic, it seems that the general criteria are
discovered only by considering the particular criteria. The general
criteria may then be inferred from whatever is shared in common
by sets of particular criteria for proper basicality. Plantinga uses the
term "criteria" to cover both what I have called material or general
criteria and particular criteria.
Thus Plantinga provides us with the outline of a nonclassical,
normative foundationalism. There are beliefs, both basic and non
basic. The former may be properly basic under certain conditions.
The discovery of those conditions is up to the community (or indi
vidual, as the case may be). The latter are, presumably, properly
nonbasic when appropriately based on other properly basic beliefs
or based on beliefs that are in turn based appropriately on properly
basic beliefs and so forth. In all cases, the propriety or appropriate
ness of the beliefs is a normative one.
22

5·

Proper Basicality, Theistic Beliefs, and the Parity
Thesis

Plantinga claims that with the collapse of classical foundation
alism the door is open to the possibility of belief in God being
properly basic. At least there is no reason to think that belief in
God cannot be. In fact, Plantinga's own version of foundationalism
is specifically designed to allow belief in God to be properly basic.
But is belief in God truly properly basic? Those in the tradition of
Reformed Christian theology answer affirmatively, says Plantinga,
and he enthusiastically concurs. He says little, however, about the
conditions that ground or justify belief in God as basic. He argues
that classical foundationalism is false but does not replace the crite
ria he rejects with his own. He claims instead that even without
23

22. I thank Bill Forgie for helpful discussion on these distinctions.
23. Plantinga, "Reason and Belief in God," p. 73.
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knowing the criteria for proper basicality one can know (in many
cases) which beliefs are and are not properly basic. The conditions
in which properly basic beliefs are provided grounding can thus be
discovered inductively. From these conditions one can discover the
criteria. Even though one does not know the conditions in which
belief in God is properly basic, it may nevertheless be properly
basic. The issue should not be decided without a close look at the
beliefs of religious believers.
Plantinga does suggest that belief in God is not groundless. He
compares it to grounded perceptual beliefs ("I see a tree"), memory
beliefs ("I remember eating breakfast this morning"), and beliefs
that ascribe mental states to other humans ("That person is in
pain"). These are the paradigm beliefs, as I suggested in Chapter I
that we call them. Plantinga argues that, in a manner analogous to
the grounding of these beliefs, "God exists" may be grounded.
Following Calvin, Plantinga holds that we have a disposition to
believe such things as "This flower was created by God" or "This
vast and intricate universe was created by God. On doing some
thing wicked I may form the belief "God disapproves of what I
have done." On reading the Bible one may feel compelled to be
lieve "God is speaking to me. " These conditions ground the beliefs
mentioned. Plantinga notes that none of these beliefs are, strictly
speaking, the belief that God exists. But again, strictly speaking,
what we are justified in believing is that "That person is in pain"
rather than that "That person exists. " We see no harm in ignoring
the one step, immediate inference from the former to the latter, so
it too is taken as properly basic. By analogy, there is no harm in
saying that the belief that God exists is properly basic, even though
there is a one step, immediate inference from the theistic claims
mentioned above to the belief that God exists. This immediate in
ference does not, presumably, provide anything more than a mini
mally complex sort of discursive evidence.
It is in this general context that Plantinga's parity thesis is most
clearly seen. The thesis emerges when he compares theistic beliefs
to paradigm beliefs, even though the comparison's role is not well
spelled out. Clearly enough, however, the comparison of (or anal
ogy between) the paradigm beliefs and theistic beliefs is no mere
"24

24. Ibid., p. So.
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convenience. It is a major tenet of Plantinga's position. As a first
account of Plantinga's parity thesis, let us say that, under appropri
ate conditions, S's belief that p, where p is a belief about God, has
the same nonclassical, normative justification as S's belief that p*,
where p * is a paradigm belief. Of course, the paradigm beliefs
should not be understood to be just the three examples mentioned,
but any beliefs of like kind. So theistic beliefs have, according to
Plantinga, at least the same kind of epistemic standing as many of
our commonly accepted nontheistic beliefs, insofar as permissive,
normative justification is concerned.
But, as with Alston's parity thesis, one must distinguish between
having the same kind of epistemic justification and having the
same level or strength of that kind. With Alston, it is clear that Jnw
is a weaker level of Jn than is Jn" and so it is evident that his con
'
cern is with level and kind. Alston also tells us that he is aiming at
the level of epistemic justification sufficient for "rational accep
tance. " But with Plantinga the issue is not so clear. Perhaps, how
ever, he means us to work with the notion of proper basicality
understood as a kind of j ustification, namely, noninferential nor
mative justification. It is natural then to suggest various levels
within that kind. Thus we can say that the level of justification
within the range of proper basicality is to be understood as the
same for both theistic and paradigm beliefs. But we need to con
sider potential overriding conditions. For example, although there
might be levels of strength of noninferential justification, they gen
erally have to do with special circumstances, such as that the night
is foggy rather than clear. The belief that there is a car ahead is
properly basic when held on a clear night. The belief that there is a
car ahead is also properly basic on a foggy night. But the former is
more strongly justified than is the latter even though both are
properly basic. (It might be two motorcycles, rather than a car. In
either case, it is time to get off the road . ) In this way, then, there
may be a range of strengths of justification within the category of
proper basicality; as well, some overriders may remove justifica
tion completely. To be clear about parity, we must allow for po
tential overriding conditions. Thus, given no special circum25

25. Plantinga also writes, at some length, about the defeasibility of properly
basic beliefs, noting that the justification that accrues to them is prima facie only.
This view meshes well with his normative account, as far as he has a developed
account, of justification; see ibid., pp. 83-85.
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stances, theistic beliefs and paradigm belief can have the same level
of justification-the strongest level-of the same kind ofjustifica
tion-noninferential normative proper basicality. Thus, a more ac
curate account of Plantinga's parity thesis is
Parity ThesisPiantinga (PTpJ): Under appropriate condi
tions, where no overriders are present, S's belief that p,
where p is a belief about God, has the same nonclassical
normative proper basicality (the strongest level) as S's be
lief that p *, where p * is a paradigm belief.
Thus PTPI is a broader claim than PTA• for it includes not only
perceptual beliefs, but memory beliefs and beliefs about other
minds as well. But both PTPI and PTA make claims not only about
the kind but also about the level of epistemic justification. They
differ, however, in that Alston's is a practice-based claim rather
than a belief-based claim.
Although Plantinga's discussion is broader than Alston's in that
Plantinga's parity thesis makes reference to memory beliefs and to
beliefs about other minds as well as to perceptual beliefs, it is easier
in some contexts to discuss Plantinga's thesis if we narrow its
scope. So consider a narrower version of PTp1:
Parity Thesis i>Iantinga (PTpJ): Under appropriate condi
tions, where no overriders are present, S's belief that p,
where p is a belief about God, has at least the same non26

26. Plantinga's more recent claims, in "Justification and Theism," Faith and Phi
losophy 4 (1987): 403-26, and "Positive Epistemic Status and Proper Function,"
point toward understanding positive epistemic status as the proper functioning of
one's epistemic equipment. In Warrant: The Current Debate and Warrant and Proper
Function, he indicates his preference for the term "warrant" over "justification" for
that thing, enough of which, together with true belief, is sufficient for knowledge.
On that account, warrant is again a matter of proper functioning. The relationship
between positive epistemic status as a necessary condition of knowledge and posi
tive epistemic status as a condition of justification (in the normative sense being
considered here) is not clear or, perhaps, even important. Plantinga indicated, in
conversation, that his earlier work on Reformed epistemology asked the wrong
questions, if one is interested in knowledge, but that perhaps there are some as yet
uncovered relationships among knowledge, justification, and positive epistemic
status. He does reject various accounts of normative notions of justification as
necessary conditions of knowledge. It is thus difficult to know what to say about
the relationship of normative, permissive justification and positive epistemic status.
But then it is not clear that we need to have a position on the matter for the
purposes here. I make some futher comments on this topic in Chapter 9.
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classical normative proper basicality (the strongest level)
as S's belief that p*, where p* is a perceptual belief.

Since showing that the narrower thesis is false is sufficient for
showing the broader thesis false, I concentrate mostly on the nar
rower thesis. Hence, the majority of my discussion focuses on per
ceptual beliefs in comparison with theistic beliefs. I return later to
comment on memory beliefs and beliefs about other minds.
We now have Plantinga's parity thesis before us. In the remain
der of this chapter I present a challenge to it.
6.

The Universality Challenge Explained

Plantinga's central goal is the defense of PTPI· Since paradigm
beliefs can be properly basic, so can theistic beliefs. (For conve
nience, I speak simply of proper basicality rather than the strongest
level of proper basicality. ) I argue that PTPI or, more specifically,
PTl>1 is incompatible with Plantinga's foundationalism, or at least
with foundationalism as far as it relies on its traditional roots.
Foundationalism's traditional roots are, I believe, largely eviden
tialist concerns. Contrary to Plantinga's suggestion that evidential
ism grows out of foundationalism, foundationalism seems more
naturally understood to grow out of evidentialism, that is, to grow
out of the desire of the evidentialist to avoid arbitrariness, where
"arbitrariness" means, roughly, the claim that just any belief can be
properly basic (or, more broadly, normatively, epistemically justi
fied). If one is to avoid this arbitrariness, if one is to follow the
spirit of the evidentialist, then one approach is to be a founda
tionalist about justification. But I argue that PTpJ, and hence PTPh
is incompatible with Plantinga's foundationalist theory ofjustifica
tion insofar as it rests in the desire to avoid arbitrariness. This is so,
I argue, because of what I call the "universality challenge. "
The universality challenge is this: given an experience shared by
both theist and nontheist alike, nearly everyone will be led to form
a shared nontheistic (perceptual paradigm) belief, whereas only the
theist will be led to form a theistic belief. So, whereas both theist
and nontheist experience awe at the beauty of the universe, only
n

27. This challenge is a more rigorous form of one presented in Richard Grigg,
"Theism and Proper Basicality: A Response to Plantinga," International journal for
Philosophy of Religion 14 (1983): 123-27.
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the theist (and perhaps not even she in every instance) will form
a belief about God's creativity. Or perhaps more telling (because
avoiding potential problems with the aesthetic overtones of
"awe"), when both theist and nontheist experience a tree, both will
form the belief "I see a tree, " whereas only the theist will (some
times) form the belief that God made the tree. 28 The challenger
suggests that this universality of belief formation indicates the
firmly grounded nature of the perceptual paradigm beliefs, and
since the experience that generates the theistic belief does not pro
vide universality, it does not provide sufficient grounds for proper
basicality.
The motivation behind this challenge is broadly egalitarian in
spirit. The idea is that every fully rational human has certain belief
forming practices for producing justified beliefs. A general account
of these practices might be, roughly, that if some (cognitive) input
I is taken in by some fully rational person S, then S will form a
Uustified) belief p whose object is of kind K. For example, if Suzie
takes in the sensory input of tree-shapedness, then she will form
the justified belief that she sees a tree. The universality challenge
has the background assumption that all fully rational beings have
these practices and that, if one does have the practice, then one will
form the corresponding beliefs. As far as justified belief is con
cerned, all belief formations must be universal in this sense, includ
ing theistic belief formations. If one rejects this assumption, then
the universality challenge is not relevant to the parity thesis.
To flesh this assumption out somewhat, consider the following.
Suppose two people are looking through their home for some ob
ject, say, a particular copy of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. If both
were to enter the den, look toward the lower left corner of the
desk, epistemic equipment in full working order, and the copy of
Kant's first critique were lying on the desk in that area, would they
not both form the belief "there's the copy of Kant's Critique"? Not
clearly, and for many possible reasons. Person S1 may be distracted
28. To be exact, perhaps not everyone forms the belief "I see a tree. " Perhaps
one is not paying attention to one's experience or is distracted by the brilliance of
the green color and so does not form any belief. Nevertheless, when asked what it
is one is seeing, everyone, or nearly everyone with normal experiential equipment,
will say "I see a tree. " The theistic belief or description is not universal in this
sense. To simplify the discussion, I assume this account but refer simply to the
beliefs being formed.
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by something else on the desk, or by his concern that he is making
person S2 late for her class, having asked her to help him search.
But if S2 picks up the book, holds it in front of S1 's eyes, and says,
"here it is, " surely S1 will form the belief in question, or something
very close to it, or at least a belief that entails it. The point of the
egalitarian assumption is not that we form exactly the same beliefs
when given the same input, but that we are capable of forming a
belief about the kind of object providing the input, and, moreover,
that rational people typically do so. And the more fully rational
one is, the more likely one is to form beliefs that are in agreement
with other fully rational people. As far as we are fully rational, all
of us have the same doxastic tendencies. We all share, qua fully
rational people, the same objectification scheme for generating
justified beliefs. Finally, as far as one lacks these tendencies and
schemes, the fully rational person ought to be able to obtain them.
Another brief example. Suppose there is a glass of water in front
of S1 and S2• S1 forms the belief that the glass is half full, S2 that it
is half empty. There is a disagreement in the beliefs formed. But
presumably both would agree that one half the glass's capacity
contains water. It is the fully rational person's tendency to form
beliefs about a certain kind of object, given a certain input, that is
the egalitarian assumption's concern, not the details of what S1 or S2
focuses on. If it is a glass of water in front of them, and they are
concentrating on that rather than something else, they will form a
belief about the glass of water. Background beliefs and attitudes
may affect the details of the beliefs they generate, but the belief
will be a belief about the glass and water.
So, as the theist and nontheist stand in front of the majestic
mountains, both will form a belief about the mountains. Why do
they not both form beliefs about God's creative activity in the
mountains? Should they not both have the capacity to do so? And
if not, why not?
What grounds can be produced for denying or affirming what I
have been calling the "egalitarian assumption"? Kant assumed that
all rational creatures share the same intuitions of space and time
and the same categorical structures. Much like this, most epis
temologists assume that human minds work alike. In particular,
they assume that if we are all fully rational and all take in the same
cognitive input we will all form beliefs of the same kind, barring

Plantinga's Parity Thesis

[ I 25

the typical epistemologist's standard special circumstances or dis
torting conditions (poor lighting and the like). The best argument
in the assumption's favor is that it seems to capture part of our
broad notion of rationality. Two rational persons, in a frame of
mind to concentrate on a given object, will, being rational, form a
belief about that object. If one does not, then, barring special dis
tractions or other excuses, one is rational and the other is not in
this instance. To be rational is to belong to a community of be
lievers who, given the full human capabilities, form similar beliefs
given similar inputs. The assumption thus allows for the possibility
of epistemological research; without the assumption, or some
broader assumption that includes it, there would be no reason to
think we can talk about human knowledge qua human. How could
we talk about whether a belief is rational, or rationally produced,
unless we assume that our cognitive practices deal with a given set
of data in the same way, at least in terms of output? If you can
excuse yourself from the requirements of rationality simply by say
ing that you do not have the doxastic mechanism needed to form a
given belief but yet still claim that you are fully rational, you can
get away with epistemic murder. Perhaps this is reason enough to
justify the assumption. Intuitively, at least, I am inclined to accept
the assumption, and I do not see any reason to reject it.
Some further explanatory notes on the universality challenge are
in order. First, it is important to understand that the universality
challenge does not depend on the theistic belief being generated by
an experience only the theist has. That would not count against the
proper basicality of the theistic belief any more than your not hav
ing the experience of the tree would count against my properly
basic belief that I see a tree, given my experience of the tree. Nei
ther can the challenge find a response simply in the claim that not
everyone objectifies experiences in theistic terms because one lacks
the disposition to do so, lacks the conceptual scheme that allows
one to do so, or, perhaps, simply lacks the ability to do so. The
challenge assumes that fully rational people do have the same basic
objectification schemes. One cannot lack the needed scheme qua
rational being. A comparison of the universality challenge to two
challenges suggested by Alston (see Chapter 2, Section 4) is helpful
in understanding the former. Alston writes that PP and CP differ
in that (1) the capacity for PP, and practice of it, is found univer-
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sally among normal adult human beings, and (2) all normal adult
human beings, whatever their culture, use basically the same con
ceptual scheme in objectifying their sense experience. Alston's re
sponse to these objections is that, although those kinds of univer
sality are interesting and comforting to us, they are not necessary
for reliability. This is shown by the fact that not everyone engages
in the practice of pure mathematics. But it is important to under
stand why it is true that not everyone engages in pure mathemat
ics. Here we must move beyond Alston's suggestions.
Does the mathematically inclined student, for example, have
some ability or means to objectify information in mathematical
terms that other students do not have? I think not. Even where we
speak of students not having mathematical ability, the students in
question typically have some ability. The ability shows up in de
grees. Although there are some who may not engage in the prac
tice, this is not because of a total lack of ability. Rather, those who
do not engage in the practice of pure mathematics, even at the
lowest levels, fail to do so simply because they have no need of it,
never thought about it, or have never been exposed to it. For those
of different cultures who do not engage in the practice, perhaps
their cultures have not developed the appropriate categories even
though in principle nothing stops individuals from so doing. The
slave boy in Plato's Meno is relevant here. At first he does not
engage in the practice of geometric reasoning, but he quickly
learns that he can. In short, two people one of whom engages in
the practice and one of whom does not should be said to differ
because the latter lacks the epistemic practice pragmatically al
though not in principle. I suggest that this lack is the result of the
fact that the one capable of engaging in the practice has the appro
priate input whereas the other does not have that input. This latter
case is comparable to people who have no theistic experience what
soever and hence do not generate theistic beliefs. But how do we
explain Plantinga's cases in which both theist and nontheist have
the same experiential input but only one forms a theistic belief?
It could be suggested that the difference is not in experience but
in conceptual schemes. The theist has a theistic conceptual scheme,
the nontheist does not-rather like the Meno's slave boy, who at
first does not have certain geometrical concepts but later does. But
surely the average atheist or agnostic has a noetic structure that
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contains the concept of God, in spite of all its supposed difficulties.
This raises all kinds of interesting and complex questions about the
relationships between experience and the conceptual schemes used
to understand or objectify them. Do experience and scheme arise
together? Can one have an experience without a conceptual
scheme? To what extent do conceptual schemes shape experience?
But we need not answer these questions in detail to understand the
thrust of the universality challenge. It is not that there are two
experiences or that there are two different conceptual schemes
working. The egalitarian assumption is that everyone, given the
same input, will generate (roughly) the same belief, or at least a
belief whose object is the same (kind of) thing. The challenge sug
gests, that is, that there is a close connection between the input of
an epistemic practice (the experience, in most cases) and the con
ceptual scheme used to objectify that input. Whenever a person
with normal epistemic practices takes in tree-shaped data, a tree
belief is generated. Or, as with Alston's case, the notion of theistic
objectification relies on an account of experience in which there is
some sort of theistic content (as I argued in Chapter 2). In the
experiences to which the universality challenge calls attention,
however, there is no theistic content per se. Rather, the emphasis is
on the shared but nontheistic nature of the experience and the con
ditions necessary to explain why the theist forms a theistic belief
but the nontheist does not. Since the experience is nontheistic,
it does not matter that the experiencer has a theistic conceptual
scheme. No theistic scheme of objectification will generate a theis
tic belief if there is no experience on which the scheme can work its
magic. How then does the theist legitimately generate her theistic
belief when the nontheist does not, given only a shared, nontheis
tic experience?
The assumption that the experiences are nontheistic in content
may appear to be unfair to Plantinga, but I think not. First of all,
many, if not most, of his examples appear to have the feature that
the experience is one that both theist and nontheist could share
looking at the flower, reading the Bible, feeling guilty. Second, an
important result from the criticism of PTA applies to Plantinga if
the experiences to which Plantinga calls attention are understood as
having a theistic content not shared by the nontheist. Such exam
ples fall prey to the background belief challenge. If the experiences
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allow for noninferential justification, it is not of the conceptual
reading but only of the noninferential mediated variety. Insofar as
the experiences are taken to be direct experiences of God, there is
nothing phenomenologically given in the experience that allows
one to say truly, "this is phenomenologically an experience of
God. " There must be background beliefs in the justification of the
belief that one's experience is an experience of God. These back
ground beliefs provide the mitigating circumstances that poten
tially weaken the level of justification of the theistic belief, since
these beliefs may themselves fail to have justification. Thus the an
tecedent conditions set out in PTPI or PTJ,h namely, that there are
no overriding conditions, may never be met. This in itself may
remove the possibility that theistic and perceptual paradigm beliefs
have the kind of parity suggested by PTJ,1. One does not use back
ground beliefs to form the perceptual paradigm beliefs, but one
does use them in the formation of beliefs about God. In the theistic
cases, as in, perhaps, any case dealing with epistemically unique
individuals, one may not have the strongest level of proper ba
sicality, for such beliefs involve a special role for beliefs as opposed
to concepts alone. In defending PTJ,h Plantinga cannot retreat to
unshared experiences with theistic content. Such experiences can
not be direct, conceptual-reading experiences of God, since back
ground beliefs are part of the epistemic conditions needed for justi
fication.
The universality challenge thus suggests that, when an exper
ience is shared by a theist and a nontheist, both should form
(roughly) the same beliefs, including theistic beliefs. If this does
not occur, then that fact needs explaining. It is not sufficient to
suggest that the theist has a practice by which she generates the
theistic belief whereas the nontheist does not have the practice, for,
by the egalitarian assumption, one should expect, given the same
(cognitive) input, that theist and nontheist should both form the
same belief. Of course, if the egalitarian assumption is false, then
the universality challenge is irrelevant. But then some other story
29

29. It will not do for Plantinga to make the content of the beliefs part of the
conceptual scheme as in hyper-Kantian category analogues for the reasons Forgie
rejects the hyper-Kantian understanding of mystical experiences (see Chapter 3,
Section 3). To do so vitiates the presumption of veridicality.
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needs to be told about how to keep a restraint on the formation of
any belief in any set of conditions and experiences whatsoever; ar
bitrariness knocks at the door. The egalitarian assumption provides
a kind of control over what can be legitimately taken as properly
basic; it is a backdrop assumption needed for the avoidance of arbi
trariness.
30

I have presented Plantinga's pos1t1on on rationality and the
proper basicality of beliefs about God. From this emerged his par
ity thesis. The universality challenge to this version of the parity
thesis suggests that Plantinga needs to explain why we do not all
generate the same beliefs, given the same experience. There are
several possibilities in this regard. In the next chapter I explain four
of them. Of these, the first three are unlikely candidates for giving
aid to Plantinga. The last, although a better candidate, leaves Plan
tioga with results that are less than sanguine.
30. There may, in fact, be other ways to provide the control needed, but the
egalitarian assumption is a place to begin, even if ultimately not correct. Alston· has
suggested to me, on several occasions, his own reluctance to admit that the egali
tarian assumption is correct.
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The Universality Challenge and
the Resurrection of
Evidentialism

The universality challenge is this: since the experiences that gen
erate theistic beliefs are shared by theist and nontheist alike, Plan
tinga must explain why only theists generate theistic beliefs
whereas (nearly) everyone generates the nontheistic, perceptual
paradigm beliefs. I consider several possible responses to this chal
lenge here. The first three of these fail to provide aid to Plantinga.
In the last several sections I present and discuss a response which,
although successful, leads to the resurrection of evidentialism and
the evidentialist objection to theistic belief.
I.

A First Response to the Universality Challenge

To respond successfully to the universality challenge one must
provide an account of experience and belief formation such that
both theist and nontheist can share the experience but which allows
the theist alone to form a theistic belief that is properly basic. Is it
enough to generate the challenge if there is a common core to the
experience that both theist and nontheist share? Two "common
core" cases can be suggested. Both theist and nontheist can admit,
for example, that they are awed by the universe, that the flower is
beautiful, or that the Bible is profound. But the theist can then
either claim to interpret the experience differently from the non
theist or claim to experience something more, a divine awe, a di-
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vine beauty, or a divine profundity. In either case, the experience
leading the believers to different beliefs could be said to be shared
only insofar as there is a common aspect or part of the experience.
The first case does not help Plantinga, for although there is a com
mon core of experience, there is an interpretation added to it. Pre
sumably this is inferential and we are no longer considering a prop
erly basic belief. In the second case-in which, for example, both
theist and nontheist experience the common core of "awe at the
universe" but the theist also experiences "the hand of God"
alongside the common core-the aspect of the experience that is
not common is the theistic part. But the theistic aspect of the expe
rience, insofar as it is theistic and unshared, falls under the censure
of challenges already discussed. Insofar as what is not common in
the experiences constitutes an additional unshared experience, the
universality challenge is not even applicable. At best the case falls
under the background belief challenge to direct experiences of
God, and at worst the case is irrelevant to Plantinga's goals.
2. A Second Response to the Challenge
A more promising line is suggested by the notion of superve
nience. Two examples spell out the account. First, it is widely held
that moral facts are supervenient on physical facts. W. D. Hudson
provides an intuitive account of supervenience: "You would puzzle
your hearers if you said that two things, A and B, are alike in
every respect except that A is good and B is not; or if you said that
two actions, C and D, were exactly the same except that C was
right, or obligatory, and D was not. They would insist that there
must be some other difference to account for this one. "' This
"some other difference" is often taken to be a difference in physical
fact. For instance, if two cases of a knife being raised above a child
and then plunged into his flesh are not both to count as murder,
there must be a physical difference in the two cases; perhaps one is
done in the context of the operating room but the other is not. The
difference may also be one of intention, so, for example, the per
son raising the knife intends to murder the unfortunate recipient.
I. W. D. Hudson, Modern Moral Philosophy (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday,
1970), pp. !64-65 .
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According to this position there is no difficulty in claiming that
moral beliefs are objectively true or false and epistemically justifia
ble even though the moral facts making them true supervene on
physical facts. Further, it is consistent with this position that there
be two people, both of whom have exactly the same experience of
the physical facts but one of whom does not form the same moral
belief as the other. This second person, indeed, does not form any
moral beliefs at all. Ethicists sometimes call such a person
"amoral. " Here we have a case in which the experience of both
persons is the same-they experience the same physical events or
things-but in which one is led in quite a different direction in
terms of belief. One requirement for a counterexample is met: the
experience is the same.
But there is a second requirement for a counterexample: the be
liefs must not only be generated from the same experience but
must also be properly basic. Are moral beliefs properly basic? It
seems clear enough that moral beliefs are neither reducible to phys
ical beliefs nor inferred from them. Yet they are typically treated as
justified. Thus, it seems plausible enough that some moral beliefs
are properly basic, and if so the second requirement for a counter
example is met.
But some may suggest that the claim that moral beliefs are prop
erly basic is arguable, and perhaps a nonmoral example is best.
John Rawls, in "Two Concepts of Rules, " writes: "Many of the
actions one performs in a game of baseball one can do by oneself
or with others whether there is the game or not. For example, one
can throw a ball, run, or swing a peculiarly shaped piece of wood.
But one can not steal base, or strike out, or draw a walk, or make an
error, or balk; although one can do certain things which appear to
resemble these actions such as sliding into a bag, missing a grounder
and so on. Striking out, stealing a base, balking, etc., are all actions
which can only happen in a game. "2 There are new facts brought into
existence by the practice of baseball. There would be no such thing as
stealing second base were it not for the game of baseball. Baseball
facts are supervenient on physical facts; stealing second base is super
venient on a person running from one sandbag to another.
2. John Rawls, "Two Concepts of Rules," in Ethics, ed. Judith J. Thomson and
Gerald Dworkin (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), p. 1 28.
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Now, suppose that I am ignorant of baseball and its rules but
you are not. As we sit to watch the game, we both have the same
experience of the physical facts. We both see some person running
from one bag to another. You form the belief that the runner just
stole second base; I do not. Furthermore, your belief that the run
ner stole second base is quite plausibly properly basic. Here we
have a counterexample that appears to meet both criteria for suc
cess. The believers both share the same experience, but one is led
to a belief that is properly basic and the other person is not.
The supervenience account applies to the theistic case in this
way. First, the theist and nontheist both have the same experi
ence-being awed by the beauty of the universe. Second, the theis
tic facts are supervenient on the physical (or aesthetic) facts. The
theist is led to a theistic belief, the nontheist is not, just as the
morally aware person and the person who knows baseball are led
to moral and baseball beliefs, whereas the amoral person and the
person ignorant of baseball are not led to moral or baseball beliefs.
We have then allowed for the areligious (or atheistic) person, one
who simply does not see the religious point of view, and the chal
lenge appears to be met on its own grounds. There is a shared
experience along with the generation of a nonuniversal but prop
erly basic belief.
So the universality challenge appears to be met. But we need to
look more closely here. First of all, there probably is no separate
epistemic "baseball practice. " Where beliefs about supervenient
facts are generated, I suggest, the generation is because of the
larger belief practices we all share. The difference appears to be that
the non-baseball believer fails to have certain concepts the baseball
believer has. Thus the supervenience cases seem to provide a prima
facie counterexample to the egalitarian assumption lying behind
the universality challenge. But I do not believe these cases provide
true counterexamples. Apparently not everyone sharing the same
experience will generate the same belief. As noted, some people
grasp concepts that others do not. But this is not to say that their
conceptual schemes are fundamentally different or, for that matter,
that their belief-forming practices are fundamentally different.
Surely we all have the ability to generate beliefs about supervenient
facts. Nevertheless, we need to explain the nonuniversality of be
lief formation about supervenient facts. I believe the best explana-
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tion is that not all people share the same concepts (although they do
all share roughly the same conceptual scheme) . This failure to have
certain concepts is a pragmatic failure, however, and thus, as in
Alston's case of the practice of pure mathematics, it does not indi
cate that we should be epistemically suspicious of the practice it
self.
Does this work for theistic belief formation? Can theistic beliefs
be understood as beliefs about supervenient facts? One might sug
gest that the nontheist is epistemically deficient in just the way the
non-baseball believer is: she lacks theistic concepts. The problem
here is that many nontheists apparently have the requisite theistic
concepts. How one is to explain the lack of theistic belief genera
tion in their case is difficult. These observations suggest that we
need to look elsewhere to explain the nonuniversality of theistic
belief formation.
Furthermore, even if the supervenience cases do meet the uni
versality challenge, for the theist the supervenience approach qua
supervenience is an unwise direction in which to seek solace. The
problem arising with understanding theistic facts to be superve
nient on natural facts is one of ontology. According to the gener
ally accepted account of supervenience, (significant) change in the
physical facts leads to change in the supervenient facts. And if there
is a change in the supervenient facts, there must be a corresponding
change in the physical facts. As far, then, as the ontology of the
matter goes, the supervenient facts are inextricably related to the
physical facts. In the supervenience account of moral facts, for ex
ample, the moral state of affairs, although not reducible to the
physical state of affairs, would have no ontological status without
the physical state of affairs. And a stealing of second base would
never occur if no one ran around a diamond-shaped field touching
sandbags.
So it would be in the religious case. If the experience shared by
the theist and nontheist were of the same natural facts, and the
theistic facts supervened on those natural facts, then the theistic
facts would be inextricably bound up with the natural facts. But in
the commonly accepted picture of theism, God is ontologically in
dependent of the physical world. That facts about God are super
venient on physical facts presents us with an ontologically inferior
God, an unhappy state of affairs for the Christian theist and hence
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for Plantinga. At best this account allows a type of pantheistic God
whose ontological status is not independent of the physical uni
verse.
Thus, although there may be counterexamples to the underlying
claims of the universality challenge (and even this I am not willing
to admit), they are not of a variety that rescues Plantinga's parity
thesis from the grip of the challenge. To make this point explicit
one need only consider the following modification of the chal
lenge. Instead of "all properly basic beliefs are universal" being the
central claim of the challenge, it can be replaced by "all properly
basic beliefs about nonsupervenient facts are universal. " Since
theistic beliefs are not about supervenient facts, they must be uni
versally formed. The challenge is not yet met. One must show
how theistic beliefs can be nonuniversal and yet properly basic. 3

3. A Third Response to the Challenge
A final possible but unsuccessful response to the challenge relies
on the notion of a gestalt shift. Two analogies to the theistic case
bring out this possibility. 4 First, suppose I have a defect in my eyes
so that I see only the dots on a surface covered with red and white
dots. You, and everyone else without this peculiar defect, see a
pink surface. Your experience, then, is infused with pinkness.
There is a gestalt shift that I simply do not make. Thus we both see
3· Hidden in these comments may be the beginning of a way to avoid certain
difficulties with the egalitarian assumption. Perhaps the practices surrounding su
pervenient beliefs are not universal, as the egalitarian assumption suggests, and
perhaps this is because of background beliefs. There are, in fact, many cases each
day of perceivers having the same experience but not generating the same beliefs.
Perhaps some of these happen because of supervenience conditions that involve
background beliefs, and perhaps others are not supervenience cases but still involve
background beliefs-like the Tim and Tom Tibbetts case of identifying twins. But
recall that the universality challenge, supported by the egalitarian assumption, is
concerned with beliefs formed in an immediate way-unlike the Tim and Tom
Tibbetts case. If there is a way background beliefs can play a noninferential role in
belief formation, perhaps a reply to the universality challenge can be developed. I
explore issues related to these suggestions in the following chapter.
4· I have Francis W. Dauer to thank for these examples. He was also helpful in
my thinking about the issue of supervenience. The suggestion that a supervenience
understanding of religious experience provides only for an ontologically inferior
God is his.
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something different and form different beliefs. Can we both be
said to experience the same thing?
Two suggestions are available. On the one hand, one might ar
gue that there is a common core to our experience-the white and
red dots. In fact, if you pay very close attention to the surface, you
too see the red and white dots. Nevertheless, it seems that the ex
periences that generate the corresponding beliefs are phenome
nologically quite different. You will not generate the pink surface
belief unless you have the phenomenological experience of pink
ness. And unless you make a special effort, your experience is one
of being appeared to pinkly whereas mine is one of being appeared
to dottedly. Our experiences are thus quite different. On the other
hand, suppose your experience is so infused with pinkness that you
simply cannot see the dots no matter how close you get to the
surface. In this case, we do not at all share the same experience. In
either case, the analogy does not suffice to reply to the universality
challenge.
Second, suppose you and I are at the symphony. You hear only
a succession of musical notes played by the orchestra whereas I
hear a melancholy melody. It is implausible that we both have the
same core of experience but that I experience something more.
Our experiences are the same: we both seem to hear the musical
notes. Yet our beliefs are quite different. Further, I do not hear the
melancholiness of the music above and beyond the musical notes
or form the belief about the melancholy melody by inference.
There are two ways of understanding this example, neither of
which provides much ammunition against the universality chal
lenge. First, the melancholy melody may be understood as a qual
ity or feature that supervenes on the pattern of musical notes. This
interpretation does not provide an alternative to the conclusion
reached about supervenience earlier. Second, the experience I have
of the melody may be explained by a type of gestalt shift, as in the
former case in which one sees pink where there are, in fact, only
red and white dots. Thus, just as in the former case in which you
are appeared to pinkly, in this case I am appeared to in a melan
choly-like manner. This understanding of the case challenges the
claim that our experiences are the same, putting it on no better
footing than the pink-surface case in which the perceivers have two
different experiences.
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Of the two interpretations, the second seems the weaker, for
there appears to be a difference between the dot case and the mel
ody case. In the red and white dot case, the belief that one sees a
pink surface is tied to the phenomenological content of being ap
peared to pinkly. To see the surface as covered with red and white
dots, one presumably must "shake off'' the apparently pink phe
nomenological experience. One must replace, so to speak, one ex
periential content with another. But in the melody case I do not
have to shake off the apparent melancholiness in order to hear the
musical notes. Somehow the melancholiness rests in the musical
notes, and I hear both, which is not to say that there is no phe
nomenological difference between hearing the music as melancholy
and not.
The argument here does not, fortunately, rest on our making a
choice between the alternative interpretations. Whether one takes
the supervenience interpretation or the gestalt interpretation, the
example does not help Plantinga reply to the universality chal
lenge. He must turn elsewhere.

4· Exaggerated Alstonian Epistemic Practice
As we saw in Chapter 2, Alston suggests that one way to avoid
the difficulties with the bifurcation of belief formation into experi
ence and explanation is to understand belief formation in terms of
what he calls objectification. He uses the term "objectify" to stand
for "taking a certain kind of experience as an experience of some
thing of a certain sort. " In the physical object case, we take percep
tual experiences as experiences of physical objects (rather than psy
chological data) . He suggests, then, that just as we form physical
object beliefs directly on the basis of perception, so we form theis
tic beliefs directly on the basis of theistic experience.
Recall the suggestion that the "certain range of experience" ob
jectified by CP must have, on Alston's own grounds, a theistic
content not, presumably, experienced by the nontheist. As in the
case of PP, in which there appears to be a link between how the
experiencer would describe the experience and the belief generated
by it-a lingo-conceptual link-so it is with CP. It is here that PTA
falls prey to the background belief challenge that relies on the dis
tinction between conceptual reading and noninferential mediated
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beliefs, for the latter seem more weakly justified than the former.
For a theistic belief to be formed, given Alston's account of direct
experiences of God, the generation of the belief must rely on back
ground beliefs as opposed to a mere conceptual scheme.
In Plantinga's case, however, I suggest an even stronger reliance
on background beliefs, for with his generation of theistic beliefs the
experience and the belief generated through it are not linked in the
lingo-conceptual manner suggested with regard to Alston's posi
tion. Hence, there is nothing in the experience alone that even
hints at a theistic belief. The theistic content of the generated belief
appears to derive solely from the background beliefs. I suggest, in
other words, that Plantinga could not simply adopt Alston's ac
count of CP but could use only a modified, exaggerated version.
This, in turn, brings the necessity of justification for the back
ground beliefs into clear focus.
It is possible that the theist's objectification of certain experiences
in theistic terms does not rely on a lingo-conceptual link or a re
lated underlying theistic experience as suggested by Alston's ac
count. Although objectification of an experience in physical con
cepts perhaps must rely on an experience that is describable in
physical object language, in the exaggerated practice I am suggest
ing, objectification of an experience in theistic concepts does not
demand the possibility of a description of the experience in theistic
object language. Rather, background beliefs may allow the theist
to objectify any perceptual (or aesthetic or moral, etc.) experience
into theistic language and beliefs. The reason some do not objectify
their experiences in this way is just that not everyone shares the
same set of background beliefs. 5 We all objectify perceptual beliefs
in terms of physical object language because we all share the physi
cal object conceptual scheme. We do not all share the theistic back
ground beliefs. 6
5. Here I call attention to the fact that the objectification must be noninferen
tial. If it were otherwise, the resulting belief would not be basic and the case would
not be significantly different from an interpretive common core type of experience
and belief formation suggested in Section 3.
6. Someone might raise an egalitarian-assumption question about this whole
idea. This exaggerated CP does not solve the universality challenge, the critic
might say, since it does not meet the egalitarian assumption driving the univer
sality challenge. The reply to this suggestion is that the egalitarian assumption
that everyone has (roughly) the same epistemic practices and hence given the same
input will generate the same beliefs-does not come into play here. It associates a
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Consider the following examples analogous to this kind of theis
tic objectification. Suppose .Letitia recently married and one after
noon on coming home finds her spouse, Jack, away. He left sev
eral clues as to his whereabouts. She discovers that his truck is still
in the laneway, but his bush boots are missing. Further, she notes
that Jack's favorite foods are missing from the pantry. Finally, Let
itia finds a note in Jack's handwriting stating that he has gone to
the bush. Letitia makes the inference and forms the belief that Jack
has gone to the bush. All kinds of beliefs come into play, and she
reasons to the conclusion that Jack has gone to the bush. Here the
belief is clearly not basic, it is inferred. Suppose, after a lengthy
marriage, however, that Letitia comes to know Jack very well. As
she comes in the door, Letitia notices Jack's bush boots missing
from the normal spot. She immediately forms the belief that Jack
has gone to the bush. In these circumstances the belief depends on
a complex set of (background) beliefs about Letitia's husband-he
acts in thus and so ways, for example, he only uses his bush boots
for trips to the bush-but Letitia does not reason to it. Such a
belief formation seems more than plausible; in fact, we form beliefs
in like manner many times each day. When we are very familiar
with circumstances and hold the relevant background beliefs, we
do not reason to the belief we form; we form it immediately. Fur
thermore, there appears to be no lingo-conceptual link, or at least
the same kind of link, between the experience of the boots being
missing and the belief that Jack has gone to the bush. 7 The belief
certain kind of content, say, physical object content, with a certain kind of belie£
In the case of PP, for example, physical object experiential content generates, via
the physical object conceptual scheme, physical object beliefs. The egalitarian as
sumption does not just claim that everyone forms the same beliefs given the same
input, but also that everyone has roughly the same practices and conceptual
schemes available to them. Presumably the same (kind of) practice is available to
everyone, as the examples that follow in the text indicate, but the practice is so
widely variant in its application that just about any experience can generate just
about any belie£ The difference between the beliefs one person forms as opposed
to another are not because of a different practice or different concepts but because
the application of the practice depends on one's background beliefs (and not merely
a conceptual scheme).

7. I say there is not a lingo-conceptual link, but there may be some kind of link
between the experience of the missing boots and the belief that Jack has gone to the
bush. There may be a link as well between experiencing a beautiful flower and the
belief that God created it. But in neither case is it the same kind of link as that
between "I see a tree" and "being appeared to treely." When I believe "I see a
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formed is not about the boots' being missing but about Jack. Nev
ertheless, such a belief is basic, since Letitia does not infer it.
That this example would be acceptable to Plantinga can be de
fended in the following manner. Plantinga writes that "a belief can
easily change status from nonbasic to basic and vice versa. "8 His
example is that I may now believe that 21 X 21
441 on the basis
of calculation but later I merely remember it. It is at first nonbasic
but later basic. He also claims that self-evidence is relative to per
sons, and thus that what is self-evident to you may not be to me. It
can therefore be suggested that what is at first nonbasic because not
self-evident may later become basic because it becomes self-evi
dent. For example, I may come to believe that 256 + 327
583
only by calculating it, but later, if I am particularly talented at
arithmetic, I may just "see" that 256 + 327
583. It is not that I
merely remember that 256 + 327
583. Rather, I have become so
adept with arithmetic that I know that 256 + 327
583 much like
I know that 2 + 3
5· What is self-evident to the learned is not
necessarily self-evident to the unlearned. We form all types of be
liefs without reasoning to them, and, although it might be argued
that we reason subconsciously that 256 + 327
583 or that my
husband has gone hiking, this seems to be little more than an ad
hoc defense. So, for Plantinga, a beliefs being basic for a person
seems to come to little more than the fact that the person has not
inferred it; it is a psychological fact about that person. If it is in
ferred, it is nonbasic; if not, then basic.
Furthermore, it appears that a belief formed in the context of
other background beliefs can be basic even when that belief was
once inferred from the background beliefs. Plantinga says simply
that for a belief to be basic one must not hold it because one in
ferred it by discursive reasoning; that is, one must not hold it on
the basis of other beliefs, one must not consciously infer it from
those beliefs. In the case of the wandering spouse and the bush
boots imagined above, Letitia does not believe on the basis of evi=

=

=

=

=

=

=

tree, " I also admit, when questioned, the truth of "I am being appeared to treely";
but Letitia need not admit the truth of "I am being appeared to missing-bootedly"
whenever she has the belief "Jack has gone to the bush. " Neither is it the case that I
always admit to the truth of "I am appeared to beautiful-flowerly" when I believe
"God created the flower. "
8. Plantinga, "Reason and Belief in God," p. 50.
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dence that her husband has gone hiking, if what is meant by evi
dence is that she inferred from some of her other beliefs that Jack
went hiking. Letitia did not infer anything at all. It is simply a
matter of fact that some beliefs require, for their formation, a com
plicated set of background beliefs, and yet beliefs formed against
that complicated background can be basic. She merely objectifies
her experience in terms of Jack's having gone hiking.
In cases such as Letitia's, not everyone who has the same experi
ences will form the same beliefs. I may experience the spot where
the bush boots should be as empty and not form any belief at all
about Jack. What we have here is a noninferential mediated epi
stemic practice with a twist. The beliefs in question are generated
in the context of experiences and sets of background beliefs in
which the burden of the work is on the background beliefs. By
breaking the lingo-conceptual link between the experience and the
generated belief I have, in effect, moved the role of the experience
away from a justificatory toward a genetic position. The experi
ences are much more the occasion for the belief generations, and
their content is less important epistemically. 9
How do these suggestions and examples help with the univer
sality challenge to PTJ,1? First, the suggestion allows the theist to
have exactly the same experience as the nontheist. We both experi
ence the same flower and the same beauty (and in a parallel fashion
the same lack of bush boots). Second, it begins to explain, al
though admittedly in an extremely cursory fashion, how the theis
tic belief comes to be held. It is not inferred and hence it is basic. 10 I
do not infer from the flower's beauty that God created it anymore
than Letitia infers from the missing bush boots that Jack has gone
to the bush. The experience initiates a complex, noninferential be
lief-forming process that leaves me with the belief, an objectifica
tion of the experience in theistic language. Third, the experience
need not lead to the same belief for everyone. Both of us may see
9. Perhaps this could be understood as a kind of holistic justification rather
than a foundational one, or at least a justification with a strong holist component. I
return to this suggestion in the final three chapters.
IO.

Here one should compare note

9 and the account Plantinga gives of co

herentism in "Coherentism and the Evidentialist Objection to Belief in God," p.
125, in which he argues that coherentism is really a kind of foundationalism where
all justified beliefs are foundational.
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the beautiful flower but only one of us be led to believe that God
created it, just as we may both experience the lack of bush boots
but only one of us be led to the belief that Jack has gone to the
bush. It seems, then, that there is a least one possible solution to
the universality challenge.
s. Evidentialism and the Intuitive Results

Although the exaggerated Alstonian response appears to supply
the features needed for a reply to the universality challenge, the
response is not without its difficulties. These have to do with the
thrust behind evidentialism, and thus a brief review of evidential
ism's tenets may be helpful.
Evidentialism, recall, is the view that claims the following:
(1*) There are obligations, standards of excellence, or (other)
normative patterns to follow with respect to belief that,
when followed, provide permissive justification for belief.
(2*) It is either intellectually wrong or intellectually defective
for anyone to believe, on insufficient evidence, any belief
requiring discursive justification.
(3*) Since belief in God requires discursive justification, it is
irrational, unreasonable, or unjustified to accept theistic
belief in the absence of sufficient evidence or reasons.
The evidentialist objector holds (1*), (2*), and (3*) along with this
denial:

(4) We have no evidence, or at any rate not sufficient evi
dence, for the proposition that God exists.
Plantinga, recall, rejects not only (4) but (3*) as well.
One central motivation behind the evidentialist understanding of
justification is the desire to avoid arbitrariness in what should be
taken as justified. Not just any belief should be taken as justified;
there must be some good reason or ground. Plantinga himself fol
lows this general spirit when he rejects the Great Pumpkin objec
tion as not applying to his theory. But the evidentialist objector
goes one step beyond merely requiring grounds and requires dis-
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cursive grounds for belief in God. Since it has no discursive
grounds, the objector says, belief in God is arbitrary and hence not
justified. Plantinga denies that it must have discursive grounding.
According to Plantinga, foundationalism is the theoretical sup
port for evidentialism. The historical motivation behind the foun
dationalist account of justification is the search for some means of
tying our beliefs to the independently existing world. The motiva
tion is a drive toward a guarantee of truth, the avoidance of arbi
trariness. But more recent foundational accounts, Plantinga's in
cluded, are not quite so bold. They do not seek such a guarantee.
Nevertheless, the closer the foundational beliefs are to providing
the link to the independent world, the more likely it is that the
belief system built on those foundations is not arbitrary. We can
sum up the thrust of the foundationalist/evidentialist platform with
the claim that both attempt to avoid arbitrariness with respect to
justified belief. Insofar as Plantinga strives to remain a founda
tionalist, we can understand his goal to be to escape the arbitrari
ness evidentialism seeks to avoid. 1 1
But the spirit of the evidentialist seems to haunt the halls of the
foundationalist mansion Plantinga builds for us. Doing away with
classical foundationalism is not sufficient to do away with eviden
tialism, or at least its central thrust. If the reply to the universality
challenge provided in the earlier parts of this chapter is a represen
tative account of how Plantinga must reply to the challenge, the
evidentialist is surely going to press the arbitrariness charge against
Plantinga's position. Three problems immediately come to mind.
First, the account allows virtually any experience to be objec
tified into theistic language and belief, since there is no mandatory
lingo-conceptual link between the experience or its content and the
belief formed. An experience of any event, object, or person po
tentially leads to a theistic belief. Now, Plantinga himself denies
that just any belief can be legitimately taken as properly basic.
Properly basic beliefs are formed in certain kinds of difficult-to
specify but nonarbitrary conditions. But he fails to spell out these
conditions, and the pressure brought to bear against the parity
thesis by the universality challenge questions the likelihood that
1 r. Plantinga does admit to a kind of polemical relativism but does not seem to
take this result to be of great importance.
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Plantinga can spell out any conditions that rule out arbitrary beliefs.
His claim that not just any belief can be legitimately formed seems
somewhat idle.
Second, the background beliefs that allow the objectification of
any experience into theistic language and belief are extremely indi
vidualized. Consider the following analogous case. Suppose some
person, Norm, is not at all attentive to the amount of milk left in
the refrigerator. Frequently his wife asks him to bring milk home,
but he, being distracted by another hundred details in his life, fails
almost as frequently to bring milk home. After being chastised
many times for his failings, Norm begins to connect the experience
of driving past Mike's Milk Store, and seeing the sculpted plastic
milk jug in the front, to the belief that he should bring milk home.
At first Norm has to use his seeing the sculpted plastic milk jug
as a cue to his memory, not as to whether he was asked to bring
milk home but rather to what belief his seeing the jug is to be
connected to. He must, therefore, reason along the following lines:
"That jug is supposed to remind me of something. What is it? Oh,
yes. It's a milk jug. Why a milk jug? Probably has to do with milk.
Oh, yes. I remember. I should bring milk home. " But after a while
Norm does not reason this way. He simply sees the sculpted milk
jug and forms the belief "I should bring milk home. " Here it is not
Norm's memory at work but rather an idiosyncratic belief-form
ing mechanism.
Whatever goes on in Norm's mind, it seems so conditioned by
his unique background and experience that a criticism of the justi
fication of the belief may be impossible by someone who does not
have the same background or experience. It might just as well have
been an experience of a telephone or automobile that triggered the
belief that Norm should bring milk home. The lack of common
ality among background beliefs suggests a minimal likelihood of
common ground for an evaluation of the justification of the belief.
In other words, the general drift of the exaggerated Alstonian ac
count suggests that such an individualized picture of the ground of
belief formation makes it highly unlikely that we can ever agree on
a set of criteria for justification. Plantinga admits that there may be
no generally shared set of criteria when he suggests an inductive
procedure to discover it. He even suggests that the criteria will not
be polemically useful in coming to agreement on the grounds for
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justification, at least across theistic-nontheistic lines. But this ad
mission seems only to indicate the need for wariness. If Plantinga's
only defense against the universality challenge is the exaggerated
Alstonian defense, then extreme caution is suggested, for on that
account even if there is a community to which one can appeal for
shared examples of proper basicality (in the sense, say, of a Chris
tian community) there is no guarantee that everyone in that com
munity uses the same or even similar sets of background belief in
their generation of theistic beliefs. This may be a more radical re
sult than one with which Plantinga is willing to live.
Finally, the plausibility that the belief "Jack has gone to the
bush" is properly basic seems to derive from the fact that Letitia
once reasoned to the belief. When she does not reason to it, what
justifies it? Is there some experience that provides justification?
One is tempted to suggest, following the spirit of the evidentialist,
that if her belief is ever to be justified it must, at least somewhere
back in her personal epistemic history, have been inferred. If this is
so, the notion of a belief being basic may come to no more than an
account of one's own psychology, and we can discover the ba
sicality of beliefs merely by conducting an empirical survey. "Did
you infer the belief consciously on this occasion?" "No. " "Then it
is basic. " But thus far this has nothing to do with the propriety of
the belief. On what grounds is a belief such as "Jack has gone to
the bush" taken to be proper? Without some discursive grounds, it
seems quite likely that it is not proper. So far, the account given
only provides us basicality but not propriety.
The exaggerated Alstonian view suggests that the background
beliefs enable the objectification of experience into belief. Thus
these beliefs are important. Following through with the example,
it is natural to suggest that the role these beliefs play is something
like this. What justifies the belief "Jack has gone to the bush" is
that if Letitia's background beliefs were transcribed into discursive
form they would provide reasons for her belief or, when taken
together, they would provide an argument for the belief. If this is
true, whence derives the propriety of properly basic beliefs? As
suggested earlier, it appears that we can cash out being basic sim
ply in terms of not being consciously inferred. Thus, basic beliefs
may be beliefs held without discursive evidence but which must
have been discursively held in the past. If what really provides
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epistemic justification is the background beliefs or some relation
ship between the supposed basic beliefs and the background be
liefs, the evidentialist ghost begins to appear.
These issues raise the suspicion that Plantinga's theory commits
him to a type of arbitrariness insofar as he wishes to retain the
parity thesis. But suspicions are only suspicions. We now need a
more rigorous account of the problems; we need an explicit state
ment of the revitalized evidentialist challenge.

6. The Resurrection of Evidentialism
The intuitive charge against the exaggerated Alstonian apparatus
is that it results (theoretically) in any belief counting as properly
basic. There is, in short, a kind of arbitrariness that results from
Plantinga's theory. The only way Plantinga can protect his position
against the charge of arbitrariness is to return to an evidentialist
approach to theistic beliefs. 12 But to do so is to give up the parity
thesis, for perceptual paradigm beliefs are then possibly properly
basic, not needing background beliefs, whereas theistic beliefs are
not.
For the sake of argument, let us assume that there is a way a
noninferred belief is justified for a person when she has appropriate
background beliefs as in exaggerated Alstonian objectification. In
sofar as Plantinga must use the objectification approach to avoid
the universality problem, he must appeal to certain background
beliefs. What is the status of these beliefs? First, it is clear that they
have theistic content. It is hard to see how background beliefs that
make no reference to God at all can be used to objectify theistically
neutral experiences into theistic beliefs. For ease of discussion, let
us call these background beliefs "theistic* beliefs. " Theistic* beliefs
are the background beliefs needed to objectify an experience into
theistic belief, and they are fairly high-level beliefs in terms of their
theistic content. Second, theistic* beliefs stand in need ofjustifica
tion. 13 Consider the following. Suppose I arbitrarily believe (with
out justification) that there is a Great Pumpkin; I develop Great
1 2. Or, as a secondary response, to retreat to a kind of holist justification for
theistic beliefs; see Chapters Io-12.
1 3. I do not mean that I have to justify them but rather that I am justified in
them.
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Pumpkin* beliefs. Suppose further that I then begin to objectify
my everyday experiences in terms of Great Pumpkin beliefs. If I
have no justification for these background beliefs, surely my objec
tifications (although perhaps basic) are unjustified. So it is with
theistic* beliefs. These background beliefs must be justified if the
objectifications resulting from them are to result in properly basic
beliefs. The central issue is, then, how theistic* beliefs are justified.
I present several options here briefly, then return to them below.
Theistic* beliefs could be properly nonbasic, that is, they could
result from an inferential procedure. This option is not attractive to
the Reformed epistemologist; if one needs natural theology (or
some other inferential means, e. g. , inferential appeal to authority,
Scripture, or tradition) to justify the very beliefs needed to allow
for objectification, the Reformed epistemologist has only put off
the evidentialist objection one step. The other options fall within
the proper basicality camp. There is first the possibility that theis
tic* beliefs are generated by another application of theistic objec
tification; that is, at some time in the past one formed theistic be
liefs via objectification of some experience. These beliefs then
became part of one's noetic structure and are now the theistic*
beliefs used to objectify other experiences into theistic beliefs. This
option has the obvious difficulty of generating an infinite regress.
The final possible source ofjustification for theistic* beliefs is some
externalist principle. It should not surprise us that Plantinga may
need to appeal to some externalist principle, for it seems that all
versions of foundationalism ultimately appeal to externalism. 14 This
claim needs defending, however, so an argument is in order.
One can distinguish among intemalist and extemalist theories of
justification. Many foundationalists rely on an intemalist picture of
justification. They say, for example, that it does not suffice for p's
justification that it be the result of some reliable belief-forming mech
anism outside my awareness or access. The evidence I have for p
must be evidence in reach of my awareness and not merely some
causal or lawlike connection between the fact of the matter and my
14. Perhaps an internalism constrained by reliabilist requirements would do the
trick here; see Alston's version of internalism discussed in Chapter 4· The impor
tant point is that at some stage the epistemic principles allow one to be justified in
holding a belief or using a practice without also demanding that one has to justify
the belief or practice.
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holding a belief about the fact. Hence, the emphasis on (conscious)
discursive reasoning is a significant part of the justificatory procedure.
But there is a sense in which all viable versions of foundational
ism rely on externalist principles. 15 Typically this appeal to exter
nalist principles occurs for properly basic beliefs. But then, since
properly nonbasic beliefs rely on properly basic beliefs for their
justification, the whole edifice collapses without an externalist
principle (or principles) at the bottom. To see the need for exter
nalist principles, consider the following strong understanding of
internalism:
lnternalism1 : S is justified in believing p if there is some
causal or lawlike connection between p's truth and S's be
lieving p and S is justified in believing that there is such a
connection.
This account can be made more general. Where <!> is some property
that connects the truth of p to S's believing p, consider the follow
mg:
Internalism2: S is justified in believing p if p has some
property <I> and S is justified in believing it does.
This general version of internalism results fairly quickly in an infi
nite regress the foundationalist will be quick to reject.
The infinite regress is generated since on this strong kind of in
ternalism the only justified beliefs are those for which I have justi
fication for accepting the justification. Any foundational belief of
mine must have its justificatory principles justified for me. But that
justification must itself be justified, and so forth. The regress be
gins early and perhaps the only way to avoid it while holding ei
ther version of internalism is to move to a holist model ofjustifica
tion in which justification is not foundational. Thus, this version of
internalism begs the question against the foundationalist and
against the idea of proper basicality.
There must then be some externalist principle to which the
foundationalist appeals without also being required to provide jusrs. I thank Francis Dauer for helpful discussion on this point.
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tification for it. Any foundationalist must accept some externalist
principle of this form:
Externalist Principle1 : If p meets such and such (external
ist) criterion, then S is justified in believing p.
One should not add to what is required for p's justification that S
must be justified in holding to any externalist principles of the
form suggested by this principle. To do so would be to add the
strong internalist requirement that S must be justified in believing
the principle before she is justified in believing any belief it de
livers.
An example helps clarify the point. The following principle
meets the above form:
Externalist Principle2: If p is self-evident for S, S is justi
fied in believing p.
There are no epistemic requirements in the antecedent; S need not
believe or be justified in believing that p is self-evident. If this were
required, the regress would begin; for S must then be justified in
accepting the principles on which p's justification rests, and to do
that S must be justified in accepting the justification for the justi
ficatory principles themselves, and so on. One cannot have Al
ston's foil reflective justification. This second externalist principle
merely claims that, if p is self-evident for S, then S is justified in
believing it and need not be justified in holding the principle itself.
To demand a thoroughgoing internalism would be to demand too
much of the foundationalist and hence of Plantinga. All viable
foundational models must rely on some externalist principles.
Returning now to the main argument, it is clear that there must be
some source ofjustification for the needed theistic* beliefs. In light of
the externalist requirement, a brief review of the options for this
source of justification is in order, for one can now more clearly see
the folly of several of the approaches to theistic* beliefs noted above.
First is the possibility of properly nonbasic status for theistic*
beliefs. Given that there somewhere (typically at the base) needs to
be an appeal to externalist principles, one might suggest that theis
tic* beliefs result from discursive reasoning at the bottom of which
are at least some beliefs whose justification derives from externalist
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principles. These beliefs are not theistic in content; they are garden
variety beliefs about the world. This suggestion amounts to a
return to natural theology (or some other kind of inferential justi
fication procedure), but my supposition is that Plantinga qua Re
formed epistemologist cannot appeal to inferences to generate and
justify theistic* beliefs.
A second possibility is to claim that theistic* beliefs are properly
basic. Here one can claim that they might result from the exagger
ated Alstonian practice presented above; that is, theistic* beliefs
might themselves be objectifications of nontheistic experiences.
This possibility, however, has the obvious disadvantage of raising
more forcefully the question with which we began: how are theis
tic* beliefs justified given the requirement that appeal must be
made to externalist principles? The present suggestion seems only
to lead to an infinite regress we can now recognize as similar to
that which the foundationalist is attempting to overcome via the
appeal to externalist principles.
Two things seem clear. First, the justification of theistic* beliefs
must itself appeal to some externalist principle. In other words,
one cannot put off an appeal to externalist principles for some
other belief (a belief nontheistic in content) and then expect to de
rive theistic* beliefs from it. To avoid evidentialism, theistic* be
liefs must be generated out of, and justified by, some fact or expe
rience directly. Second, the justification of theistic* beliefs must be
nondiscursive. This, naturally, is part and parcel of the move to an
externalist justification for theistic* beliefs, but it is also a reminder
that natural theology or other inferential procedures are not avail
able to the Reformed epistemologist.
How then are we to understand this externalist generation and
justification of theistic* beliefs? Suppose we model our understand
ing of theistic externalist principles after the less controversial,
nontheistic varieties suggested by epistemological externalists.
Typically the suggestion is that externalist principles rely on some
causal or lawlike relation between the world and one's belief. More
specifically, one moves from an experience of the world to a belief
about the world. A person takes in cognitive input i and forms
belief p. In the typical perceptual model, i is some visual, tactile,
olfactory datum which then, following lawlike or causal principles,
generates a belief about the physical world. Further, it is important
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to remind ourselves of the lingo-conceptual link between the expe
rience and the formed belief. Earlier I suggested that the experience
leading to a physical object belief is typically described by borrow
ing from physical object language; for instance, the experience
generating "I see a tree" is described by "I am being appeared to
treely" (or some near relation of this language) .
The exaggerated Alstonian practice of theistic belief generation
does not have this lingo-conceptual link, at least not in every in
stance. In fact, it cannot be required to have the link insofar as one
is to have an account of theistic belief formation and justification
which answers the universality challenge. The exaggerated Alston
ian practice is a successful solution to the universality challenge
only insofar as it disconnects the content of the experience (and
hence its lingo-conceptual description) from the generated belief.
This is the case since the universality challenge suggests that from a
shared experience both theist and nontheist ought to generate the
same belief. Since they do not, an explanation is needed. The ex
planation is simply that the experience can be objectified in any
way the belief framework of the perceiver allows. There need be
no lingo-conceptual link tying experience to generated belief. The
relevance of all this is just that, since theistic* beliefs also have
theistic content, one must ask about the nature of the conditions
that generate them. Can the conditions be described completely in
nontheistic terms, or must they be described in theistic language; is
the experience nontheistic in nature or is it theistic? If the condi
tions are nontheistic, the lingo-conceptual link is lacking; in theistic
cases it is not. 16
If the experience is theistic in nature, the difficulties raised in
Chapters 2 and 3 reappear. Any account of nondiscursive epistemic
justification for theistic beliefs supposedly grounded in theistic ex
perience alone needs to recognize the role of background beliefs in
1 6. My suggestions here assume that it is legitimate to extend the claims about
the exaggerated Alstonian practice to externalism. Is this move in fact legitimate? I
believe so. For even if the externalist were to argue that the cognitive perceptual
input is reducible to certain patterns of colors or shapes, or even to certain patterns
of energy (light waves and the like), there is still at some level a description of the
input that is conceptually tied to the output, the physical object belief. With theis
tic belief formation, at least with varieties that avoid the difficulties raised by the
universality challenge, the parallel does not hold. There need not be a conceptual
link between the belief formed and the (description of the) experience.
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the generation of the beliefs. One should therefore wonder about
the epistemic value of theistic experiences taken independently of
other complex sets of beliefs-one's epistemic base or background
beliefs. The problem of noninferential mediated beliefs and prac
tices is pressed once again. In short, it is difficult to see how so
called theistic experiences can legitimately provide an increase in
epistemic justification for theistic* beliefs without reintroducing
the very question with which we began. The move from theistic
experience to theistic belief via externalist principles is question
able.
What of the case in which the lingo-conceptual link between ex
periential input and belief is lacking? Can one move by externalist
principles from some nontheistic information to a theistic* belief?
Given the universality challenge, it is hard to see how. Once again,
one can simply reintroduce the challenge at this new level, raising
the same questions of theistic* beliefs as were raised of theistic be
liefs.
Here it is relevant to consider the supposed lawlike nature of the
externalist principles. If everyone has the same (nontheistic) input,
why do we all not share the same theistic or theistic* beliefs? It is
also important to remember why theistic* beliefs were first intro
duced: the solution to the universality challenge was that we do
not all share the same background beliefs and thus do not all obj ec
tify experiences in the same way. As can readily be seen, this reply
cannot be used here, for the question now is how theistic* be
liefs-the background beliefs themselves-are justified. As we
have already seen, to appeal to further theistic* beliefs begins Plan
tinga on an infinite regress. There appears to be little promise for
an externalist justification of theistic* beliefs, at least insofar as one
uses a kind of lawlike externalism as a model.
Perhaps one can develop an alternative view of externalism not
patterned after the less controversial, nontheistic varieties put forth
by externalist epistemologists. Perhaps theistic externalism does
not rely on the typical lawlike mechanism model. Perhaps all that
is necessary for externalism is something like the following:
Externalist Principle3: If p has property <f> (that links up,
in some reliable way, p's truth with S's believing p), then
S is justified in believing p.
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Maybe, for example, <I> is simply the property of having been
formed by God in S. God does this for persons to whom he wishes
to reveal himself. Here the "mechanism" is not a natural one about
which lawlike predictions can be made. Indeed, there is no mecha
nism at all. The formation of the belief is simply a result of a sort of
divine telepathy, a supernatural action; it is God following through
on his intention to reveal himself to at least some humans. Being
God, he guarantees the truth of the belief, but he need not supply
theistic beliefs for all. His actions are not lawlike and neither is the
formation of theistic beliefs. There is nothing in us, the human
knowers, to account for any pattern in the formation of beliefs. It is
entirely God's doing. Our minds or noetic structures need not be
understood in one way or another for God to do his work. 17
The critic may reply that, although this seems possible, it does
not provide a particularly attractive account of theistic belief. Why
does God create theistic belief in some but not in others? Perhaps
sin or spiritual blindness could be introduced here. But one must
be careful to point out that the fault is not with us or with our
noetic equipment. God can overcome any obstacle we set up. The
reason God shows himself to some and not others must be a reason
God has. We are dealing with God's intentions and motivations,
not with faulty mechanisms. As long as this is understood, God
may be justified in not revealing himself to all.
The critic may continue with a second point. This is, he may
say, a strange kind of externalism. It is difficult to see, for exam
ple, how this type of externalism, if it can be so called, gives us
justified belief. For the lawlikeness of the mechanism seems to be
exactly what is attractive about externalism as an understanding of
the criteria for justified belief. It enables us to explain why so many
beliefs we typically take to be justified are held by most people.
1 7. Consider these comments of Alston, in "Concepts of Epistemic Justifica
tion," pp. 109-10: "Unlike justification, reliability of belief formation is not lim
ited to cases in which a belief is based on adequate grounds within a subject's
psychological states. A reliable mode of belief formation may work through the
subject's own knowledge and experience. Indeed it is plausible to suppose that all
of the reliable modes of belief formation available to human beings are of this sort.
But it is quite conceivable that there should be others. I might be so constituted
that beliefs about the weather tomorrow which apparently just 'pop into my mind'
out of nowhere are in fact reliably produced by a mechanism of which we know
nothing, and which does not involve the belief being based on anything."
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In reply it could be suggested that the only important thing
about externalism is that the formation of a belief, no matter how
it occurs, is reliable. Since God is the source of the beliefs, and
since he is reliable, the source is reliable. Is the predictive, lawlike
mechanism really as important as the critic suggests? Perhaps not.
Perhaps what is really important is that from within a developed
set of beliefs and experiences there is some account of how the
formation of theistic beliefs could be reliable even if they are not
lawlike. I consider such an account in some detail in Chapter 1 0, so
I suspend further commentary until then.
The avoidance of arbitrary results via an externalist formation
and justification of theistic* beliefs seems unlikely, unless we re
turn to the natural theology (or otherwise discursive) approach. In
order, then, to understand the justification of the required back
ground beliefs by externalist principles, one must understand them
as being basic but nontheistic beliefs on which the arguments of
natural theology (or some other inferential argument) must be con
structed. But this is to return Plantinga directly into the hands of
the evidentialist and perhaps into the hands of the evidentialist ob
jector. To avoid arbitrariness with Plantinga's foundationalist ac
count of justification, one must rely on evidentialism's claims.
Natural theology, discursive justification, is necessary to avoid just
any belief being taken as properly basic on strictly foundationalist
grounds.
Plantinga's parity thesis fails because it does not take into ac
count the role of background beliefs in the formation and justifica
tion of theistic beliefs. His position, however, appears to be more
precarious than Alston's since Plantinga seems to need an exagger
ated Alstonian approach to explain why we do not all form the
same beliefs given the same input. But this approach leaves Plan
tinga's position open to arbitrariness which, in turn, demands a
return to some type of discursive provision of evidence. In the next
chapter I consider whether Alston's position is really any stronger
and explain why Alston himself finally moves away from the par
ity thesis.

[ 8 ]
Background Beliefs,
Religious Plurality, and the
Parity Thesis

The goals of this chapter fall into two groups. The first group
deals with tying together several loose ends surrounding the role of
background beliefs in CP or, more generally, in noninferential me
diated practices. Thus in Section I I answer the question whether
Alston is better off, epistemically, with CP than Plantinga is with
an exaggerated Alstonian epistemic practice. The second group
surrounds the issue of why Alston himself finally abandons the
parity thesis between PP and CP. The goals of the remaining sec
tions are first to explain Alston's position on how religious diver
sity affects the rationality of engaging in CP and second to explain
how his view fits in with the argument of this essay, as far as we
have reached.
I.

The Resurrected Evidentialist

My argument in Chapter 7 suggests that Plantinga's defense of
PTPh or more specifically PTPh must appeal to an exaggerated ver
sion of CP, thus opening the door to an arbitrary generation of
beliefs or demanding a retreat to natural theology or other discur
sive bases for theistic belief. I conclude that PTPh and hence PTPh
are not true. Does PTA fare any better? This question cannot be
answered without some further work. I argued that both CP and
PP, as Alston construes them, are practices in which there is a
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lingo-conceptual link between the experience and the belief gener
ated by that experience: if one believes "I see a tree," then one does
not fail to affirm, when queried, something like "I am being ap
peared to treely"; if one sees God's creative work in this flower,
then one does not fail to affirm, when asked, something like "I am
being appeared to God-createdly." But I have also argued that CP
is a noninferential mediated practice whereas PP is a conceptual
reading practice. The background belief challenge suggests that
there can be nothing in an experience itself that allows one to de
scribe the phenomenology of the experience by propositions such
as "It is of God." This is true for the same reasons that no experi
ential phenomenon can itself be described as "It is of Tim Tib
betts." In short, background beliefs are important when it comes
to the experience of, and corresponding beliefs about, epistemically
unique and spatiotemporal nonrooted individuals. The time has
come for a further analysis of this claim, especially as it applies to CP.
PP does not simply generate, as noted in Chapter 2, beliefs
about epistemically unique physical objects; that is, it also gener
ates beliefs about certain kinds of things, it classifies things. It is
this fact, among others, that allows PP to be a conceptual-reading
practice. We all seem to share, roughly, the same conceptual
scheme, or at least we do pragmatically. Once PP is set into mo
tion by an experience, the belief generated is one in which the
physical object scheme allows us to read off a physical object be
lief. But there is a distinction to be made between PP as a classify
ing practice generating beliefs such as "Those are desks" and
"These are trees" and the epistemic practice (or subpractice)' that
allows us to generate beliefs about epistemically unique physical
individual objects, such as "The desk in my office is brown" and
"The tree in my front yard needs cutting down." One simple way
to individuate between these two practices is to recall a point I
made in discussing Alston's account of perception, namely, that
with PP one has a set of concepts (e.g., tree, house, car) that can be
applied in situations that are novel to the perceiver. One can im
mediately objectify new perceptual experiences into physical object
concepts, since the concepts are general enough to apply to newly
experienced objects. This is not the case with epistemically unique
physical objects such as Suzie's house. One may have the concept
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"house" before seeing the buildings in a neighborhood that is new
to one's experience and hence be able to identify the buildings as
houses. But one does not have a complete enough concept of
Suzie's house before an experience (obtained in person or through
someone's description of the house-see Chapter 3, Section 4) of
Suzie's house, since that concept is not a general one applicable to
many houses but a unique one that applies only to Suzie's house.
So, one cannot have detailed concepts of Suzie's house before be
ing "introduced" to the particular house that is Suzie's. And reap
plication of such concepts relies on having memories, not of other
houses that are like Suzie's (or at least not solely so) but of this
particular house and one's earlier experiences of it. In short, the
concepts we attach to unique objects are attached not by our being
able to recognize, for example, that this is a house of the Suzie
kind (as if there were more than one house that is Suzie's) but
rather by our remembering earlier experiences of this (numerically
the same) house. This distinction in approach suggests a distinction
in epistemic practice. As I argued in Chapter 3, in PP the concepts
that attach to epistemically unique physical objects are made up of
kind concepts and information about local spatiotemporal location.
Insofar as this position is right, then the practice, or subpractice, of
forming beliefs about epistemically unique physical objects is a
conceptual-reading practice. Let us call this (sub)practice that gen
erates beliefs about epistemically unique physical objects the
"unique physical object practice."
Parallel to the distinction between PP and unique physical object
practice, we should recognize a distinction between what I call "re
ligious practice" and CP. Since CP generates beliefs about the
unique God of the Christian faith, it seems somewhat parallel to
unique physical object practice and its generation of beliefs about
epistemically unique individuals. The practice that allows us to
form beliefs with religious (as opposed to specifically Christian)
content seems parallel to PP. The content of these religious beliefs
is a little hard to spell out, but perhaps one could point to phenom
enological analyses such as Rudolf Otto's mysterium tremendum.2
Many (dare I say most?) humans have at least a (more or less)
2. Rudolf Otto,
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vague sense of a reality beyond the merely physical or even the
merely (humanly) personal. But as the plurality of religions indi
cates, there are many ways to understand this reality. At the bot
tom of all these, I suggest, is this awareness of a nonhuman, non
physical reality. Religious practice puts us into contact with this
reality. The additional and uniquely Christian beliefs generated do
not come via religious practice but through CP, a practice that
allows us to identify the experience as an experience of God the
Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, or the First Person of the Trinity,
that is, as an experience of an epistemically unique individual. It is
CP, and not religious practice, that clearly is a noninferential medi
ated practice.
It is CP, then, as contrasted to religious practice, that requires
the use of background beliefs. Religious practice does not, for we
have a conceptual scheme that alone allows us to objectify our ex
perience into the kinds of vague categories I suggested above.3 We
need the background beliefs for the doctrinal content of the Chris
tian beliefs. Do these background beliefs need justification? Here I
plan to fulfill my promise of explaining why the ranking of PP
over CP is an epistemic ranking and not merely one based on the
cognitive desirability of PP's features over CP's.
I suggest that the background beliefs required in CP need justi
fication as much as do those beliefs required for the exaggerated
CP to which I appealed in discussing Plantinga. I argued in Plan
tinga's case that the content of the background beliefs is substan
tively theistic, for there is no necessary lingo-conceptual link be
tween the experience generating theistic beliefs and the beliefs
generated. To avoid arbitrariness in belief, then, the evidentialist's
demands seem to press in on Plantinga's position. It is thus fairly
3. J. William Forgie's work, from which I drew the background belief chal
lenge, may be faulty since it does not distinguish clearly enough between religious
practice and other practices. If "God" picks out only the vague kinds of charac
teristics that religious practice allows us to, then Forgie's argument needs refining.
Compare, for example, an epistemic practice that allows me to be justified in be
lieving that I am in the presence of a human person as opposed to one in which I
am justified in believing that I am in the presence of Tom Tibbetts. In the former,
I do not have to identify the person as Tom or Tim, but in the latter I do. But it is
only in the latter that I need background information in the form of beliefs. There
is more on this general view in the text, but what is said there applies not only to
Alston's work but to Forgie's as well.
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obvious that theistic* beliefs need justification. Although perhaps
less obvious, so do the background beliefs for CP. Are these sub
stantively theistic in content? Yes, but not only so. They are sub
stantively Christian in content. Even though what I have said about
religious practice allows for some religious content in experiences
generating religious beliefs,4 this experiential content itself does not
allow for the generation of specifically Christian beliefs. The
source of the Christian content, I suggest, rests entirely in the
background beliefs-call them "Christian* beliefs." And surely
these need justification.
Granting the need for a religious content in the experience gen
erating Christian beliefs (to allow for the spirit of Alston's direct
approach), there is still nothing phenomenologically in the experi
ence that makes it a Christian experience. What would make an
experience a Christian experience, as opposed to a merely religious
experience? For that matter, what could make an experience a
Christian, as opposed to a merely religious, experience? I propose
that nothing in experience alone can do so. When one holds Chris
tian* beliefs, one may take the experience (and perhaps legit
imately so) to be Christian. But taking an experience to be explic
itly Christian and its actually being so are not at all the same thing.
Why, then, understand any religious experience to be a Christian
experience? Why not Buddhist, or Hindu? There is, I suggest, a
kind of arbitrariness in doing so, a kind of arbitrariness in the use
of CP. Of course, one does not typically select CP over some other
practice, such as a Hindu practice (except, perhaps, in cases of radi
cal conversion). Rather, one grows into the use of CP. So the arbi
trariness is not one of choice but one that presses the question,
what justifies my practicing CP rather than some other noninferen
tial mediated practice? To avoid this arbitrariness, Christian* be
liefs need justification. CP's noninferential mediated nature makes
it epistemically inferior to PP.
We can see the same point if we return to the background belief
challenge. Compare the Tom and Tim Tibbetts case to the case of
God. The reason one knows that it is Tim rather than Tom one
4·

There is, in other words, a lingo-conceptual link between religious experi

ence and the beliefs religious practice generates. I am not convinced that this is best
construed theistically; it may be even vaguer than that.
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sees in the next yard is not given by the phenomena but requires
that one have the belief that Tom is out of town. This background
belief to which one appeals is of a fairly high level in terms of its
content vis-a-vis Tom and Tim. Furthermore, although we do
come to recognize human persons by their features, actions, and
personality, as Alston says, we do so only on being introduced to
them and learning their individual names. Our background beliefs
about the persons we know seem to be fully personal in their con
tent. I remember (or at least it is within the range of my memory)
that Jack appears the way this phenomenal experience I am now
having appears. Thus, my noninferential mediated generation of
the belief "This is Jack," is justified. It will not do, as Alston sug
gests, simply for it to be true that such and such an appearance is
sufficient for the appearance to be "ofJack" in the circumstances in
which I find myself. 5 The circumstances are too important to be
passed over so lightly, for it is these circumstances that contain the
information enabling me to objectify this experience as an experi
ence of Jack. Since the circumstances cannot be confined to spa
tiotemporal information picked up in the experience, this informa
tion must be brought to the experience, presumably as beliefs. The
background beliefs needed for identifying individual persons seem
always to have a content that contains reference to that unique per
son and thus, to avoid arbitrary application of proper names to
phenomenal experiences that do not "contain" the proper-name in
formation, the background beliefs need justification.
Why should it be any different with God and experiences of
him? In Alston's case, if one does need background beliefs, these
cannot be without (theistic) Christian content. If they were with
out such content, and given the constraint that no experience can
be phenomenologically of the Christian God, then how could they
give rise to the generation of a Christian belief, at least one with
content that is specifically about the unique individual, God the
Father of our Lord Jesus Christ? Assuming that they do need to
have Christian content, then the beliefs need either inferential or
noninferential justification. If, on the one hand, they are justified
5·

Alston has suggested to me that I am not willing to be externalist enough
about the circumstances. Here, I guess, is the proverbial parting of the ways, since
I think he is all too willing to be externalist where he ought not to be.
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via inference, Alston's position succumbs to the evidentialist, just
as Plantinga's does. On the other hand, if they are justified nonin
ferentially, we are back into the same kind of infinite regress laid at
Plantinga's feet. There must be, somewhere, a nonexperiential jus
tification of theistic Christian beliefs.6
Here perhaps Alston can suggest that one need only be justified
in the background beliefs (and not need to justify them) and the
regress does not get started. But the need for being justified is all
my argument rests on. Unlike Alston's appeal to similar strategies
in other contexts-for example, where one may be justified in a
certain epistemic principle and that enables one to be justified in
another belief-there is no distinction in epistemic level between
the belief in question and the theistic background belief. The latter
does not function at a different level epistemically; it is a first-order
belief and not a second-order principle. Alston may appeal to his
externalist account of justification for these background beliefs, but
one still can raise the infinite regress problem as long as the exter
nalist account is rooted in experience. How are these justified (as
opposed to justifiable)? My suggestion is that they too must appeal
to background beliefs that in turn appeal to background beliefs,
and the regress is off and running.
Thus Alston's parity thesis appears to be in little better shape
than Plantinga's. The deliverances of PP are conceptual-reading be
liefs whereas those of CP are noninferential mediated beliefs. The
latter are such that the background beliefs needed for their justifica
tion stand in need of justification themselves. As such, they cannot
have the same strength of justification as conceptual-reading be
liefs. I have more to say about CP in Chapters 10 and 11, but I
believe the argument here shows that the observation about back
ground beliefs made in Chapters 2 and 3 is epistemically impor
tant. Conceptual-reading beliefs differ from noninferential medi
ated beliefs in that the latter have an additional step needed for
their epistemic justification. The evidentialist specter is present in
Alston's epistemology of religion as well as Plantinga's.
6. We need to consider the theistic, nonlawlike kind of externalism mentioned
in Chapter 7, Section 6, as a possibility. Alternatively, could we not be introduced
to God much as we are introduced to a new human being? Is this nonexperiential?
What about the credulity disposition? I consider these issues in Chapter 1 I.
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Alston's Rejection of the Parity Thesis: Checking
Procedures

In Perceiving God, Alston moves away from the parity thesis. He
does so for two reasons. The second bears the burden of my con
cern in the next section, but the first deserves to be recognized as
well.
In his chapter on the Christian mystical perceptual practice
(CMP), Alston contends that CMP satisfies the conditions for ra
tional acceptance. As with sense practice (SP) (what I have called
PP), CMP is acquired and engaged in long before one is explicitly
aware of the practice, it involves procedures for evaluating its out
puts, it is set in a broader context of epistemic practices that in
volve interacting with perceived objects, it is socially transmitted
and monitored, it depends on and is connected with other prac
tices, it is subject to change, and it has its own set of distinctive
presuppositions. There are differences, of course. CMP has a dis
tinctive conceptual scheme, a distinctive subject matter, and its
own overrider system of beliefs. Alston also gives an account of
how CMP is to be distinguished from other epistemic practices,
including other religious epistemic practices.
In defense of CMP's being rationally engaged in, Alston sug
gests that he has already made a prima facie case for its being so,
since it is a socially established doxastic practice. But he does con
sider at length reasons for denying that it is a genuine, full-fledged
practice. These reasons include, but are not limited to, the charges
that CMP is only partially distributed among the population, that
CMP is not a widely shared practice, and that it is not a source of
new information. The important issue for us is the supposed lack
of checks and tests of particular perceptual beliefs. Alston fills sev
eral pages dealing with this charge and, although he admits that
CMP does lack the kind of checking system SP has, this does not
show that CMP is unreliable. All that need concern us here is what
Alston says toward the end of his discussion of the overrider sys
tem.
I am quite prepared to recognize that a checking system of the sort
we have in SP is an epistemic desideratum. If we were shaping the
world to our heart's desire, I dare say we would arrange for all our
fallible doxastic practices to include such checks. It certainly puts us
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in a better position to distinguish between correct and incorrect per
ceptual beliefs than what we have in CMP. But though this shows
that CMP is epistemically inferior to SP in this respect, that is not
the same as showing that CMP is unreliable or not rationally en
gaged in, or that its outputs are not prima facie justified. 7
Here Alston links explicitly what he earlier referred to as "cog
nitively desirable features" to epistemic concerns. An epistemic
practice's failing to have certain cognitively desirable features that
another has does indeed indicate a difference in epistemic level. So
if SP is epistemically superior to CMP because of the kind of
checking procedures available to it, even though the latter is still
rationally acceptable, one suspects that a strict parity thesis be
tween SP and CMP is not forthcoming. Still, both are prima facie
rationally engaged in, on Alston's account, and that is all he sets
out to show in Perceiving God.
3.

Alston's Rejection of the Parity Thesis: Religious
Plurality

The problem of religious diversity for the rationality of engaging
in CMP, says Alston, cannot be handled in the same way as others
he discusses, that is, by calling attention to "epistemic imperialism"
or the "double standard." The intuition behind the problem with
plurality is that "if the general enterprise of forming perceptual re
ligious beliefs is carried on in different religions in such a way as to
yield incompatible results, no such practice can be considered to be
reliable, so none is rationally engaged in. "8 But Alston uses consid
erable space spelling out exactly what the issue is. There are two
questions. In what way are religious practices incompatible, and
why or how does this incompatibility cast doubt on CMP's ratio
nality? I take these in order.
The incompatibility, says Alston, is not an internal one because
there is more than one practice for forming perceptual religious
beliefs. Any incompatibility is an interpractice problem, not an in
trapractice problem. Thus, if there is incompatibility it is between
the deliverances of two separate practices. If one takes it that these
7. Alston, Perceiving God, p.
8. Ibid., p. 255.
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deliverances are of the singular subject-predicate form and that
they attribute to the subject some putatively perceivable attribute
or activity, then there are two questions to ask. First, is the subject
the same? Second, are the predicates incompatible?
'
Again, we can take these in order. Although there are cases in
which the subjects of the beliefs delivered by various religious epi
stemic practices are (taken to be) the same (such as in Christianity,
Judaism, and Islam), this is not always the case. The beliefs the
Christian has about God are quite different than those held by the
Hindu, and although different beliefs about an object do not entail
that the objects are truly different, there seems to be good reason
to think they are. So in these cases, even if the predicates attribut
able to perceived religious objects are incompatible, that does not
show that the beliefs are incompatible unless it can be shown that
the objects are the same.
On the predicate side, much of the apparent contradiction is not
due to the positive content of the beliefs but rather to what Alston
calls "implicit denials." Attributing to God the message that Jesus
is his Son is not incompatible with Mohammed being God's
prophet unless the former message also contains a rider claiming
that Jesus' work is the only way to salvation. Even Thomas Aqui
nas thought that mystical claims of God's being an undifferentiated
unity (such as we find in Vedanta or Yoga mystical literature) are
not incompatible with claims that God is personal. There must be a
denial of the identity between God-as-undifferentiated-unity and
God-as-personal assumed by the one who holds the former. At the
very least, says Alston, caution is called for here. Seeming contra
dictions are not always what they appear.
To identify contradictions, Alston raises the issue of how doxas
tic practices in other religions are to be separated from CMP. Most
of his discussion in Perceiving God is cast in terms of "God." But
nontheistic religions do not, obviously, describe the object of their
epistemic experiences in that language. So Alston broadens his
conception of religious (what he calls "mystical") practice by stat
ing that "it is what is taken by the subject to be a direct experiential
awareness of the Ultimate," where by Ultimate he means "the ulti
mate determiner of one's existence, condition, salvation, destiny,
or whatever. "9 This broader conception of religious practice pro9.
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vides the basis for showing the incompatibility of the output of the
competing practices. It is helpful to quote Alston here at some
length:
One's conception of the Ultimate will differ in different religions.
Even where the broad outlines of the conception is the same, as it is
among the various theistic religions, the details will differ. After all,
a religiously very important feature of the Christian, Jewish, and
Moslem conceptions of the Ultimate has to do with God's purposes
for mankind and His work in history; and the account of this varies
drastically from one of these traditions to another. And all these will
diverge sharply from the conception of the Ultimate in Buddhism
and certain forms of Hinduism, where the Ultimate is not thought
of as a personal agent. Let's further note that one's conception of
God (the Ultimate) enters, to a greater or lesser degree, into a par
ticular subject's identification of the perceived object as God (Brah
man ...). When I take God to be present to me I will, if I am a
Christian, but not if I am Moslem or a Hindu, most likely take it
that He who became man in the person ofjesus Christ to save us .from our
sins is present to me. Indeed, it is generally true that we make use of
what we believe about perceived objects when we perceptually iden
tify them. When I take the person I see across the room to be Joe
Walker, I thereby take him to be the person with whom I went to
college, who lives two blocks from me, and so on.Because of this
leakage of the background belief system into perceptual beliefs, the
latter will be incompatible with each other across religious tradi
tions, even if the predicates attributed in these perceptual beliefs are as

compatible with each other as you like. 10

The upshot of his discussion is that, even if the perceptual beliefs
we have about God do not conflict themselves, the practices of
forming such beliefs are still subject to serious conflict by virtue of
the associated belief systems.
After considering two ways one might strive to show that the
associated belief systems are not incompatible (one is by trimming
the exclusivistic claims from the various religions and the other is
Hick's Kantian strategy), Alston says that most practitioners of re
ligion are pre-Kantian in their beliefs, that is, they are realists about
them. So, in fact, from the point of view of the actual practice of
believers, the various religions are incompatible in just the way
Alston suggests.
IO.
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A second important question Alston discusses is why or how
religious plurality influences the rationality of engaging in CMP.
He considers two versions of an argument in which it is suggested
that religiously diverse results of mystical practices lead �o the dis
crediting of CMP. The stronger version is developed from "a natu
ralist line." It suggests that the best explanation for the radical in
commensurability of mystical practice output is that each result is
nothing more than an internally generated practice, with no refer
ent beyond the practitioners. But, says Alston, there is no reason
to assume that this is the best explanation. There could very well
be aspects of reality so difficult for us to discern that we end up
with quite different results when we try to discern them. A more
modest version of the charge against the rationality of engaging in
any religious epistemic practice, and hence the practice of CMP, is
"to suggest that the diversity is best explained by supposing that
none of the competing practices is a reliable way of determining
what that reality is like. "11 The argument behind this suggestion is
that if one of the practices were reliable it would show itself to be.
But why, says Alston, should we assume that?
There is another possibility, however. Given the rich diversity
among religious doxastic practices, only one, if any, of the prac
tices can be reliable. Why suppose it is CMP? There are many rea
sons internal to CMP, but do we not need reasons external to the
practice, since all the practices presumably have internal reasons?
The critic will suggest that no such external reasons are forthcom
ing, so there is no reason to engage in CMP or, for that matter, in
any other religious doxastic practice. Alston responds that perhaps
there are external reasons, but he passes over them and takes the
worst-case scenario by assuming that there is no external evidence.
He concludes that the justificatory efficacy of CMP is not dissipated
but may be significantly weakened by the fact of religious diversity.
It is not dissipated because there is a significant difference be
tween cases of religious diversity and nonreligious diversity. Con
sider the different observation reports of an accident or competing
means of predicting the weather. In both kinds of case there are
accepted means by which to resolve the dispute, even when one
cannot in fact use those means. Hence, when the reports or
I I.
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methods appear to conflict, there is at least the possibility of reso
lution. It is this very possibility of resolution that dissipates the
rationality of engaging in all these diverse means of predicting the
weather or trusting everyone's report about an accident. But with
the case of religious diversity there is no possible means of resolu
tion. So why then take the absence of such means to count against
the reliability of the practice? Alston suggests that there is no good
reason to do so and hence that religious diversity does not dissipate
the rationality of engaging in CMP.
It does reduce the strength of the justification, however. The
basic reason is that, although it is possible to imagine ways we
might differ in our viewing the world with competing SPs (say, by
a "Cartesian" practice of seeing what is visually perceived as an
indefinitely extended medium that is more or less concentrated at
various points or a "Whiteheadian" practice of seeing the world as
a series of momentary events growing out of one another vs. our
"Aristotelian" practice of seeing the world as made up of more or
less discrete objects scattered through space), such a possibility is
just a possibility. With mystical practice, the possibility is actu
alized. The various practitioners of mystical practices do indeed
view ultimate reality differently. If this problem did not exist, pre
sumably CMP would be taken to be more strongly trustworthy.
Engaging in CMP remains prima facie rational, even if one cannot
see how to solve the problem of religious diversity. But the
strength of its overall rational status is less than that of other prac
tices, such as SP, where there is no problem of diversity, as a mat
ter of fact. And so Alston does not see himself as committed to
parity between CMP and SP (CP and PP).
If Alston is correct about this last point, then CP and PP do not
share the same strength (or level) of epistemic status, although they
are both prima facie rational. But in addition to the reason put
forth in his discussion of religious diversity, there is Alston's point
about checking procedures and epistemic desiderata, as well as the
position argued throughout this book that there is a distinction be
tween conceptual-reading and noninferential mediated practices,
with CP being the latter and PP and unique physical object practice
the former. So there is a triple reason to reject PTX as anything
close to a complete description of the relationship between the ra
tional status of CP and PP.
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I have argued that PT� fails as a complete account because en
gaging in CP does not have the same strength of overall rationality
as engaging in PP, even though it remains prima facie rational to
engage in both. What remains to be done is to consider some of
'
Plantinga's suggestions about epistemic warrant as those sugges
tions apply to the parity thesis, as well as to defend Plantinga's
suggestion that beliefs about God can be properly basic against a
challenge resting on confirmation. The discussion of confirmation
serves as a springboard to the final goal of this book, which is to
suggest and defend a new parity thesis.
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Planting a on Warrant

In Chapters 6 and 7 I argued that PTp) and hence PTPI founder on
the need for background beliefs in the generation and justification
of theistic beliefs. The problem for Plantinga is generated by the
kinds of examples he gives, examples in which the theistic believer
and nonbeliever share the same experience but the former gener
ates a belief about God whereas the latter does not. My discussion
to this point has worked only with Plantinga's essays published
before 1 9 86. His research emphasis changes beginning with his es
say "Coherentism and the Evidentialist Objection to Belief in
God, " in which he for the first time considers at some length the
notion of warrant or positive epistemic status as opposed to epi
stemic justification. Although in that essay he is still directly con
cerned about the evidentialist challenge and the proper basicality of
theistic beliefs, later essays and two books deal less directly with
those concerns but tackle the issue of positive epistemic status or
warrant-that thing or quantity enough of which separates mere
true belief from knowledge. What is his account of warrant, and
can it help his case for epistemic parity between paradigm and
theistic beliefs?1
In this chapter I attempt to answer these questions. I first explain
Plantinga's account of warrant and suggest a new parity thesis on
r.

I use the terms "warrant" and "positive epistemic status" interchangeably.
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the basis of his account. The new thesis is weighed and found
wanting for reasons similar to those we have been considering all
along.
r.

Plantinga' s Account of Warrant

Plantinga shifts to the language of warrant and posttlve epts
temic status from the language ofjustification. He writes:

'
t
.I

.i

.ii

What is this quantity enough of which ... epistemizes true belief?
... Whatever exactly this further element or quantity may be, it is
either epistemic justification or something intimately connected
with it. So perhaps the natural procedure would be ju st to baptize
this element, what ever it is, "epistemic justification." But this
would be misleading. The term "justification" suggests duty, obli
gation, permission, and rights-the whole deontological stable .
Furthermore, one of the main contending theories or pictures here
...explicitly identifies the quantity in qu es tion with aptness for epis
temic duty folfillment; to use the term "justification," then, as a name
for the quanti ty in question would be to give this theory a confusing
and unwarranted (if merely verbal) initial edge over its rivals.I sh all
therefore borrow Chisholm's more neutral term "positive epistemic
status" as my official name for the quantity in question.2

Elsewhere he uses the term "warrant" for this same item. 3
What is positive epistemic status? Plantinga says, following Chis
holm, that it is a term of epistemic appraisal. Furthermore, it
comes in degrees. Finally, it is related to knowledge. Thus, "posi
tive epistemic status . . . initially and to a first approximation, is a
normative property that comes in degrees, enough of which is
what epistemizes true belief. "4
In various places Plantinga examines and finds wanting other ac
counts of warrant. He rejects Chisholmian internalism, non-Chis2. Plantinga, "Positive Epistemic Status and Proper Function, " pp. 2-3.
3. See Plantinga, "Coherentism and the Evidentialist Objection to Belief in
God, " p. 1 1 9, Warrant and Proper Function, and Warrant: The Current Debate. These
last two works give the fullest account of Plantinga's thinking on warrant. Unfor
tunately, at the time the present book went to press, Plantinga's books were not
yet published. Unless otherwise noted, where I quote in this chapter from these
works, the page numbers are those of Plantinga's final manuscripts.
4. Plantinga, "Positive Epistemic Status and Proper Function, " p. J.
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holmian internalism, coherentism, and reliabilism. I do not recount
the details of his criticisms, but his basic point in many, if not all,
cases is that the accounts "come to grief when we reflect on the
variety of ways in which our noetic faculties can fail to function
properly. " In each case, the reason for the failure of the accounts
"is cognitive malfonction, failure of the relevant cognitive faculties to
function properly. "5 This observation results in a positive charac
terization of positive epistemic status. Following Plantinga's lead,
let us consider this account one aspect at a time.
One necessary condition of positive epistemic status is that one's
"cognitive equipment, one's belief forming and belief sustaining
apparatus, be free of . . . cognitive malfunction. A belief has posi
tive epistemic status for me only if my cognitive apparatus is func
tioning properly, working the way it ought to work in producing
and sustaining it. "6 Plantinga notes that proper functioning is not
to be identified with normal functioning. One's cognitive equip
ment might be functioning normally (in the statistical sense) when
one forms the wishful belief that one is about to win the Nobel
Peace Prize. Under such conditions, one's equipment is not func
tioning properly; it is not functioning the way it ought to, but it is
functioning normally.
Furthermore, consider a case in which your cognitive equipment
is functioning well in the environment for which it was meant but
you are moved to an environment in which your equipment was
not meant to function-Alpha Centauri, for example. Suppose
there are subtle epistemic differences in the two worlds. Cats are
invisible in Alpha Centauri, but whenever one is present to a hu
man he or she forms the belief that a dog is barking. Suppose there
is a cat present, and hence you hear a dog barking. Even if there is
a dog barking (in a soundproof room) and thus one's belief that
there is a dog barking is true, the belief has little by way of positive
epistemic status. One's equipment may be functioning properly for
its home environment, but it does not match the environment in
5. Quotation from Plantinga, "Positive Epistemic Status and Proper Func
tion , " p. 32. On these issues, see also Plantinga, "Chisholmian Intemalism, " in
Philosophical Analysis: A Defence by Example, ed. David Austin (Boston: D. Reidel,
1 987), "Coherentism and the Evidentialist Obj ection to Belief in God," "Justifica
tion and Theism, " Warrant and Proper Function, and Warrant: The Current Debate.
6. Plantinga, "Positive Epistemic Status and Proper Function, " p. 32.
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which it is operating. "So we must add another component to pos
itive epistemic status; your faculties must be in good working or
der, and the environment must be appropriate for your particular
repertoire of epistemic powers. "7
The final aspect to warrant is the addition of a "firmness of be
lief' rider. Plantinga says that it is tempting simply to identify a
beliefs having positive epistemic status with its being produced by
properly functioning equipment in the appropriate environment.
This identification would be mistaken, however. Two beliefs could
be thus formed and yet one have much more warrant than the
other. Belief in the corresponding conditional of modus ponens has
more warrant than a vague memory belief even though both are
formed by properly functioning equipment in the correct environ
ment. What is needed here is recognition that when one's epistemic
equipment is working well one's beliefs are held with the appropri
ate level of firmness:
Obviously another element of positive epistemic status is the degree
to which I do or am inclined to accept the belief in question; I can't
be said to know p, for example, unless I believe it very firmly in
deed. If my faculties are working properly, the more strongly I be
lieve . . . p the more positive epistemic status p has for me. When
our cognitive establishment is working properly, the strength of the
impulse towards believing a given proposition . . . will be propor
tional to the degree it has of positive epistemic status-or if the
relationship isn't one of straightforward proportionality, the appro
priate functional relationship will hold between positive epistemic
status and this impulse. 8

So, at this stage Plantinga's account of warrant is this: "In the
paradigm cases of warrant, belief B has warrant for S if and only if
that belief is produced in S by his epistemic faculties working
properly in an appropriate environment, and if both B and B*
have warrant for S, B has more warrant than B* for S if S believes
B more firmly than B*. "9 This account, he says, needs further re
finements, some of which he attempts. I do not, for the most part,
consider these in detail, but only list several of his concerns. First,
7· Ibid. , p. 3 3 8. Ibid. , p . 34·
9. Plantinga, Warrant and Proper Function, p. 8 .
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he notes that not all my cogmttve faculties need to be working
properly for a belief to have warrant for me. One's memory may
play one tricks, but that is not a reason to reject introspective be
liefs. Second, proper functioning also comes in degrees. A faculty
does not have to be functioning perfectly in order to produce war
ranted beliefs. Third, that one's environment is misleading need
not deprive one's belief of warrant. "What counts . . . are uncor
rected and uncompensated malfunctionings. "10
A more central issue is what Plantinga calls the "design plan. "
Comparing human beings by analogy to an automobile, he sug
gests that, just as there are specifications for an engine's operation,
so there are specifications for the way a human being operates. He
writes that there is
something like a set of specifications for a well-formed, properly
functioning human being-an extraordinarily complicated and
highly articulated set of specifications. . . . Suppose we call these
specifications a "design plan," leaving open the question whether
human beings and other creatures have in fact been designed. Then
of course the design plan will include specifications for our cognitive
faculties (as well as for the rest of our powers and faculties). They
too can work well or badly; they can misfunction or function prop
erly. They too work in a certain way when they are functioning
properly-and work in a certain way to accomplish their purpose. 11

Our design plan is such that our faculties are "highly responsive
to circumstances. " Intuition, sight, memory, and so forth do not
all operate the same way. Experience-both sensuous experience
and the sort of experience involved in feeling impelled or disposed
to accept a given belief-is important in the responses of our epi
stemic faculties. And the design plan orders us such that the pur
pose of our epistemic faculties is the production of beliefs that are
true rather than false. There may be aspects of the design plan that
allow for other ends for faculties. It might be part of the design
plan that a person with an illness that typically leads to death be
lieves that she will be the exception to the statistics telling her that
it is highly likely that she will die. This feature of the design plan
ro. Plantinga, "Positive Epistemic Status and Proper Function," p. 36.

I I. Ibid. ' pp. 36-37-
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may increase the chances of survival. Nevertheless, she is not war
ranted in such a belief. Or certain kinds of wishful thinking-that
one's girlfriend still loves one, for example, when the evidence is
against it-may reduce one's suffering and hence be a �ood
thing-part of the design plan-and yet one is not thereby war
ranted in that belief. And so Plantinga wants to concentrate on that
segment of the design plan aimed at the production of true beliefs.
He also argues that his picture of warrant can help us deal with
Gettier problems:
We might generalize the idea of a design plan: there is a design plan
not only for our cognitive faculties, but for the entire cognitive situ
ation. Take the metaphor in this notion of design more seriously for
the moment; then the designer of our cognitive powers will have
designed those powers to produce mostly true beliefs in the sorts of
situations their owners ordinarily encounter. The designer will be
aiming at a kind of match between cognitive powers and cognitive
environment; there will be, we might say, a sort of design plan not
just for cognitive faculties but for cognitive-faculties-cum-cognitive
environment. In Gettier situations, however, there are relatively
minor departures from the design plan for the cognitive situation in
question; the cognitive environment [or the cognizer's equipment]
then turns out to be misleading for someone with our cognitive
powers. And the force of saying that in these cases the beliefs just
happen to be true, are true by accident . [is that] the belie£Is]'s being
true [are] not a result of things working in accordance with the de
sign plan. '2
.

.

This account of warrant is, clearly enough, a kind of external
ism. What are its relationships to internalism? Let me point out
only a few highlights. In speaking of Alston's account of justifica
tion-an account that we have seen has both internalist and exter
nalist components-Plantinga says that, once Alston (rightly) re
jects the deontological notion of justification, he has to choose
among many "epistemically valuable but non-deontological states
of affairs" such as usually believing the truth, now believing the
truth, having a belief formed by a reliable belief producing mecha
nism, and so forth. Plantinga suggests that Alston is guided in his
choice by the received tradition in epistemology which "involves a
marriage of the idea that deontological justification is central to
12. Ibid. , p. 42.
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warrant . . . with the notion that .
a fundamental intellectual
duty is that of believing only on the basis of evidence. " Hence we
find Alston's emphasis on grounds and on the accessibility of those
grounds. But Plantinga notes that the received tradition is incoher
ent: although it claims that deontological justification is sufficient
for warrant, clearly it is not. One can have done all one's duties, be
within one's epistemic rights, and so forth, and yet have little if
any warrant for one's beliefs. Also, there is supposed to be a con
nection between evidence and warrant. But the deontologically
justified belief need not rest on evidence. Plantinga's point is that,
insofar as Alston's understanding of justification is constrained by
the received tradition (even though Alston explicitly rejects a
straightforwardly deontological account of justification), it foun
ders on the fact that all we need for counterexamples to it are
"cases where some phenomenon is in fact a reliable indicator of the
truth of a proposition, but my believing the proposition in ques
tion on the basis of that phenomenon arises from cognitive mal
function. " So even though Alston moves away from deontological
notions of justification, he does not completely escape their influ
ence, at least according to Plantinga. 13
So, says Plantinga, epistemic duty fulfillment is not nearly suffi
cient for warrant. Since the internalist tradition is, by and large,
deontologically understood, an internalist aspect to justification is
not sufficient either. But is it necessary? In particular, is epistemic
duty fulfillment necessary? Plantinga's answer is an initial no. But
his answer here is not firm. 14 First he notes that one can conclude
that in general the doing of one's intellectual duty is neither neces
sary nor sufficient for warrant. But then he goes on to wonder
whether it sometimes is important. He specifically wonders how to
state a question about this issue, for if duty fulfillment is not neces
sary, how can it be important, ever? He concludes by stating:
The deontological internalist ordinarily exaggerates our degree of
control over our own beliefs; and she is certainly mistaken in think
ing that epistemically dutiful behavior is sufficient for warrant. It
13. Plantinga, Warrant: The Current Debate, pp. 246, 248, 252.
14. In, perhaps, more ways than one. What I say and quote in this paragraph is
not derived from the version of the manuscript Plantinga sent to the publ isher.
The discussion does not, to my knowledge, appear in those final versions. I there
fore do not wish to put too much weight on this point.
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also seems that dutifulness isn't necessary for high degrees of war
rant (although here there is more room for doubt). Still, there are
indeed circumstances when a failure to be dutiful is all that stands
between me and high warrant. And now the main point: when
things are going properly, when I am behaving in accord with the
design plan for human beings, I will not be violating my epistemic
duty. Perhaps it is my duty not to take drugs that will prevent me
from forming true beliefs or cause me to form wildly false ones; our
design plan, you might say, presupposes that I �on't do that; it
makes no provision for my doing that, and if I do that my faculties
will not produce the results they are supposed to. No doubt it is
part of my epistemic duty not to try to alter my noetic inclinations
and tendencies just for the fun of it, to try to become extremely
skeptical, for example, so that I come to believe next to nothing
or, on the other hand, to become unduly gullible.... Our design
plan includes our doing our epistemic duty, at least for the most
part."

So there is some kind of "epistemic duty fulfillment intemalism" in
volved in warrant, but the relationship is not a clear one-except that
this intemalist aspect is neither necessary nor sufficient for warrant.
In another place Plantinga allows for an intemalist aspect to war
rant-conferring circumstances that is not obviously related to de
ontological considerations. Plantinga notes Alston's rejection of the
demand that one must know or justifiably believe the epistemic
principles on which one's beliefs rest. He grants that one may be
lieve that 2 + 1 = 3 on the basis of its just seeming utterly obvious
to one. Neither justification nor warrant requires that one have any
views as to whether its seeming that way to one is a reliable indica
tion of its actually being that way. But this is not true in all cases,
says Plantinga. One may believe that a bear has passed by on the
basis of the way the brush looks; and to have warrant for this be
lief, one must know or warrantedly believe that the brush's having
that particular crushed sort of look is indeed a reliable indicator
that a bear has been by. In summary Plantinga writes:
So there isn't anything at all like a simple, single answer to the ques
tion whether warrant for grounded beliefs requires that the subject
know that the ground is [a reliable] indicator of the belief; some
times this is required and sometimes it is not. And the reason is not
1 5 . Quoted from an early draft of Plantinga's work on warrant, the chapter on
externalism, p. 22.

Plantinga on Warrant
far to seek. In some cases it is perfectly in accord with proper cogni
tive function to believe A on the basis of B even if you have never
had any views at all as to whether B is an indictor of A; in a wide
variety of other cases a properly functioning human being will be
lieve A on the basis of B only if she has first learned that B reliably
indicates A; in certain cases where you are aware of partial malfunc
tion, to have warrant you will have to believe of a ground that it is a
reliable indicator, even though in the absence of such malfunction
you would not have had to have any views at all on the subject. Of
course there will be many other complications.And the point is that
it is the complex, highly articulated nature of the human design plan
that makes impossible simple generalizations of these sorts about
rationality and warrant.16

One presumes that such an occasional requirement does not lead to
an infinite regress of the type that motivates Alston to deny the
requirement that one be justified in believing the justificatory prin
ciples that ground one's beliefs.
The central point in all this is just that the basic idea of Plan
tinga's account of warrant is extemalist even though intemalist fea
tures sometimes come into play. These cannot be specified ahead
of time, for they are dependent on details of the epistemic situa
tions. In sum, then, Plantinga says, there is a presupposition in
thinking about warrant in the way he suggests. This presupposi
tion is that
when our faculties function in accord with the design plan (in an
appropriate environment) the beliefs they produce are for the most
part true....Further, we take it for granted that these faculties are
reliable; they not only do produce true beliefs, but would produce true
beliefs even if things were moderately different....our presupposi
tion is that in general (for a person S with properly functioning
faculties in an appropriate environment, and given the above quali
fications [not all of which have been discussed in this chapter ]) the
more firmly S believes p, the more likely it is that p is true.17
2.

Warrant, Knowledge, and the Parity Thesis

Recognizing that Plantinga's concerns just explained are not
those of his earlier essays in which he directly argues for an epi1 6. Plantinga, Warrant and Proper Function, p. 56.
1 7. Ibid. , p. 19.
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stemic parity between paradigm and theistic beliefs, it is neverthe
less worth while to ask how his account of warrant might apply to
the issue of parity. Can it help PTp1? The first thing to note is the
obvious role Plantinga's theism has played in the development of
his account of warrant. This role is explicitly discussed in "Justi
fication and Theism. " To keep the point short, since Plantinga is a
theist, it is natural for him to think of humans, made in the image
of God, as cognitive creatures capable of knowing. Hence God is
the designer, and the notion of a design plan is a natural outflow
ing of this view of the world. But Plantinga does not suggest that
one has to be a theist in order to accept his account, or that his
account obviously entails theism. It may, but he does not press the
point.
Nevertheless, given that God is the maker of the design plan,
and that he is loving, kind, and interested in us knowing him, it is
natural to think that God would have included in the human de
sign plan a way we could come to know God. Plantinga's occa
sional reference to Calvin's sensus Divinitas illustrates this. What is
the relationship between these suggestions and the claim that be
liefs about God can be properly basic? Plantinga himself asks this
question and urges other theistic philosophers to consider it too. 18
Clearly, a beliefs being properly basic is not the same thing as its
being warranted; a beliefs being properly basic is not sufficient for
warrant. Since proper basicality, as I have been using the term, is a
kind ofjustification, and warrant and justification are not the same
thing, then warrant and proper basicality are not the same thing. 19
But is a beliefs being warranted (in a noninferential manner)
sufficient for its being properly basic? This is not clearly the case;
even though one is generally doing one's epistemic duty when
one's epistemic equipment is functioning properly, Plantinga indi
cates that the connection is not a necessary one. So being properly
basic, that is, being noninferentially normatively justified (being
within one's rights in holding a belief without discursive evidence)
is not straightforwardly analyzable in terms of proper function.
Nevertheless, Plantinga's earlier work certainly relies on the sup
position that there is one piece of our belief-forming equipment
r 8. Plantinga, "Justification and Theism," p. 425.
19. In Warrant and Proper Function, Plantinga does make use of the notion of
basicality in ways not necessarily connected to justification. See Chapters 3 and 5,
for example.
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that generates theistic beliefs. So perhaps to the extent that he
would say that the generation of theistic beliefs is due to the proper
functioning of our equipment it is fair to suggest that PTPI receives
some support from his latest analysis. Just as our equipment func
tions properly to generate and warrant paradigm beliefs, so it oper
ates to generate and warrant theistic beliefs. To the extent that a
beliefs having warrant for us makes that beliefjustified for us, it is
true to say that Plantinga's analysis of warrant supports PTPI·
More direct yet is this suggestion. Although epistemic justifica
tion (and its internalism, deontologism, proper basicality, etc.) is
an interesting and important notion, it does not provide us with an
analysis of the feature that turns mere true belief into knowledge.
Since we are interested in the strongest account of epistemic parity,
what more could we ask than to say that propositions about physi
cal objects, other minds, and the past, on the one hand, and God
and his actions, on the other, can all be known? So, just as Mary
can know that there is a tree in front of her, she can know that
God exists, or perhaps that he wants her to concentrate on philo
sophical theology rather than the ontology of art. Such a parity
thesis would certainly be interesting. And I believe Plantinga's
work might allow him to make such a claim. But let us set knowl
edge aside for the moment and simply ask about a parity thesis
making reference to warrant.
Plantinga might suggest that both paradigm beliefs and theistic
beliefs have warrant, but since there are levels of warrant, to make
it a parity thesis he might propose the following:
Plantinga's Parity Thesis* (PTti): For person S, whose
epistemic equipment is functioning properly in the appro
priate environment, paradigm beliefs and theistic beliefs
have the same level of epistemic warrant.
A more narrowly construed parity thesis is
Plantinga's Parity Thesis*' (PT ;;) : For a person S, whose
epistemic equipment is functioning properly in the appro
priate environment, physical object beliefs and theistic be
liefs have the same level of epistemic warrant.
If that level of warrant is strong enough for knowledge, and if one
believes a true theistic proposition, then one can know the theistic
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proposition, just as one can know the paradigm propositions, or,
more particularly, hysical object propositions.
Are PTt\ or PT PJ
I true? I suggest not, for something like the rea
sons we have considered all along. Let us suppose that, for the
kinds of reasons discussed throughout this essay, even where one's
equipment is functioning properly, the part that generates and
warrants theistic belief must rely on background beliefs. Where it
is justification, as opposed to warrant, that is at stake, the back
ground beliefs themselves need justification. At least so I have ar
gued. With warrant, however, this is not true. One's epistemic
equipment may need background beliefs for the generation of cer
tain kinds of beliefs, but warrant may derive simply from the
proper function of the equipment in the appropriate environment
(and so forth) . The background beliefs appealed to may not them
selves need to be warranted. Nevertheless, the reliance of our
equipment on background beliefs worries us epistemically, even if
no warrant is explicitly required for them. The basic reason for this
is complexity. There is more room for slip-ups or mistakes. Epi
stemic practices involving background beliefs may function as well
as those that do not, but the simple fact of their greater complexity
warns us away from trusting them as much, even if they are func
tioning properly in their environment. Put another way, even if
functioning properly, two practices may function differently and
one may not function as well as the other. Memory, for example,
may not be as reliable in producing true beliefs as perception. So,
noninferential mediated practices may not be as reliable as concep
tual-reading practices. This is true whether Plantinga understands
the role of experience to be of the direct Alstonian type or the
exaggerated Alstonian type considered in earlier chapters. In the
case of PT �, physical object beliefs and theistic beliefs are always
separate, epistemically, since the practice delivering one is a nonin
ferential mediated practice and the practice delivering the other is a
conceptual-reading practice. The appeal to background beliefs in
identifying an experience as one of an epistemically unique individ
ual simply puts epistemic practices that make such an appeal on a
different epistemic level. This does not entail that one does not
have warrant for theistic beliefs, or that one can not know them. It
only says that there is some reason to think that the level of war
rant is not the same. Furthermore, this does not mean that belief-
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forming practices that are noninferential mediated practices are not
practices capable of generating warranted beliefs. It may be part of
the design plan that some practices are noninferential mediated
practices, just as some practices, or at least some application of
practices, need access to beliefs about the reliability of the practice,
as Plantinga suggests.
What about memory beliefs and beliefs about other persons? The
issue is less clear, at least to me, in the case of memory. It seems
that memory is a conceptual-reading practice, or at least not a
practice in which one uses background beliefs. Suppose one's
memories are attended by the sensuous experience to which Plan
tinga refers in several places. Surely one simply forms the memory
belief in the conceptual-reading manner noted above. At least it
seems obvious that one generally does not bring in background
beliefs. If, on the other hand, one's memories are not attended by
the sensuous experience, as some apparently are not, then it seems
quite clear that no background beliefs are needed for the formation
of memory beliefs; they are simply present to one's consciousness.
The practice or subpractice of generating beliefs about other per
sons needs further analysis, which I defer until the next chapter.
Let me just say that, as with PP versus unique physical object prac
tice, and religious practice versus CP, there seems to be a distinc
tion between the practice of forming beliefs that categorize what is
experienced into kinds of things (persons) and the practice of form
ing beliefs about epistemically unique persons. Insofar as Plan
tinga's concern is the former, then PTt\ (as well as PTPh for that
matter) is not true with respect to other-mind paradigm be
liefs.
Back to the main point. There is some reason to think PTt\ is
not true, most obviously in the case of the parallel between the
formation and warranting of theistic beliefs and physical object be
liefs. But even though I suggest that there are different levels of
warrant for theistic beliefs as opposed to physical object beliefs,
this does not show that one could not know theistic propositions.
There is, as Plantinga notes, a minimal level of warrant needed for
knowledge. But nothing says that a proposition could not have
more warrant for me than is needed for knowledge (and thus one
could perhaps know one thing more strongly than another) . So
even though, as it seems to me, PTt\ is not true, a parity thesis
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according to which one can know both paradigm beliefs and theis
tic beliefs might be made out.
Plantinga's account of warrant does not help the parity thesis
vis-a-vis justification. In the next chapter I consider a challenge to
Plantinga's claim that belief in God can be properly basic. It is
found unsuccessful, but the discussion leads to some further obser
vations and the development of a new parity thesis that does not
fall prey, I believe, to the background belief challenge.
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My focus has been to explain and analyze various versions of the
parity thesis. One goal in this chapter is to explore a challenge to
Plantinga's claim that theistic beliefs can be properly basic. In
Chapter 2 I explained Alston's response to a challenge relying on
the supposed lack of confirmation of theistic beliefs. In Chapter 4 I
used a similar challenge to refute PTAS· The challenge to Plan
tioga's position also rests on the notion of confirmation. The lesser
part of my purpose here is to show that Alston's reply to the con
firmation challenge is appropriately applied to the challenge to
Plantinga's position. The more important goal is to use the discus
sion of confirmation as a springboard to further observations. This
discussion enables me to develop, in the next chapter, a new parity
thesis that does not fall prey to the challenges brought against PTA
and PTPI· Thus, in Sections I and 2 I present what I call the "pre
dictive confirmation challenge" and show that it fails. Section 3
fulfills the other goal, that of making certain observations that feed
into my suggestion that a holistic approach is needed for the justi
fication of theistic belief.
I. The Predictive Confirmation Challenge

The challenge to Plantinga's parity thesis is brought by Richard
Grigg, who writes:
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Plantinga points out that a belief such as the one that I had breakfast

this morning is properly basic in certain circumstances, i.e. , as long
as I have no reason for supposing that my memory is defective.But
note that we can trust beliefs such as . . . [the paradigm beliefs] not
only because we are unaware of defects in our experiential equip

ment but also because we constantly have outside sources for confir
mation of such beliefs. Indeed, is it not only through such outside
sources that we can become aware of a defect in our equipment? For
example, when I return home this evening, I will see some dirty
dishes sitting in my sink, one less egg in my refrigerator than was
there yesterday, etc. This is not to say that .. . ["I had breakfast this
morning"] is believed because of evidence.Rather, it is a basic belief
grounded immediately in my memory. But one of the reasons that I
can take such memory beliefs as properly basic is that my memory
is almost always subsequently confirmed by empirical evidence.But
this cannot be said for a belief about God, e. g., the belief that God
created the world.'

Grigg's argument, briefly stated, is that paradigm beliefs are
properly basic because of some type of confirmation they have,
whereas belief in God is not similarly confirmed. Since according
to PTPI paradigm beliefs and beliefs about God are both properly
basic, the lack of confirmation for beliefs about God proves the
thesis false. That Grigg's confirmation challenge to Plantinga is re
lated to the confirmation challenge to CP Alston considers is ob
vious. The deliverances of CP are said not to have the kinds of
confirmation that the deliverances of PP have, so, although PP's
results are justified, CP's are not. As we know, Alston argues that
the challenge is irrelevant to his claims. For the same reasons, the
challenge is irrelevant to Plantinga's claims.
Why should Grigg's disanalogy show that theistic beliefs are not
properly basic? Grigg's assumption seems to be that properly basic
beliefs are beliefs that are reliably produced by a mechanism or
practice that generates beliefs about objects that are regular in a
way that allows for predictions to be made about them. Thus, in
sofar as Grigg's challenge rests on the belief that confirmation is
necessary for reliability, his challenge falls prey to Alston's re
sponse to similar confirmation challenges. The nature of the confir
mation for which Grigg calls is not clear, however, and some clarir.

Richard Grigg, "Theism and Proper Basicality, " p. 1 26.
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fic�tory terminology and distinctions are in order. At one point
Gngg seems to call for the confirmation of beliefs, as when he sug
ge�ts that "I had breakfast this morning" is confirmed by there
hem� �irty dish:s i?- the sink. At another point he seems to suggest
. (where, I take it, "reliability" refers to the
that It IS the rehabihty
tendency t� produce true beliefs) of the belief-generating practice
�?at stands m �eed of confirmation. Grigg says, for example, that
my memory IS almost always subsequently confirmed by empiri
cal evidence. " It is convenient to call the confirmation of a prac
tice's reliability the "validation" of a practice, reserving the term
"confirmation" for the confirmation of the truth of a belief Con
firming that a belief is in fact true, however, does not entail that it
is pro�erly basic. But one clear feature of properly basic beliefs,
accordmg to the challenge, is that their confirmation at least makes
it likely that they are true and thus, perhaps, if not inferred from
other beliefs, basic and properly so.
A second point is simply that not every properly basic belief is
confirmed, and thus confirmation of a given belief is not necessary
for its proper basicality. Two issues come to mind. First, some
beliefs, even when we try to confirm them, fail to be confirmed.
Ne�ertheless, it does not follow that such beliefs fail to be properly
basic. The memory belief that I took a walk by myself in the
woods yesterday may not be confirmed because no one else saw
me. My hiking boots show no evidence of the walk, I brought
back no evidence of the walk from the woods, and so on. So, even
though many memory beliefs are confirmed, some are not. Nev
ertheless, such beliefs do not fail to be properly basic, at least on
those grounds. The second issue deals with the simple fact that
many beliefs are not confirmed because we have neither the time
the interest, nor any special reason to do so. Generally speaking, I
�o not concern myself with the confirmation of my memory be
hefs unless there is some special reason to do so. I do not worry
about :vhether I ate breakfast this morning, unless, for example, I
am bemg asked by the physician just before she does surgery. If
my �emory seems vague on the topic, I might then try to confirm
or disconfirm my memory belief. The failure of a given belief to be
co�firmed surely does not entail that the belief fails to be properly
basic.
Two morals should be drawn here. First, the concern ought to
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be not that each and every properly basic belief is confirmed but
that, when, in general, one attempts to confirm certain kinds of
belief, they are confirmed. There are, however, some exceptions to
the rule. This brings to focus the second moral, that attention
should be paid to the source of the belief to be confirmed-the
epistemic practice-rather than to the belief alone. This brings
Plantinga's and Alston's positions close together on the issues of
confirmation and reliability. Some important relationships seem to
hold between the confirmation of beliefs and the validation of the
practice that generates the beliefs. One of these relationships �ay
be, for example, that, since many beliefs generated by a gtven
practice are confirmed, the practice is validated. If this relationship'
were to hold, then it might be enough for defense of Plantinga's
theory against the confirmation challenge to show that, if the prac
tice from which a belief comes is validated as reliable, then any
belief generated by the practice, all other things being equal, can be
legitimately taken to be properly basic. Here we find a potential
explanation for the fact that we generally trust our beliefs even
though not every belief can nor should be confirmed. But, as Al
ston correctly notes, such an approach to showing a practice reli
able is epistemically circular. Thus, talk about validation on
Grigg's behalf is better recast in terms of the rationality of engag
ing in such practices. More on this below.
We cannot yet reply to the confirmation challenge. The nature
of confirmation and validation remains unclear. How exactly
are we to understand the challenge? We can take one clue from
W. V. 0. Quine, who has taught us well that beliefs do not face
the tribunal of experience alone. The web of our beliefs is complex
in many ways, not the least of which is the very detailed set of
confirming and disconfirming relationships that hold between one
and another belief (or sets of beliefs) and between beliefs and expe
rience. What I suggest here is that this web of belief and experience
provides various understandings of the nature of confirmation
from within, depending on the kind of belief one considers. To
develop this point, we can concentrate initially on beliefs and expe
riences having to do with the physical world, drawing out some
implications of Alston's suggestion about the practices he calls b�
sic. Recall that a basic practice is "one that constitutes our baste
access to its subject matter. [For example, ] we can learn about our
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physical environment only by perceiving it, by receiving reports of
the perceptions of others, and by carrying out inferences from
what we learn in these first two ways. We can not know anything
a priori about these matters, nor do we have any other sort of
experiential access to the physical world. "2 Alston's suggestion, in
part at least, is that any judgment about the truth or falsity of a
claim about the physical world (or the reliability or unreliability of
a practice giving us information about the world) must be made
within the epistemic practice that provides access to the physical
world. There are, to be sure, some overlapping situations. For ex
ample, memory might be partly but not wholly validated by what
we learn from perception (a second practice), even if the remaining
parts involve appeal to memory. But the basic point stands: we
think that paradigm beliefs have a link to something that makes
them likely to be true only because we accept (pragmatically) the
practices that generate them. It is only within the basic practices
that we discover the nature of the physical world that gives the
paradigm beliefs that confirming link. Alston goes further than this
with his doxastic practice approach when he suggests that we
should understand reliability through the notion of rationality.
Compatible with this position is the suggestion that, because of
the nature of the physical world and the epistemic practices we use
to form beliefs about it, we take confirmation to be predictive in a
certain way; we take it that, when we go about confirming the truth
of a certain belief, we ought to look to see if certain other things
are true. We expect certain features or facts about the world to
become apparent to us as we continue to use the epistemic practice
(and its many subpractices) that grants us access to the physical
world. If, for example, I want to confirm that I see a tree, I look
again or ask someone else to look. Similarly with nonperceptual
practices. If I believe that I ate breakfast (a memory belief) and I
wish to confirm it, I look to see if I left dirty dishes in the sink.
Since physical objects do not normally disappear from view with
out some reasonable explanation, and since my epistemic faculties
are operating normally (as far as I can tell from within the prac
tice), I fully expect to find my beliefs about the world confirmed
when I try to confirm them. Thus, as Alston suggests, PP is self2. Alston, "Christian Experience and Christian Belief, " p. II7.
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supported; it is then prima facie rational to engage in PP and, fur
thermore, the rationality that attaches to engaging in PP extends
beyond the kind that comes from the trivially supported type of
self-support accruing to all epistemic practices.
2.

The Failure of the Predictive Confirmation
Challenge

Grigg's challenge, interpreted through the notion of basic pra�
tices, comes to the following. Although many of the paradigm
beliefs can be confirmed (and their corresponding practices vali
dated) in a predictive way, theistic beliefs and practices cannot.
Therefore, theistic beliefs cannot be properly basic. We have al
ready seen, in Chapters 2 and 3, that this kind of predictive confir
mation challenge fails, according to Alston, because of irrelevance.
Alston's response to the fact that CP lacks confirmation whereas
PP does not is that the perceptual world is regular, and on the basis
of this regularity we can confirm and disconfirm our beliefs. The
physical world and our access to it are predictable simply because
the things about which we are seeking confirmation are regular
and predictable. We do not, however, find the regularities in our
access to God or his activities that we find in perceptual or mem
ory experiences. The regularities in religious experience are absent
not because of any fault in our epistemic faculties but because the
object about which we seek information is not regular or predict
able; God is not predictable. We can say, in summary, that theistic
beliefs are not confirmed and the practice by which theistic beliefs
are formed is not validated-not nontrivially self-supported-sim
ply because the attempts at validation and confirmation depend on
the regularity of the objects that the beliefs are purportedly
about.
This much we saw in Chapters 2 and 3. But the additional, posi
tive claim Alston makes, which I have mentioned before but only
briefly, is that if the confirming features were true of CP they
would tend to show CP unreliable. Alston writes: "The reality CP
claims to put us in touch with is conceived to be vastly different
from the physical environment. Why should not the sorts of pro
cedures required to put us in effective cognitive touch with this
reality be equally different? Why suppose that the distinctive fea
tures of PP set an appropriate standard for the cognitive approach
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to God?"3 In other words, our access to God and information
about him is different in an important way from our access to per
ceptual objects. The object of the former lacks the regularity of the
object of the latter. Whereas the breakfast dishes I put in the sink
remain there, enabling me to perceive them (ceteris paribus) when
I try to, God does not act in this predictable fashion. 4 We do not
even know which features of things, if any, God typically uses to
reveal himself. For all we know, there is no typical revelation of
God. But there is an explanation for this lack of regularity: God's
revelation of himself is not confined by the regularities of the natu
ral order. The lack of regularity in our experience of God, then, is
no reason to reject the reliability of the practice by which we some
times form beliefs about him or his activities. In fact, if some of the
things Christian's believe about God are true, then not only is pre
dictive confirmation not necessary for the trustworthiness of the
practice of forming theistic beliefs, but if we did discover great
regularity in God's dealings with us we would have reason to dis
trust the deliverances of the practice.
Simply stated, then, the Alstonian reply is that the predictive
confirmation challenge is irrelevant. An account of confirmation
internal to one kind of practice cannot be relevantly applied to an
other kind of practice. That theistic belief-forming practices do
have predictive confirmation available for their deliverances should
be no surprise. Let us consider an example that illustrates the reluc
tance of theists themselves to appeal to predictive confirmation.
The prayer of a Christian student that he score well on the medical
school entrance examinations may not be answered affirmatively.
Thus, a belief formed in the context of the prayer, for example,
"God will help me do well on the exams, " would remain uncon
firmed. In this case it is not that one cannot imagine what will
confirm the belief but rather that one receives more or less direct
disconfirmation. This in itself is not a problem for the notion of
predictive confirmation of theistic beliefs, but it does point in the
general direction of a rather telling fact about the way theists deal
with confirmation. Many Christian theists specifically make al3 . Ibid . , p. 1 28.
4. There may be an object of the belief that remains regular. For example, in a
case in which "God created the flower" is taken to confirm that "God created the
world, " the flower is regular (parallel to the dishes) although God is not. On the
analysis supplied, however, the latter irregularity is the real issue.
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lowances for "unanswered" prayer. Hence they would admit that
prayer-related beliefs such as "God will help me to score well on
the examinations" often fall into one of two categories. They are
either forthrightly disconfirmed (God does not act as the theist ex
pects, as when the prospective medical student fails the entrance
exams) or they are neither confirmed nor disconfirmed (at least
immediately-perhaps God makes the student wait for years to
take the exams) . In fact, the mature believer would say that such
beliefs ought to be held with a great deal of tentativeness, if th�y
are held at all.
This does not mean that one could never receive confirmation of
this type,5 and many theists do take events in their lives as confir
mation that God exists or that he wants them to do one thing
rather than another. Nevertheless, it points out a certain reluctance
on the part of theists "to put God to the test" or to be so pompous
as to think that they have this kind of access to the mind or will of
God. The central point is that, although one might receive confir
mation of these specific beliefs on occasion, theists are reluctant to
claim that such confirmation is readily available. The question to
be asked is why theists make such allowances. The lesson to be
learned is that theists understand that God's actions toward us are
not always predictable, at least not in the same manner as natural
phenomena. For all the importance of predictive confirmation in
realms dealing with physical objects, it is clearly not as important
to theists or to the practice by which they form beliefs about God.
In short, basic practices can give us different, internal accounts of
what confirmation should look like, and to apply the standards
internal to one kind of practice to another is simply to apply an
irrelevant standard. Perhaps, then, we should look for another
kind of confirmation for theistic beliefs.
3.

Nonpredictive Confirmation

I turn now to explore two examples, one theistic and one deal
ing with a human person. My purpose is twofold. I note both
5. As already noted, however, a great deal of such confirmation might tend to
show the theistic belief practice unreliable. Still, one could receive such confirma
tion on occasion without it affecting one's judgment of the practice's reliability.
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differences and similarities between the two kinds of examples in
terms of confirmation and epistemic justification. I also provide
further grounds for my Alstonian observation that, although the
theist might know what would confirm her theistic beliefs, she
does not know when or if the confirmation will occur. The main
implication of this observation is that there is a kind of nonpredic
tive confirmation that, given the framework of basic practices de
veloped by Alston, is exactly what one should expect given the
nature of beliefs about individual persons and God.
Grigg gives an example of a theistic belief that is unconfirmed,
at least in terms of predictive confirmation: God created the world.
How might one approach confirmation of such a belief? It cannot
be done through predictive means, for the object of the belief
God-is not predictable. So, for what kinds of things should one
look? Two possibilities suggest themselves. First, it might be
enough for the provision of confirmation if there were some non
theistic event or fact to which one has epistemic access; that is, it
might be enough to confirm the belief that God created the world
if we can discover some ordinary, nontheistic fact about the world.
If this is enough, then one could have confirmation via a nontheis
tic belief-forming practice such as one of the paradigm practices
perception, for example. Take the mere existence of the world.
After all, if God created the world, then the world must exist. And
surely we can discover that the world exists. The second possibility
is that we need some other theistic belief to provide confirmation.
If this is the case, perhaps the practice through which one forms
theistic beliefs must come into play. This, and thus that nonpredic
tive confirmation for theistic beliefs is a possibility, is what I argue
here.
Return now to the first alternative. It perhaps provides some
kind of confirmation. It seems, however, that if confirmation of
theistic beliefs occurs through a nontheistic practice, the confirma
tion provided is very weak. Consider this analogy. Suppose it is
suggested that the belief "Kirsten created this sculpture" is con
firmed by the fact that this sculpture exists. Now, although it is
surely true that the creation of something entails the entity's exis
tence (or at least entails that the thing exists for some time), the
entity's existence seems to do little to confirm the belief needing
confirmation. It is best described as a fact that is necessary to the
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confirmation but not sufficient for confirmation. Thus, although
the sculpture's existence can immediately be inferred from
Kirsten's creating it, the discovery of the sculpture does little to
ward confirming that Kirsten created the sculpture. The same
seems to be true in the theistic case. If the existence of the sculpture
were enough to provide confirmation for the belief that Kirsten
created the sculpture, then the analogous theistic belief about God's
having created the world would be confirmed by the existence of
the world. But in neither case does the mere existence of the entoity
in question confirm one's beliefs about its creator. What seems to
be needed is an experience of, or belief about, the world (or the
sculpture) that more strongly links it to its creator.
We can now turn to the second possibility for confirming theis
tic belief, in which another theistic belief is needed for the confir
mation. Here I appeal, once again, to Alston's notion of a basic
practice. Continuing with the sculpture analogy, what is needed to
confirm that Kirsten created the sculpture is some information
about the sculpture that more strongly links this sculpture to
Kirsten's creative touch. What could this link be?
Although many suggestions could be made, perhaps we can di
vide the various options into three types. First, there could be
some sort of uniquely identifying features of the sculpture that al
low one to judge that it is indeed Kirsten's creation. One could be
an expert on Kirsten's style, for example, and be able to recognize
this piece as being in her style. Second, one could rely on the au
thority of someone who knows that this sculpture is Kirsten's cre
ation; perhaps an expert testifies to the claim or perhaps one is told
by a friend that this sculpture comes from Kirsten's creative hand.
Finally, perhaps the creator herself informs you that the sculpture
comes from her hand; maybe Kirsten simply tells you that she
made it. All these link this sculpture to Kirsten.
Some observations about the sculpture example can provide in
sight into the possibility of nonpredictive confirmation of theistic
beliefs. Parallel to the sculpture case, there seem to be three possi
ble means of linking the theistic belief to be confirmed with the
world created. First, one may be an expert on God's "style" and
thus be able to recognize the world as being in that style. Second,
one may be told (perhaps by one's parents or one's religious com
munity) that the world was created by God. Third, one may be
told by God that he created the world.
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What do we learn from these three parallel pairs of possibilities?
First, on the assumption that I am an expert and that I am paying
attention and trying to see whether this sculpture did indeed come
from Kirsten, I should be able to find features that (more or less)
uniquely identify this sculpture as Kirsten's creation. But note that
at some point I have to learn that this style is Kirsten's style. There
is nothing at the phenomenological level that allows me to identify
this object as the unique one that is the center of my concern. Nor
is there anything that uniquely connects the object to another indi
vidual qua that unique being. To return to the language developed
earlier, one simply cannot develop conceptual-reading beliefs about
such situations. There is always information in the background
somewhere that has significant content about the individuals in
volved. This information is held in the form of beliefs; more than
just a conceptual scheme is needed. Thus, one does not link the
unique features of some object to a unique person without at some
point learning about the intimate connections between the two;
and what is learned has substantial belief content. So it is with
God's creative work, or at least one might suspect. One cannot
know that this world was created by God through unique features
of the world unless one follows through with a learning process
that moves beyond a conceptual-reading level.
The comparison indicates some disanalogies as well. There are
two. First, what is the significance of "being an expert"? Are there
any experts when it comes to recognizing God-touched features of
the world?6 But a more important disanalogy is that there appear to
be no uniquely identifying features of the world that link its cre
ation and God's creative touch. Unless one claims that the world's
apparent design is sufficient to conclude Christian theistic creation,
I see little promise here. So, although there are some interesting
parallels between the Kirsten case and the case of God in terms of
where one might look for confirmation (both involve background
content beliefs), there is an important difference in that when it
comes to God's creation of the world there appear to be no unique
features of the world that can be attributed only to God (or least
none to which we have epistemic access) . Why the God and Father
of Jesus Christ, for example, instead of Krishna?
6. It might be interesting here to look closely at how difficult it is to become an
art expert and the interesting phenomena surrounding forgeries in the art world.
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I suggest that in fact this disanalogy teaches us something im
portant about CP. I have already noted (Chapter 8, Section I) that
CP needs Christian* beliefs to generate religious beliefs with spe
cifically Christian content. I argued that these background beliefs
need justification. Where are they to be found? My argument is
that such a demand leads to either an infinite regress ofjustification
or natural theology (or other inferential reasoning) with a Christian
result. Neither of these is felicitous for the Reformed epistemolo
gists. But there is another possibility that I considered briefly
(Chapter 7, Section 6): a theistic, nonlawlike externalism.
This kind of externalism is not lawlike in that its working in us
is not natural (in a sense that allows for predictive possibilities) but
supernatural. It depends on God's inclining himself toward us and
not on some lawlike mechanism. It is rather like the reliabilism
Alston rejects in arguing that justification is not simply reliability
but has, rather, a reliability constraint. He says that it may be that
accurate weather predictions simply pop into my head-but I have
no access to their source even though they are reliable. Rather like
that, perhaps God simply pops things into the theist's head. Let us
call this "theistic reliabilism. " But would this reliable source of be
lief provide the kind ofjustification required for Christian* beliefs?
Certainly not on Alston's account of justification, for theistic re
liabilism has no internal access as Alston requires. What about ac
cording to Plantinga's view? Insofar as one is impelled to believe
these God-inspired beliefs (and one has met whatever normative
requirements there are), they would meet Plantinga's criteria for
justification or proper basicality. But that is just to raise an impor
tant question about the extraordinarily weak notion ofjustification
in which Plantinga's account of proper basicality is embedded.
Why should we take such beliefs to be justified, even prima facie?
Alston seems to have the happier account ofjustification here, and
once again, the theistic reliabilism I have suggested does not spec
ify an internalist constraint.
Why not add one? The answer is that, unlike other reliable prac
tices in which one can return again to the practice for "retesting, " it
is not clear that one can do so with CP. The account of God pro
vided by CP is one of a deity who hides himself. One can have a
religious experience and never have another by which to test the
first. At least with the human case-Kirsten and her sculpture-
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one can check the features of Kirsten's style, or check with Kirsten
herself, or ask other experts. In the religious case, can these other
approaches be used to check earlier experiences? Perhaps, but an
other problem arises here.
Recall my distinction between CP and religious practice. Al
though it is true that many, if not most, Christian believers have a
large number of religious experiences, they must learn to take
these as Christian experiences since nothing in the phenomenon of
the experience is explicitly Christian. What is the source of the
Christian content? This brings us to the second possibility noted
above, my being told by my parents that God created the world. Is
this really parallel to my being told by a friend that this is Kirsten's
sculpture? In the case of the sculpture there are other means of
checking the story. I can appeal to features of the sculpture that
pick it out as Kirsten's or I can ask Kirsten. 7 Can I ask God? Per
haps, but asking does not imply receiving a reply. Of course, the
same is true for Kirsten; she does not have to grace us with a reply
either. And here we learn something of value. The access we have
to information about persons qua unique individuals depends in an
important way on the self-revelation of the person involved or on
information given to us by others. Let me expand on this.
Just as I must learn from someone to take the markings on the
sculpture to be in Kirsten's style, thus connecting this sculpture to
Kirsten, so I must learn to take religious experiences to be Chris
tian. Where do we learn such things? Barring prophets and the
founder of Christianity, we learn the set of Christian beliefs, sym
bols, and concepts from our parents, the broader Christian com
munity, and, more generally, the entire tradition-its history,
myths, and scriptures. Here what Reid calls-and the Reformed
epistemologists call attention to-the "credulity disposition" is im
portant. We all have a natural disposition to trust what others tell
us. This disposition is modified as we mature as epistemic agents.
We learn not to trust certain people, or not to trust them on certain
issues. This disposition, I suggest, is important in the formation of
Christian beliefs (as well as those of competing traditions such as
7· The former approach seems ruled out in the God case, for there may be no
unique features to which I can appeal as evidence that this world was indeed cre
ated by God.
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Buddhism or Hinduism). In fact for most of us-once again bar
ring prophets and religious visionaries-this is the sole source of
our Christian framework of beliefs and concepts. But one of the
things we learn as we mature epistemically is that, although much
of what we learn through the credulity disposition is true, when it
is crucial we should check the claims of others ourselves.
Is it crucial to do so for the Christian tradition? It appears so, for
the tradition is in competition with others as it claims exclusive
truth for its central beliefs. And unlike other epistemic practices
that are conceptual-reading practices, CP is not-it is completely
self-contained in its belief content. By "completely self-contained" I
mean that, for those in the tradition whose sole source of that be
lief content is the authority of others, we must either find some
means of checking our employment of the credulity disposition or
recognize the rather radical circularity of our Christian worldview.
The former seems unlikely, for the only people who seem to have
access to Christian truth by some means other than the word of
other Christiaas are the prophets and founders. This brings us to
the third possibility suggested above, that I am, or some human is,
told by God that he created the world. But just how would God
communicate such a thing? Scripture tells us, but that is little if any
better than being told by a friend. And prophets are the source of
Scripture. Furthermore, information we have about the prophets is
largely internal to the tradition, its scriptures, and its authority;
once again we must rely on the credulity disposition. Even if we
could ask Jesus himself-and what better source than him to ask
if he is the Son of God, would we not have to take his word for it?
Not even his miracles take us from this-worldly events to theo
logically laden beliefs. Although they are certainly surprising, all
historical research can give us that they happened. What history
does not give us is why they happened, and in particular that they
happened at the hand of God. So this route seems unpromising
unless, perhaps, one wants to return to natural theology. But even
here it seems that we cannot get explicitly Christian results but at
best only a rather generic theism.
What of the other option-recognizing the rather radical circu
larity of the Christian world view? This is the position I believe we
should take, but not without noting the fact that such circularity
has been thought by many to provide justification for the beliefs
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the circle contains. This is a holistic kind ofjustification, or a t least
a justification with a strong holistic component. This should not, I
think, be a surprise, for when I presented the account of exagger
ated CP above I in effect greatly loosened the justificatory connec
tion between the experiences that are the occasion for the genera
tion of theistic beliefs and the resulting theistic beliefs. This is an
important claim of the holist: experience is the genesis of belief but
is not needed for justification. This distancing ofjustification from
experience is no less true for CP. Although there is a religious
experience at the bottom of CP, the generation and justification of
the explicitly Christian reading of that experience depends wholly
on other Christian beliefs. I have more to say on this below.
Now, this all seems parallel to cases of linking individual hu
mans to their activities. It seems clear enough that the belief or
experience needed for confirming that Kirsten created the sculpture
is one that makes reference to Kirsten. It is not sufficient to know
some "bare" fact about the sculpture, that is, a fact that stands free
of some attribution of Kirsten's activity or even, for that matter,
the fact that some person created it. So it seems with the belief that
God created the world. If the world's existence is to be understood
to confirm the belief that God created the world, there must be
some information that links the world to God besides the original
belief. There must be some means of access to further theistic data
for the confirmation of theistic beliefs to occur. And this is, I sug
gest, just where the holist justification, with its reliance on the cre
dulity disposition, comes into play.
The theist may be quite willing to suggest that she does have
access to further theistic data. The theist may receive confirmation,
on occasion, that God created the world. The predictive confirma
tion challenger can point out, however, that this access fails to
have an important feature. The access to theistic data needed for
confirmation does not, unlike the access to ordinary perceptual ob
jects, allow for predictive confirmation. Why? Because whatever ac
cess one has to the needed information-information that has a
theistic component-relies on God's revealing himself or his activ
ity. When trying to confirm that it is the desk in my office that had
ink spilled on it, I can put myself (typically) in a position to con
firm it by looking (again) to see if the ink stain is still there. But I
cannot put myself in a position for God to speak to me and be in
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the least guaranteed that he will. Although one can predict what
event would confirm a theistic belief (e. g. , God's telling us he did
something), one cannot predict the occurrence of the event. Its oc
currence relies on God's action, to which we have no predictive
access. In summary, with perceptual beliefs and PP there appear to
be (under many if not most circumstances) means by which we can
predict the occurrence of happenings or events that would confirm
the belief in question. Although sometimes these predictions fail,
generally they do not. We believe this because the predictions" rely
on a certain understanding of the physical world and the epistemic
practice through which we have access to that world. This under
standing is internal to the set of beliefs we have about the world,
the experiences we have of the world, and the practice through
which these two are connected. Furthermore, the perceptual epi
stemic practice can become internally validated through repeated
confirmations, allowing us generally to trust the practice as reli
able. With theistic beliefs the case is different. We can say what
(theistic) facts or events might provide confirmation, but we can
not say ahead of time when (or even if) we will have access to
them; we cannot predict their occurrence. I suggest that the prac
tices through which we have access to God, through which we
form theistic beliefs, do not give an understanding of God that
provides for predictive confirmation-and that is precisely as it
should be. The same is true, however, for belief-forming practices
that provide us with beliefs about epistemically unique, spatiotem
porally nonrooted individuals, especially those with free will.
There is no epistemic access to such individuals apart from the
practice that generates beliefs about them. One must always turn
to the same practice (or subpractices) to confirm the belief in ques
tion. And with these practices there is no predictive element. The
objects of the beliefs are unpredictable, just as God is.
To complete the discussion of our examples, one further issue
needs consideration. There is a sense in which any person holding
the belief "God created the world" has access to the information
needed to confirm theistic beliefs. For example, it follows imme
diately from the fact that God is the creator-sustainer of the world
that God created the flowers, the hills, the trees. It might be sug
gested that these (theistic) beliefs provide the needed confirmation.
I believe this suggestion does not suffice, for this "access" is not
really access and therefore does not provide an interesting kind of
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confirmation. Grigg speaks of the confirmation being "outside. "
Although it is less than fully clear what Grigg means by outside
confirmation, it surely should not include confirmation by beliefs
whose truth is known simply by an immediate, one-step inference
from the belief needing confirmation.
The problem can be seen by exploring the following case. Con
sider meteorologist Smith who, after research, forms the belief p
that sundogs can be seen whenever conditions C are met. As she
continues her research, Smith discovers that conditions C are, in
fact, about to occur. To confirm her belief, she predicts that at
time t and location 1 a sundog will appear. Those conditions come
about, the sundog appears, and Smith has confirmation of p. Now
Smith holds the belief that sundogs appear under certain condi
tions. Were she merely to infer that a sundog did in fact appear
under those conditions, without the corresponding experience, she
would not have truly confirmed her belie£ Armchair science is ruled
out. Likewise, without some further data beyond the theistic belief
"God created the world, " confirmation seems unlikely. The confirm
ing information must be generated from an "outside" source.
This raises the important issue: what exactly is the appropriate
sense of "outside"? I do not think I can provide a full answer to this
question. Two things can be noted, however. First, I have already
suggested that to be outside is to extend beyond immediate infer
ences from the belief to be confirmed, beyond what can be done in
the armchair. Second, in some ways confirmation is always "in
side. " This is where Alston's notion of basic practices, the notion
of epistemically circular reasons, Alston's larger doxastic practice
approach to epistemology, and the possibility of holistic justifica
tion come into play. The sculpture analogy is a case in point. What
confirms the belief that Kirsten created the sculpture is an aware
ness of a further fact connecting the sculpture to Kirsten's creative
work. The information needed for confirmation must make refer
ence to or contain at least some of the members of the very set of
notions contained in the belief being confirmed. A belief about
Kirsten must be confirmed by some further information about
Kirsten; a belief about God must be confirmed by further informa
tion about God. 8
8. It is not clear that one can draw a hard and fast conclusion on this point. For
example, the confirmation in the breakfast case does not directly rely on the notion
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A somewhat different although related point is that I have access
to this connecting information by Kirsten telling me, someone else
telling me, or some feature "telling" me that Kirsten did indeed
make the sculpture. The source of the confirming data is, presuma
bly, the same source as (or a source closely allied with) the source
from which I derived my original belief. Otherwise the content of
the data is not likely to be immediately related. It seems true that
there are only a limited number of means through which one has
access to the needed information and also true that certain kinds of
information can be discovered only by certain kinds of approach.
This is in part the point of Alston's suggestion that beliefs about
physical objects are formed through a basic practice. My claim is
that I came to hold the belief that Kirsten created the sculpture via
a belief-forming practice that relies on someone telling me
(whether Kirsten or someone else) or recognizing that the sculp
ture is one of Kirsten's and that any confirmation I come by is not
outside these practices (or closely related practices) and their related
beliefs and experiences.
The lesson I wish to draw from these observations is that it ap
pears that confirmation is circular in two senses. First, confirma
tion seems to rely on the fact that the confirmation available for a
given belief must typically appeal to the epistemic practices and
related beliefs and experiences that formed the original belief need
ing confirmation. Thus, if there is a link between confirmation and
validation, one might begin to suspect that it is somewhat circular.
Such confirmation and validation are not "outside" in any absolute
sense. Second, confirmation is circular, since even how it should be
conceived is dependent on the practice and the nature of the objects
about which the practice provides us beliefs. For practices dealing
with regular predictive things, confirmation should be predictive.
For those not dealing with predictive things, confirmation should
not be predictive. Accordingly, if confirmation is to have an epi
stemic role, one should suspect that that role has a large holistic
component, especially where a noninferential mediated practice is
at stake.9
of breakfast. It does, however, seem to rely indirectly on the notion: there is one
less egg in the refrigerator because I ate it for breakfast.
9. A general note on this chapter. Alston makes the point, in Perceiving God, pp.
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nonrooted. Humans fit the bill here, and something to which Al
ston alludes can help us get started in our thinking about a new
parity thesis. In wondering whether there is some way CP
"proves" itself, as PP does with all its "payoffs in terms of predic
tion and control of the course of events," Alston calls attention to
another epistemic practice:
interpersonal perception, our awareness of other persons as persons.
There is controversy over whether to regard this as an autonomous
practice or simply as a department of perceptual practice, but I shall
adopt the former view. That is, I shall suppose that we have a prac
tice of objectifying certain ranges of our experience in terms of the

One goal in this chapter is to suggest and explore a new parity
thesis in terms of its appeal to holistic principles, Reid's credulity
disposition, and the theistic nonlawlike externalism introduced
briefly earlier. A second goal is to consider two potential rejoinders
to the position developed here. In Sections 1-3 I concentrate on the
first goal; in Sections 4-6 I deal with the second.
1.

Interpersonal Practice and the New Parity Thesis

Many of the concerns uncovered in the discussion to this point
grow out of two issues. The first is that according to both PTA and
PT� epistemic parity exists between theistic beliefs that are about
an epistemically unique, spatiotemporally nonrooted individual
God-and beliefs about epistemically unique but spatiotemporally
rooted things. The second issue is the confirmation ofjustified be
liefs. Just what constitutes confirmation, what role does it play in
justification, and do theistic beliefs have it?
Taking these in order, the first issue suggests that perhaps a suc
cessful parity thesis is to be found in beliefs that parallel one an
other more closely-in a comparison between beliefs about God
understood as an epistemically unique, spatiotemporally nonrooted
individual and beliefs about other individual entities akin to God in
just that way, that is, epistemically unique and spatiotemporally

presence, condition, characteristics, and activities of other persons,
and that this practice can no more be justified from the outside than
any of the others we have been considering. It is, in a way, inter
mediate between PP and CP.In particular . . . its internal self-justi
fication is not so purely in terms of predictive efficacy as is PP. To
be sure, by perceiving what we do of other persons we are thereby
enabled to anticipate their behavior to some extent, and this is of
pragmatic value. But persons are notoriously less predictable than
things, and the value of this practice for our lives is not restricted to
that payoff. To compensate for this relative unpredictability there is
the possibility of entering into communication, fellowship, compe
tition, and so on with other persons. And, most basically, that is
what this practice enables us to do. '

Alston notes that this practice is intermediate between CP and
PP. He does not say in detail exactly in what regard this is true. He
would, I am sure, include the fact that persons are less predictable
than things and that God is even less predictable than we humans.
But I believe there is another important distinction to which Alston
does not call attention but toward which I have been aiming. The
practice through which we generate Christian theistic beliefs is a
practice that has, as its central focus, a single epistemically unique
spatiotemporally nonrooted individual-God, and his desires,
thoughts, and actions. God is the only member of his kind. Inter
personal perception does not have as its focus the solitary member
of a kind. Here I wish to distinguish between interpersonal percep
tion, as the practice through which we generate beliefs about perr.

Alston, "Christian Experience and Christian Belief, " pp. 1 3 1-32.
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sons qua persons, and another practice through which we generate
beliefs about persons qua epistemically unique individuals. Alston's
discussions do not make such a distinction, but it is precisely this
failure that leaves his position open to the background belief chal
lenge. The practices that generate beliefs about individuals qua
epistemically unique spatiotemporally nonrooted individuals re
quire background beliefs for the formation of their deliverances,
and thus all such practices are noninferential mediated practices (or
perhaps, if some are inferential, then simply mediated).
As Alston notes, there is debate about whether interpersonal
perception is an independent practice or a subpractice of PP. Like
that, one might debate the existence of independent practices that
generate beliefs about epistemically unique objects and suggest that
they are subpractices of broader practices. So, for example, the
practice that allows us to come to know Tom versus Tim, and Jack
versus Tom, and so forth, is really a subpractice of interpersonal
perception, the practice that allows us to generate beliefs about
persons qua persons. I treat them as independent practices.
I suggest that some of the practices that generate beliefs about
individual things qua epistemically unique spatiotemporally non
rooted individuals are on the same level as CP. These practices are
more parallel to CP than they are to PP. Let us call the practice that
allows us to generate beliefs about persons qua persons "interper
sonal perceptual practice" and the practice that allows us to gener
ate beliefs about persons qua epistemically unique individual per
sons "unique person practice. " What kind of beliefs does
interpersonal perceptual practice generate? Interpersonal perceptual
practice is closer, I think, to religious practice than to PP. Whereas
PP gives us fairly clear and specific sortal beliefs-that thing is a
tree, for example-religious practice does not. Religious practice's
deliverances, recall, are somewhat vague and general recognitions
of a reality beyond the physical and the (humanly) personal. Inter
personal perceptual practice, I suggest, gives us (more or less) gen
eral beliefs about the realm of the humanly personal. It is interper
sonal perceptual practice that allows us to recognize that we are in
the company of personal beings rather than merely physical things.
It is a difficult practice to describe, or to individuate, for we almost
always engage in unique person practice when we engage in inter
personal perceptual practice. Whenever we form beliefs about per-
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sons based on experience, we pick out individual persons (either by
proper names, indexicals, or unique descriptions) and not just the
reality of the personal. Nevertheless, our ability to pick out the
personal from the nonpersonal seems necessary for us to pick out
the individual person. 2
Given this distinction between unique person practice and inter
personal perceptual practice, and continuing with Alston's concern
with rationality, a new parity thesis can be suggested:
Parity ThesisNew (PTN): Under appropriate conditions,
engaging in CP and engaging in unique person practice
have, for S, the same level and strength of overall ratio
nality.
There is no extension to beliefs, for overall rationality, as we have
been using the term, is a metaepistemological notion applicable
only to the evaluation of practices.
Why suggest parity only between CP and unique person practice
and not either unique physical object practice or memory beliefs
about epistemically unique things? In the latter case, as I indicated
earlier (Chapter 9, Section 2), memory beliefs are formed by a con
ceptual-reading practice. There appears to be no parallel to unique
person practice or CP. Although we do have memory beliefs about
epistemically unique individuals, it is not clear that they are gener
ated or justified in a way different from memories about anything
else. Perhaps this is because the kind of experiences attached to
memory beliefs is always internal to the rememberer. 3 As to the
former, it seems to me that, because of the regularity of physical
objects and the intimate connection between this regularity and the
spatiotemporal nature of these objects, a practice for the generation
and justification of beliefs about unique physical objects is best un
derstood as a subpractice of PP. Unique physical object practice
turns out, thus, to be a conceptual-reading practice. The identifica
tion of epistemically unique physical objects seems to rely in im2. Consider a young child's ability to tell the difference between a stuffed, grey
toy cat and a real grey cat-or science fictional androids who are supposedly con
scious or alive and the confusion this engenders for legal cases against the androids.
3. Plantinga has some interesting comments about the role of experience in
memory; see Warrant and Proper Function, Chapter 3 .
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portant ways on the spatiotemporal web that is part and parcel of
the world picture of PP, as well as on the predictive nature of PP.
Another way to state this point is that this subpractice does not
seem to be independent of PP and its requirements in the manner
in which CP is independent of religious practice, or unique person
practice of interpersonal perceptual practice. CP and unique person
practice seem, in short, to be noninferential mediated practices and
therefore entirely self-contained in terms of their belief content.
We have seen this with CP: the Christian content seems to be
wholly internal to that religious tradition and is communicated
through authority and the credulity disposition. I submit that
unique person practice functions in roughly the same way. Our
coming to learn the names of people, and hence to identify and
reidentify them, is entirely internal to the authority of others, the
credulity disposition, and certain social relationships conditioned
by these first two factors. Accordingly, if our unique person prac
tice beliefs are justified, it is through holistic considerations and not
experiential ones (more on this below) . I think, then, that PTN
stands the best chance of being true, rather than a parity thesis in
which CP is paired with unique physical object practice or a prac
tice generating memory beliefs about epistemically unique individ
ual things.
One final point needs to be clarified. In Chapter 5 , Section 2, I
argued that one could rank epistemic practices within the subclass
of nontrivially self-supported practices. This could be done, I said,
on the basis of the closeness of the cognitive connection between
experience and belief (the issue of conceptual-reading vs. nonin
ferential mediated practices) . I also called attention to Alston's
claim that one might rank practices from a cognitive point of view
because of features such as predictive power, and I raised the issue
of the relationship between these "cognitive attractions" and what I
argued above are the epistemically important roles of the back
ground beliefs. One might raise the following question: if concep
tual-reading practices are epistemically and not simply cognitively
superior to noninferential mediated practices, then why cast PTN
in terms of rationality rather than justification? Briefly, it seems to
me that Alston's characterization of the relationship of the justifica
tion of beliefs to doxastic practices is correct, and, although we
have an intuition about the epistemic superiority of conceptual-
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reading practices over against noninferential mediated practices,
this intuition rests in the cognitive attractiveness of the former over
the latter. At the end of the day, the best way to get at these rank
ings, even though they have an epistemic justificatory component,
is to discuss them in the metaepistemological framework of ratio
nality, with its internal judgments that the practices are more, or
less, reliable. In addition to this point, I believe that, although the
distinction between conceptual-reading and noninferential medi
ated practices is an epistemically important one, the epistemic ad
vantage of the former over the latter does not remove the latter
from being reliable or justified.
PTN has, then, at least one advantage over the others we have
considered. It does not fall prey to a disanalogy in regard to the
need for background beliefs. Both CP and unique person practice
are noninferential mediated practices. The obvious question to ask,
however, is why this is an advantage, since I have already argued
that the appeal to background beliefs seems to force the Reformed
epistemologist into either natural theology (or other inferential evi
dence provision) or an infinite regress of justifications, in either
case calling the Reformed epistemology project into question. The
best response to this issue is seen in the move to certain holistic
considerations that seem to be required by noninferential mediated
practices or at least such practices that strongly rely on their back
ground beliefs. I have hinted at certain aspects of these holistic con
siderations. In the next section I make them at least somewhat
more explicit. Natural theology or arbitrariness are not the only
options for CP's background beliefs.

2.

Comportment and Confirmation

Beliefs are not held individually; they are held in complex
groups. The web of belief is intricate. The relations between one
belief and another, and between beliefs and experiences, are not
easily untangled. This complex of beliefs and experiences might be
described in terms of beliefs more or less "fitting" well together,
"cohering" well together, or, as I say here, "comporting" well to
gether. The example of remembering eating breakfast this morn
ing provides an illustration of what I mean by comportment. But,
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before looking at the example, some observations are in order.
First, consider the more traditional models of foundationalism such
as those that emphasize self-evidence or incorrigibility as the crite
rion for proper basicality. On such models a person would, under
normal circumstances at least, not attempt to confirm a properly
basic belief. After all, a basic belief has the advantage of being so
well grounded that no other belief is more firmly grounded. Thus,
not only is there supposed to be no need for further justification or
confirmation, no such justification or confirmation is even 'possi
ble. To which beliefs would one appeal? Properly basic beliefs are
considered certain or unassailable in terms of their epistemic justi
fication. No other belief or set of beliefs could provide assurance of
justification for a properly basic belief, because no other belief is
more firmly justified. On such models properly basic beliefs are
considered to have a privileged epistemic status.
With weaker models of foundationalism, Plantinga's included,
basic beliefs do not hold such a special status. They can be chal
lenged, and one may then wish to appeal to other beliefs to shore
up the status of the belief in question. Returning again to the dis
cussion of the confirmation challenge, recall that Grigg claims that,
although we constantly have outside sources for confirmation of
such beliefs, this shoring up does not provide justification. He is
correct, if justification's only source is experientially grounded.
Here Grigg seems to be wary of the danger of letting beliefs slip
from a properly basic status to an inferential status. But if confir
mation provides holistic grounds for justification, and Plantinga's
account of coherence systems is correct (i. e. , given that coherence
provides justification, all justified beliefs in coherent systems are
properly basic), 4 then the beliefs in question can remain properly
basic even though other beliefs are involved in their justification.
Putting this concern into Alston's language, such beliefs could be
justified by coherence relationships but not be mediated inferen
tially. Furthermore, confirmation need not be understood in a
strictly predictive manner. Instead, we may simply appeal to the
fact that under most circumstances the paradigm beliefs comport
well with the rest of our experiences and noetic structure.
4. See Plantinga, "Coherentism and the Evidentialist Objection to Belief in
God, " pp. 1 23-26.
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What does it mean to say that a belief comports well? Return
now to the breakfast example. Even on the weaker foundational
models one would not, in most circumstances, worry about con
firming one's belief that one ate breakfast this morning. It is a
memory belief and under typical conditions can be legitimately
taken to be properly basic. Although I may rely on the fact that the
practice that generated this belief-memory-is validated by many
other sets of circumstances and beliefs, I do not typically set out to
confirm my memory beliefs or to validate the practice from which
they come. But suppose I have the belief that I ate breakfast this
morning and then come home to discover that there are no dirty
dishes in the sink. This bit of information may be disconcerting,
for I know that this week my wife is away on one of her research
trips, my son is with some friends, no one else has a key to my
condo, I never wash the dishes in the morning because they are
few (being aware of our current drought, I do not wish to waste
water in a half-empty dishwasher), and so forth. Now, to discover
a lack of dirty dishes at least generates a certain amount of wonder;
why are there no dishes in the sink? Here we have a lack of com
portment between belief and experience (or the belief generated by
the experience)-a lack of confirmation, as it were.
How can this lack of comportment be explained? There are
many ways, no doubt, but one example suffices. Although I do
remember eating breakfast this morning, what I had forgotten is
that I woke up late and therefore merely stopped for a doughnut
on the way to work rather than taking time to cook. This explains
the lack of dishes in the sink, and now the complex of my noetic
structure confirms the original belief. The lack of comportment I
discovered initially as I found the sink barren of dishes is explained
by reference to other factors. The important thing to note is that
my belief is related in detailed ways to my other beliefs and experi
ence and that these relations provide a certain kind of confirma
tion. Also important is that one cannot tell ahead of time which
(set of) belief(s) will be problematic in the face of new experiences
or beliefs that lack comportment with present beliefs.
Given this somewhat broader understanding of confirmation,
the theist can suggest that she has what I call comportment among
her theistic beliefs, or at least comportment similar enough to that
found for beliefs delivered by unique person practice to allow the
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move from that comportment to the status of being nontrivially
supported (in Alston's sense). From there she may legitimately
claim that many of her theistic (or Christian) beliefs are properly
basic or immediately justified. I believe there is comportment for
PP's and interpersonal perceptual practice's deliverances as well.
These constitute nontrivial self-support for those practices. Com
portment for CP and unique person practice's deliverances plays
dual roles, however. Not only does it provide nontrivial self-sup
port for the practices, but it provides justification for the beliefs in
question. This is necessary for the deliverences of CP and unique
person practice, for they do not have the advantage of being expe
rientially justified as do the deliverances of PP, interpersonal per
ceptual practice, religious practice, and unique physical object
practice.
3·

Examples

I think the best evidence for these claims is to develop a set of
examples of unique person practice beliefs and CP beliefs that
comport well with other beliefs and experience, within their re
spective frameworks. That, at least, is the approach I take here.
First consider unique person practice and its deliverances. Our
use of proper names for individual humans is in many ways philo
sophically problematic. What do we do when we pick someone
out of the crowd with such utterances as " Stan went over there"? Is
"Stan" to be understood as a definite description or a proper name?
What is the nature of reference? What about extension, or inten
sion? Fortunately, here we need not worry about these issues. I
want simply to call attention to certain epistemic considerations
that come into play with our everyday use of proper names in
perceptual contexts. Note, first, that when one learns to pick out,
perceptually, a unique individual person one either has to be intro
duced to that person by the individual in question or by someone
else. One is told (by an authority) that "this or that individual" is
"so and so" -that person by the tree wearing the bright orange
shirt is Stan (or, in first person, "I am Stan") . Our credulity dispo
sition is activated at the very introduction of the name and the link
to its referent. Is there some independent vehicle for checking this
information? Maybe one could attempt to verify the information
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by checking the government records, but here one still relies on
authority. Once the name is learned-once the person is epi
stemically baptized with the name-we can only appeal to mem
ory or other "reintroductions" to access the information. Where do
beliefs thus generated get their justification? The best one can do is
appeal to that initial learning situation and the trust we have in the
source. Wherein lies that trust? The credulity disposition, as noted
above, is modified as we mature epistemically. We learn to trust
others, but only with discrimination. In particular, some people are
bad with names. It is in circumstances in which one believes one's
sources not to be good with names that one's belief that that is
Stan needs confirmation-at least explicitly. And so we listen to
others' identifications of the person in question and in particular
note the extent to which the belief (or its near relatives) is socially
embedded. Once we have the belief that Stan is such and such a
person, then we learn to use and apply the name in appropriate
contexts. In particular, we learn how Stan (typically) looks or acts:
that he has certain features (a young face for his middle-fifties, and
slightly stooped shoulders) or that he is habitual in certain ways
(his office door is always closed when he is working inside, he is
friendly with David but he greatly dislikes Sue). It is this complex
of associations, physical and social, along with other background
information (such as that Stan is back from vacation) that allows
unique person practice to generate beliefs such as "Stan is coming
down the hill. " But suppose I know that Stan said he would not be
back in town until the 2oth and it is only the I 5th, and the figure I
see, although it has stooped shoulders and a characteristically
youthful facial appearance, is laughing and talking with Sue? Then
unique person practice does not, except when not working well,
generate the belief "Stan is coming down the hill. " In short, we
learn to generate beliefs about epistemically unique individual per
sons-and are justified in holding these beliefs-only if they com
port well with other beliefs and experiences.
In short, justification of unique person beliefs is holistic in these
ways. First, no experience itself (qua phenomenon) gives us beliefs
about persons qua epistemically unique individuals. There is al
ways reliance on authority and credulity. There is, then, some kind
,
of experience that is the source of belief, but the experience itself
does not justify beliefs generated by it. Second, such beliefs either
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fit or do not fit with our other beliefs and experiences. They either
comport well or they do not (there is, of course, a continuum
here) . When they do, they are justified.
What of the deliverances of CP? Theists, in particular Christian
theists, do not hold their religious beliefs as free-standing beliefs.
Much as humans hold more ordinary beliefs in complex patterns
and with more or less loose relationships to experience, theists or
ganize their religious beliefs in patterns that entangle beliefs �me
with another as well as with experience. For example, the belief
that God loves me is often connected to beliefs about God's provi
dential care for me. Beliefs about God's providential care may well
be related to beliefs about God's gracious activity in molding my
character, to beliefs about the activity of God through the loving
actions of others, or to beliefs about God's meeting my needs,
emotional and otherwise. Furthermore, these beliefs may well be
entangled with some of my experiences.
Consider this. The pastor of a church believes that God cares for
her and her church deeply, but the pastor is discouraged about the
progress in her parish. New converts are not coming into the faith,
the parishioners are not as active as they ought to be, and the like.
Suppose, however, a parishioner who has not been active is coun
seled by the pastor. This is the beginning of an education in the
meaning of Christian service and in the meaning of sharing the
gospel. The parishioner begins to serve and to share. Eventually,
through the work of this parishioner, the parish begins to grow,
people begin new relationships with God and other people, and so
forth. Over a period of time, the discouragement wanes, the pastor
is renewed. She has, it appears, had confirmation that God does,
indeed, care for her and her church.
A further example. Christians and Jews believe that the dove is a
symbol of the renewal of the world. Noah sent out a dove when
he tested to see if the waters of the great flood had subsided. The
dove was sent out three times. On the first it returned not having
found a place to rest. It returned from the second carrying a newly
sprouted olive leaf to Noah. On the third it did not return. Noah
then knew the waters had abated. And for the Christian there is an
additional layer of meaning: the dove is also a symbol of the Holy
Spirit. When Jesus came to John the Baptist to be baptized, "the
spirit, descending as a dove, " came to rest on Jesus (John I :J2,
NASV). These symbols are entwined in the minds of many Chris-
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tians by the belief that the Spirit is both the Comforter and the
Creator, the one who encourages and the one who renews the
world. The Spirit, the dove, is thus considered the one who re
news discouraged believers. Now suppose a Christian, holding a
set of beliefs such as those described, becomes discouraged. He is
questioning whether God really cares for him. As he walks out
among the trees of the church grounds, a dove descends and
alights on his shoulder. The bird rests there for four or five min
utes, as the Christian considers his plight, his commitments, his
God. Could this dove's activity be taken as confirmation that God
does indeed care? As the dove wings its way back toward heaven,
the Christian feels his burdens lightened and a sudden rush of joy
fills his heart; he is emotionally and spiritually renewed. Although
the link may be weak from the point of view of a nontheistic web
of belief, for the Christian holding a full-blown set of theistic be
liefs this event would be very strong confirmation that God does
indeed love and care for him. 5
There are clear parallels to our beliefs about individual humans.
Suppose I am discouraged by a disagreement I have some morning
with my wife. On arriving at work later that day, I find some
freshly cut blue flowers in my office. Knowing that the first
flowers I ever gave my wife were blue, that they have become a
symbol of faithfulness and love for us, that many if not most peo
ple would not give flowers to a man, I believe that these flowers
came from my wife. I cease being discouraged, believing that all is
well with our relationship.
A final example. Suppose a committed Christian-call her Re
becca-believes that God calls some people to leadership. In fact,
Rebecca believes that God wants some believers to be in leader
ship, in particular academic leadership. Suppose further that after
prayer Rebecca has the impression that God wants her within the
halls of academia. Thus motivated, she acts in ways consistent with
5· A series of events similar to these happened to my pastor, Curtis D. Peter
son. On reading part of an earlier draft of this essay, Burleigh T. Wilkins noted
that my pastor was lucky that the dove wasn't a turkey vulture! But what would
such an event have meant for the Christian? Perhaps nothing, or perhaps it would
have been understood as one more bit of evidence for the evil in the world. How
Christians respond to such evil can itself be part of the web of belief and experience
which, when taken together, provides confirmation for the Christian worldview.
Compare the stories of Job and Habbakuk from the Hebrew testament.
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this impression; she asks her academic advisers about her suitability
for further graduate work. She is encouraged to, and does, apply
to several of the best graduate schools. In the midst of this en
deavor, Rebecca maintains her cautious skepticism. She thinks ac
ceptance at these schools quite unlikely. As human beings are wont
to be, she is not particularly self-assured.
To complicate matters, Rebecca is married to another graduate
student. She is concerned that her marriage remain strong, for a� a
Christian she believes God is unhappy with broken relationships
and, in particular, broken marriages. In this regard, she is con
cerned that her husband's career not be adversely affected by her
plans coming to fruition. Finally, suppose Rebecca is also concerned
that she not go further into debt to pay for her education. She is thus
inclined to pray that, if God truly wishes her to attend graduate
school, he confirm her rather tentatively held belief that she should
go to graduate school in order to be eventually enabled to work
within academia. Specifically, she asks God for the following two
things. First, if she is to attend one of these graduate programs, God
must provide sufficient funds so she can avoid further debt. Second,
if she is to attend, her husband's career ought not to be hurt.
In light of the first request, three things occur. First, Rebecca is
admitted to four of the five Ivy League schools to which she ap
plies. Second, three of the four schools that grant her admission
provide financial support. Third, two of the three schools offering
support provide very large financial packages, one covering three
years of tuition and living expenses, the other covering four years.
This appears to be confirmation that God wants Rebecca in gradu
ate school and, by extension, that he wants her in academic ser
vice. As to the other request, Rebecca's husband, having not yet
finished his Ph. D . , is offered a one-year teaching post (an event,
given the job market of recent years, that is nigh unto a miracle in
itsel£1) . This offer is quite unexpected and certainly furthers his ca
reer more quickly than were he not gaining teaching experience.
Rebecca's attending the graduate school of her choice seems to be
open at this point and her belief confirmed.
The web of Rebecca's belief system is complicated; the experi
ences she has and beliefs she later forms comport well with the
belief that God wants her to serve within the halls of academia.
This case and the earlier two (and others that can be generated
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easily) seem close enough to cases of unique person practice belief
and unique person practice experience comportment to allow the
move to proper basicality or justification for Christian theistic be
liefs; one's engaging in such practices is rational and nontrivially
supported.
Furthermore, unique person practice and CP are parallel in more
than the comportment of their deliverances with other beliefs and
experiences. They also have quite parallel self-support in terms of
relational development. As Alston notes, CP receives nontrivial
self-support from the fact that its participants develop spiritually.
In short, they mature and develop in their relationship to God.
Unique person practice allows us to develop similarly in our rela
tionships to other people. Alston claims that it is interpersonal per
ceptual practice that does this. More likely, I believe, it is unique
person practice, for in most cases our relational skills develop only
where we know, more or less intimately, other people. Interper
sonal perceptual practice, as I characterized it, is not the practice
that allows us such intimacy. But there is no hard and fast rule
here. Interpersonal perceptual practice can perhaps generate beliefs
such as "humans are the types of beings who suffer when in pain"
even when I have no names attached to them, and hence no inti
macy. I can still feel impelled to provide aid and thus become more
relationally sensitive. Parallel to this, religious practice may make
us more religiously sensitive, but it is only the intimacy allowed by
CP (or other practices, e.g. , Buddhist practice, Hindu practice)
that provides for deep spiritual and relational growth.
In short, these sets of beliefs and experiences, when the beliefs
and experiences are taken together, seem to provide some reason
for one to think that the Christian theistic beliefs in question are
true (or at least as much reason as in unique person practice cases,
given that there too confirmation comes from within the very
practice from which the original belief came), even though the sit
uations and circumstances are not predictable. They thus give the
theist some reason to take her beliefs to be properly basic or imme
diately justified, even though the experience that provides for their
genesis does not function in a justificatory manner. It is, of course,
important to remember that comportment is not (typically) con
sciously inferential. When it is, then the beliefs generated are not
basic or immediate.
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The Anything-Goes Challenge

The critic is likely to raise a challenge to PTN that is related to
the confirmation challenge. She can claim that the problem with
these examples is that, although it may be true that the suggested
beliefs comport well with other beliefs held by the Christian or
theist, just about any experience or belief can be taken to comport
well with such beliefs. The theist can twist and turn to make any
beliefs or experiences fit. The important question, the critic con
tinues, is this. What exactly does not comport well with the theist's
beliefs? Let us call this the "anything-goes challenge. "
The anything-goes challenge introduces some new issues into
the discussion which merit attention. Perhaps the challenge is cor
rect. The disanalogy is not that theistic beliefs do not comport well
with other beliefs and experiences but that they comport too well.
Perhaps theistic noetic structures can be manipulated to fit what
ever facts come along, whereas nontheistic structures cannot. The
anything-goes challenge is a kind of arbitrariness challenge. It is
reminiscent of the challenge brought against theists by Antony
Flew in the now famous discussion "Theology and Falsification. "
There Flew challenges the religious believer thus: "What would
have to occur or to have occurred to constitute for you a disproof
of the love of, or the existence of God. "6 Now, Flew's challenge is
intimately tied to the question of the falsifiability of theological
assertions, but we can avoid that issue to concentrate on another. If
we rephrase Flew's challenge in terms of the present discussion, it
can be understood in this way: just what set of beliefs and experi
ences would lead the theist to conclude that there is a lack of com
portment within the theistic noetic structure?
Considering Basil Mitchell's parable given in response to Flew's
challenge sheds some light on this issue:
In time of war in an occupied country, a member of the resistance
meets one night a stranger who deeply impresses him. They spend
that night together in conversation. The Stranger tells the partisan
that he himself is on the side of the resistance-indeed that he is in
command of it, and urges the partisan to have faith in him no mat6. Antony Flew, R. M. Hare, and Basil Mitchell, "Theology and Falsifica
tion, " in New Essays in Philosophical Theology, ed. Antony Flew and Alasdair Mac
Intyre (New York: Macmillan, 1955), p. 99.
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ter what happens. The partisan is utterly convinced at that meeting
of the Stranger's sincerity and constancy and undertakes to trust
him.
They never meet in conditions of intimacy again. But sometimes
the Stranger is seen helping members of the resistance, and the par
tisan is grateful and says to his friends, "He is on our side."
Sometimes he is seen in the uniform of the police handing over
patriots to the occupying power. On these occasions his friends
murmur against him: but the partisan still says, "He is on our side. "
He still believes that, in spite of appearances, the Stranger did not
deceive him. Sometimes he asks the Stranger for help and receives
it. He is then thankful. Sometimes he asks and does not receive it.
Then he says, "The Stranger knows best. " Sometimes his friends, in
exasperation, say "Well, what would he have to do for you to admit
that you were wrong and that he is not on our side?" But the parti
san refuses to answer. He will not consent to put the Stranger to the
test. And sometimes his friends complain, "Well, if that's what you
mean by his being on our side, the sooner he goes over to the other
side the better. "7
Mitchell's parable is rich in insight and deserves fuller treatment
than I give here. I wish to concentrate on only one facet. The parti
san has some experiences that do not comport well with the rest of
his Stranger beliefs. When the Stranger is in the uniform of the
police and turns over members of the resistance to the enemy, the
partisan wonders about the loyalty of the Stranger. One might
even imagine a slightly different-but more existentially power
ful-parable in which the Stranger appears to be turning over the
partisan himself to the enemy. Surely neither of these events com
ports well with the partisan's commitment to the Stranger's being
"on our side, " just as the theist's commitment to the love of God
may not comport well with the appearance of God's giving the
theist over to evil. But in neither the Stranger nor the God case
does the believer hurriedly give up the belief in question.
This brings to light an important fact. Although it is true that
some things may not comport well with a given theistic structure,
this seems equally true of nontheistic structures. If we take a natu
ralistic (read: the physical universe is all there is) worldview to be a
competitor of the Christian worldview, we discover that not all the
7- Ibid. , pp. 103-4.
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"facts" always fit. Suppose we take the scientific theorizing of the
naturalist to be (roughly) parallel to the theologizing of the Chris
tian, and then take scientific methodology to be a subpractice of
PP. I do not mean to conflate science and naturalism here. Rather,
I am relying on what appears to be the temptation, and indeed
practice, of many naturalists to take science as the best approach to
the discovery of the most general truths about "all that is. " On this
kind of naturalism, PP, scientific methodology, and the scientific
theorizing that go along with them take on the role of being the
primary, if not the only, means of obtaining truth. Insofar as the
naturalistic worldview provides control over what will or can be
taken to be factual or meaningful, metaphysics reduces to the re
sults of science. Accordingly, science can be construed as essential
to naturalism in a way that it is not to theism. But I do not mean
to suggest that science and naturalism are identical, nor that science
has no home within a theistic worldview.
With this framework understood, consider the problem of
anomalies in scientific theorizing. What does one do when one's
theory conflicts with some newly discovered data or when one's
confirming experiment fails to confirm? Or what happens when
one's naturalistic science runs up against an apparent miracle?
Something has to be given up, but it is not always clear which
belief (or beliefs) ought to go. Sometimes it is hard to tell, and the
best policy is to wait. This is, indeed, what the naturalist does.
Likewise with the theist, at least on occasion. There are things that
engender a lack of comportment with a theistic noetic structure,
and it may appear to the anything-goes critic as if the theist can
take anything to comport. But this is not the theist's special prob
lem. The theist learns to live with some of that lack of comport
ment, as does the naturalist.
Mitchell rightly recognized a similar thrust behind Flew's chal
lenge and hence raised a question of his own parable: when does it
become silly for the partisan to continue to believe in the Stranger?
We can paraphrase the question and ask at what point it becomes
silly for the theist to modify her noetic structure so that any experi
ence or belief comports well. Such a point exists, or at least so it
seems. Plantinga, for example, admits that counterevidence against
theistic belief may lead one away from theistic belief. Ultimately,
then, not just any and all beliefs or experiences can be made to
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comport well with theistic beliefs. Although one must admit that
some theists may be irrational and allow anything to comport well
with their theistic beliefs, we need only consider a believer who is
closer to being a model of rationality. The anything-goes chal
lenge, I claim, does not apply to her.
Which beliefs and experiences can and which cannot be made to
comport well with the rest of one's noetic structure must be de
cided on an individual basis. But it seems that the critic who ac
cuses the theist in general of taking just any and all beliefs and expe
riences as comporting well with her noetic structure is wrong.
Suppose Rebecca, after her prayer, had not received financial aid.
Suppose further that her husband did not obtain a job. Could she
have incorporated these events into her noetic structure and main
tained it as well-comporting? Do these experiences and beliefs con
tinue to fit with her belief that she should go to graduate school?
Possibly. Suppose Rebecca also believes that God is testing her
faith; she understands these new circumstances as God's means of
encouraging her to fulfill her commitment of faith to him in some
other way. As noted in Chapter 1 0, one of the cautions mature
Christians often urge on the younger is that requested confirma
tion not be of a predictive variety. The premedical student who
asks God to help him do well on the entrance exams fails to get the
kind of confirmation he wishes. A caution against expecting too
much, however, does not mean that God never provides.
But there are some things that Rebecca could not incorporate, at
least not in any simple way. Suppose her husband becomes quite ill
and she is needed at home. Or suppose it becomes clear that Re
becca's attending graduate school will indeed bring her marriage to
an end. Depending on how deeply rooted her commitments to
marriage are and perhaps on how deeply entwined her beliefs
about marriage are with Christian beliefs, she may be unwilling to
understand these new events as comporting well with her belief
that God wants her to attend graduate school. Clearly she is wrong
about something, and given the hierarchy of beliefs she has within
her noetic structure, it would seem that her belief that God wants
her in graduate school is the one that should be given up. Not just
anything comports well with a theistic noetic structure.
If the anything-goes challenger is persistent, she might press
again. She might suggest that, with enough alterations in the the-
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ist' s noetic structure, Rebecca can make these beliefs comport. She
may need to alter her understanding of God in some radical way
maybe God is really evil and intent on destroying her marriage. At
this point the defense can rest on two points. First, such a radical
modification of Rebecca's noetic structure seems to destroy the claim
that it is theistic or at least that it is specifically Christian. To demand
this much of one's noetic structure in order to retain one's commit
ment seems somewhat disingenuous. Second, if theistic structQres
face the problem of radical noetic modification to protect a cherished
belief, a similar point is true of nontheistic noetic structures.
This last point can be fleshed out. R. M. Hare's contribution to
the "Falsification and Theology " discussion can help here:
certain lunatic is convinced that all dons want to murder him. His
friends introduce him to all the mildest and most respectable dons
that they can find, and after each of them has retired, they say,
"You see, he doesn't really want to murder you; he spoke to you in
a most cordial manner; surely you are convinced now?" But the
lunatic replies, "Yes, but that was only his diabolical cunning; he's
really plotting against me the whole time, like the rest of them; I
know it I tell you. " However many kindly dons are produced, the
reaction is still the same. 8
A

Clearly the lunatic is prepared to take any experience to be consis
tent with his belief that the dons want to murder him. Nothing
will stand in his way.
The lesson to be drawn from this parable for the anything-goes
challenger seems to be that the reading of a set of beliefs and cir
cumstances can vary widely and that the possibility of such a wide
variety of changes in one's noetic structure is not limited to theists.
One can always attempt to add explanatory epicycles to one's be
liefs in order to hold on to them. When should one add epicycles?
That varies with the circumstances and with the depth of ingres
sion of the beliefs involved. How many and what kind of epicycles
can be rationally added is a function of how deeply entrenched the
beliefs are in one's epistemic structure and how much other evi
dence is connected to the beliefs. These issues cannot be decided
independently of looking at a given noetic structure.
8. Ibid . , pp. 99-IOO.
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If the picture presented here is correct, the anything-goes chal
lenge is met. Not just any data can be made to comport well with
one's theistic noetic structure, at least for the model rational theist.
There comes a point beyond which it is silly to add explanatory
epicycles to one's noetic structure. Furthermore, just as one can
move beyond being a model rational theist, one can move beyond
being a model rational nontheist. There is nothing unique about
theistic noetic structures, at least in this regard.
5.

Religious Plurality Revisited

A second challenge to PTN depends again on the existence
of diverse religious epistemic practices. The critic might challenge
PTN in the following way. There is an important difference be
tween unique person practice and CP. Those who engage in
unique person practice with particular persons do not generally dis
agree about the existence or the characteristics of persons with
whom they do not (but others do) engage in unique person prac
tice. And those others can come to engage in unique person prac
tice with the persons with whom the former engage in it without
giving up all previous involvements. But among the beliefs in
volved in CP is the belief that there is only one God and that that
God has certain characteristics. Therefore, one cannot engage in
CP and, for example, Jewish practice or Muslim practice or Hindu
practice. Thus, the decision to engage in CP implies the decision
not to engage in any of these other particular religious practices.
But those who engage in CP typically do not merely refrain from
engaging in these other practices. They also claim that these prac
tices are based on (or essentially involve) false beliefs. But there is
no analogy to this in unique person practice. In short, to engage in
CP I must hold that there are false beliefs involved in the religious
practices of others, but to engage in unique person practice with
my colleagues I do not have to hold that there are false beliefs
involved in the interpersonal belief-forming practices of other peo
ple. Nor do I have to hold that people engaged in unique person
practice with those with whom I do not engage in it are all some
how badly mistaken about the existence or characteristics of those
with whom they engage in unique person practice. If it is said that
adherents of different religions are not involved with a different
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deity but instead have different beliefs about the same deity, then
one should still have to ask why one should think that distinctively
Christian beliefs about this deity are correct. The presence of this
feature in CP (and presumably in other religious practices as well)
raises the specter of arbitrariness again. The same sorts of confir
mation available to Christians who engage in CP would be avail
able to Jews who engage in Jewish practice and to Muslims who
engage in Muslim practice. And it is likely that confirmations actu
ally occur in the lives of people engaging in Jewish practice and
Muslim practice in roughly the same quantity and quality as the
confirmations that occur in the lives of those who engage in CP.
But some beliefs essential to each of these practices seem to contra
dict each other, so they cannot all be true. For example, either God
reconciled the world to himself in Jesus or God did not, so either
Christians or Jews are wrong on this matter. Why then engage in
CP rather than Jewish practice, Muslim practice, or Hindu prac
tice? PTN turns out not to be true, since there is a kind of arbitrari
ness involved in engaging in CP that does not exist when one en
gages in unique person practice. Let us call this challenge the
"religious plurality challenge. "9
There are several issues involved in the religious plurality chal
lenge to PTN• but perhaps the central one is that anyone engaging
in CP must claim that those who engage in other competing reli
gious epistemic practices have false beliefs. In short, there are inter
practice contradictions. This criticism has similarities to the chal
lenge of religious diversity to the parity thesis between PP and CP
which is the straw that breaks the camel's back in Alston's discus
sion. Recall that, according to Alston, the challenge of religious
plurality to the rationality of engaging in CMP (CP) arises in the
following way. Even if the perceptual beliefs we have about God
do not conflict themselves, the practices forming such beliefs are
still subject to serious conflict by virtue of the associated belief sys
tems. Given the rich diversity among religious doxastic practices,
only one, if any, of the practices can be reliable. Why suppose it is
CP? There are many reasons internal to CP, but we seem to need
9. The source of this criticism is an anonymous reviewer for Cornell Univer
sity Press. Although not an exact quotation, the previous two paragraphs are a
very close paraphrase of a section of the reviewer's report to the press.
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reasons external to the practice, since all the practices presumably
have internal reasons.
As we have seen, Alston argues that this fact does not dissipate
the justificatory efficacy of CP, but it does reduce the strength of
justification for CP vis-a-vis PP, and therefore a parity thesis be
tween PP and CP is not forthcoming. Similar points can be made
about CP here. CP is not stripped of its rational efficacy because of
plurality. But then the religious plurality challenge does not sug
gest that it is. The criticism is that PTN is not true not because CP
lacks rationality altogether but because the strength of rationality
that accrues to CP is not as great as that which accrues to unique
person practice. But exactly why should that be taken to be true?
CP requires that those who engage in it claim that those who do
not (but rather engage in competitors to CP) are engaged in a prac
tice based on or essentially involving false beliefs. Unique person
practice does not. But what exactly is the problem? Is it that
unique person practice has more overall rationality than CP? That
is not the criticism, at least not explicitly. But that is what it would
take to show that PTN is false. Why think that the "arbitrariness"
attached to engaging in religious practices shows that the overall
rationality is lower than it would be without that arbitrariness? The
basic point seems to be that, because of the existence of competi
tors to CP, engaging in CP is arbitrary. Therefore, as Alston sug
gests in discussing the justificatory efficacy of CP, even though the
existence of these other practices does not dissipate the justifica
tion, it does seem to reduce it significantly.
In Alston's case, however, the comparison is between competing
practices-CP, Muslim practice, Jewish practice-and PP, which
has no actual competitors. The comparison is between practices
taken, so to speak, from the "outside. " What I mean by "outside"
is that CP and PP are compared from a sort of neutral point of
view. CP, Jewish practice, Muslim practice, and so forth are, taken
as individual practices, each supposed to put us into effective epi
stemic relationship to the Ultimate. Thus each one provides us
with competing understandings of the Ultimate. PP has no such
actual competitors. It has only possible competitors-the White
headian or Cartesian ways of viewing physical objects as opposed
to the Aristotelian way of so doing. Alston suggests that because
these are only possible ways of viewing the world, whereas with
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the religious practices there are actual ways of viewing the Ulti
mate, the epistemic status of CP (and its competitors) is lower than
that of PP.
But this "outside" view is not the one taken by the religious
plurality challenger vis-a-vis PTN. Rather, the criticism relies on
"inside" features of the various epistemic practices. Although there
are no competitors to unique person practice, an important feature
of unique person practice is that it can be engaged in with many
different people, thus giving us beliefs about many different peo
ple. This is not true of CP. There is, supposedly, only one person
with whom CP puts us into contact. This, in addition, perhaps, to
certain exclusivity claims involved in CP ("No one comes to the
Father but through me, " as Jesus says), leads to a denial of CP's
competitors understood as legitimate means of gaining rational be
liefs about the Ultimate. With unique person practice the assump
tion is that when you and I engage in it, if we meet and get to
know two different people, I will not suggest that your engaging
in unique person practice with Sally rather than Jim, say, is based
on false beliefs. This assumption is internal to the practice itself.
From this internal perspective, there is no arbitrariness involved in
engaging in unique person practice with different people. If you
were to met Jim, as I have, you too would have Gustified) beliefs
about him. In contrast, if I engage in CP, while you engage in
Muslim practice, I will not admit that you are in contact with Al
lah, nor will I admit that Allah, understood as a being meta
physically distinct from the God and Father of Jesus Christ, exists.
These beliefs are internal to CP.
But why does this show that the strength of rationality accorded
to CP is less than that accorded to unique person practice? There
are many, many human persons with whom we can have social
engagement, and unique person practice is a practice designed to
allow just that. But there is only one God, according to CP. The
religious plurality challenge, as construed above, treats all the com
peting religious epistemic practices as if, taken as a group, they
were like slices of a grand, Ultimate unique person practice, one
slice, let us say, being the Christian unique person practice, another
the Muslim unique person practice, and another the Jewish unique
person practice. This would be c�mparable to dividing up unique
person practice into slices, one being, let us say, the Jim unique
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person practice, another the Sally unique person practice, and
again, the Frank unique person practice, and yet another, the Mary
unique person practice. To get an appropriate analogy between
unique person practice and CP, on this understanding, one would
have to say that those engaged in the Jim unique person practice
are suggesting that those engaged in the Sally unique person prac
tice, Frank unique person practice, or Mary unique person practice
are engaged in practices based on or essentially involving false be
liefs about Sally, Frank, or Mary. But this is ludicrous. It is part
and parcel of unique person practice that one assume that there are
many other humans with whom one engages in unique person
practice. That is part of unique person practice's nature. This is not
true of CP or, for that matter, ofJewish practice, Muslim practice,
or (at least many of) the other religious epistemic practices. It is the
reverse of surprising, then, that there are competitors in the field of
religious epistemic practices, at least from the point of view of a
strict analogy between the "inside" commitments of unique person
practice and CP. It simply is not required of us, when we engage
in unique person practice, that we make the kind of denials that are
required of us when we engage in CP or the other religious epi
stemic practices. If it were otherwise, we would suspect something
amiss in our epistemic conduct of the religious practices.
Perhaps, however, the religious plurality challenger means only
to suggest something closer in line with Alston's evaluation of the
parity between PP and CP. Perhaps the criticism is simply meant
to claim that the important difference between unique person prac
tice and CP is that, taken from the outside, unique person practice
has no actual competitors whereas CP does, and although this does
not dissipate the rationality of engaging in CP it does lower the
strength of the rationality by lowering the strength of the non
trivial self-support of CP. What is to be said here? If one admits
that Alston's account of the matter vis-a-vis PP and CP is accurate,
does the same not hold true here?
The best way to combat this challenge is head-on. There are two
steps to so doing. First, the argument relies on the fact that Jewish
practice, Muslim practice, CP, and so forth all have, more or less,
the same strength of internal support and, furthermore, that there
is little if any external support. Recall, as a first step, that Alston
takes the worst-case scenario and assumes that there is no external
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support for CP over other practices. One thing to do, in response
to the religious plurality challenge, is to consider the possibility
that there is external support for CP. That, of course, is a tall order
and one I do not attempt to fill here. It is, furthermore, one I
consider to be an unlikely source of solace for the religious be
liever. Nevertheless, if it could be shown that there is significant
external support for CP which is not matched by other religious
practices, that would effectively kill the criticism.
The second step, and to my mind a more promising one, is to
challenge one of the central assumptions of the criticism-that
Jewish practice, Muslim practice, CP, and so forth all have the
same strength of internal support. The critic certainly assumes this
to be the case, as does Alston. As far as Alston's case goes, and this
is not to belittle its strength, there may be much more to say about
the internal support of various religious practices. But to say any
thing about them in this regard requires a great deal of work on the
details of various religions and the epistemic practices in which
their practioners engage. This is a much larger task than I am able
to take on. But before the religious plurality challenge can be said
to be successful against PTN• this work needs to be done. Of
course, in an era of pluralism and of extreme religious tolerance,
the suggestion that we need to engage in what Paul Griffiths calls
"inter-religious apologetics" is going to be controversial. 10 Nev
ertheless, it needs to be done. Until it is, the religious plurality
challenge to PTN cannot be fully evaluated.
I have not done the hard work needed for a full reply to the
religious plurality challenge to PT N· I have pointed out where the
digging needs to start and that is, I believe, enough at least to raise
questions about the success of the criticism. In short, it is not ob
vious that it will be successful. People on both sides need to engage
in more work before the grave can be completed.
6. Confirmation, Validation, and Rationality
Two final comments about confirmation are in order before we
leave the subject. First, in some cases nonpredictive confirmation
10. See Paul J. Griffiths, "An Apology for Apologetics, " Faith and Philosophy 5
( 1988): 399-420.
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of theistic beliefs may be possible only where the theistic belief to
be confirmed is a fairly general or broad belief. This is one sim
ilarity between (some cases of) nonpredictive and predictive confir
mation. The more general is confirmed by the more specific. "All
swans are white" is confirmed by the next swan; "All sundogs are
formed in conditions C" is confirmed by the next set of conditions
and the next sundog; "God loves me" is confirmed by the love of
my Christian brothers and sisters empowered by the Holy Spirit.
Second, could we ever validate theistic practice? It was men
tioned early in Chapter 10 that, perhaps when one confirms a suffi
cient number of beliefs delivered by a given practice, the practice is
then validated. This suggestion seems to rely on predictive confir
mation, for it seems clear enough that what connects the confirm
ing instances and the validation of the practice is an inductive argu
ment that relies on the regularity of the objects about which the
beliefs are formed. This is not unlike Alston's appeal to the induc
tive subargument in his overall justificatory argument for a belief
in the reliability of a doxastic practice. Induction, resting as it does
on our trust in the regularity of nature, provides grounds for the
move from confirming instances to validation only if the principle
of induction is assumed (practically, at least) within the practice.
If this model for the relationship between validation and confir
mation is correct, then insofar as nonpredictive, comportment con
firmations do not rest on the regularity of nature the inductive in
ference is not possible. We could never have validation of a theistic
practice, at least if that validation rests on predictive confirmation.
This aligns well with Alston's claim that, if we discovered that
God was dealing with us in a predictable fashion, we would have
evidence that the theistic practice is unreliable. To expect valida
tion of this type is to expect too much. Perhaps we must be satis
fied with nonpredictive confirmation of individual beliefs or per
haps, for many of us, no confirmation whatsoever.
But this is not to say that there is no nontrivial self-support pro
vided for CP. Is there another model for understanding the rela
tionship between the confirmation of beliefs and the validation of
practices? I believe so. On the comportment understanding of con
firmation, if beliefs and experience fit together well, they are con
firmed. One of the beliefs that fits with the rest of the beliefs in a
theistic noetic structure is that, although God does not reveal him-
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self on demand, he does love us and will provide enough informa
tion to allow us to become committed to him. The confirmation I
have of certain theistic beliefs occurs when those beliefs are taken
together with my entire set of beliefs and experiences. The practice
that allows me to move from experience to theistic belief-CP,
exaggerated CP, or whatever other practice-is "validated, " in this
case shown to be rational, within the broader system of beliefs and
experience. I can judge beliefs generated by a practice to be reliable
because the belief that it is reliable comports well with my entire
(or at least a large part of my) noetic structure; there is nontrivial
self-support for the practice. This comportment is exemplified in
particular by the relationship between the belief about the reliable
nature of the theistic practice and the belief that God loves me and
will provide sufficient information for me to commit myself to
him.
This is circular but not, I think, in a surprising way. As Alston
suggests, our epistemic practices are basic practices. We should
not, therefore, hope for a noncircular type of confirmation.
Unique person practice and CP seem to be just such circular prac
tices. Since we have no other access to the objects about which we
form beliefs besides the practices that generate the beliefs, we can
not appeal to outside, independent information as a source of con
firmation.
So, just as the only access we have to the physical world is
through perception, perhaps at the end of the day the only access
we have to God is through the practice that generates theistic be
liefs. Thus the range of practices from PP through unique person
practice and CP are nontrivially self-supported. The confirmation
of their deliverances relies on the practices that form them, and in
turn the validation of the practices themselves-their rationality
relies on the confirmation (predictive or nonpredictive) of the be
liefs generated by them. The confirmation challenger might argue
that we could have access to theistic beliefs by using a discursive
belief-forming practice (natural theology) and that this is what
should validate the practice of forming theistic beliefs. But given
the lack of success with natural theology (comparable to the lack of
success in epistemology with confirming perception's deliverances
by reasoning from beliefs about sensations, or from sensations
themselves, to beliefs about the external, physical world), it hardly
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seems likely that we should turn there to show the rationality of
the practice or, by extension, confirmation of beliefs. Furthermore,
discursive reasoning is no less a basic practice, on Alston's terms.
Whatever one demands of beliefs about God, one should de
mand no more of them than that demanded of unique person prac
tice beliefs. Confirmation and validation of an independent, non
circular variety is not available for either unique person practice or
CP beliefs. Since an independent check is not available, one should
anticipate a kind of circularity in their confirmation. So, there is or
can be as much link between basic CP beliefs and other informa
tion (which makes the theistic beliefs likely to be true, or at least
our taking them as such to be rational) as there is between unique
person practice beliefs and other information (which makes unique
person practice beliefs likely to be true, or our taking them as such
to be rational). In either case, the beliefs can be properly basic or
immediately justified: their practices can have rationality and that
at the same level. Thus the requirement that theistic beliefs be con
firmed and theistic practices validated in the sense that confirma
tion requires predictive regularity is overly strong. The demand
assumes that regularity of the object of belief is a necessary feature
for confirmation of belief. In turn, this assumes that justified beliefs
can only be formed about objects for which regular, predictive
confirmation is possible. But what is necessary for justification is
not regularity but trustworthiness or reliability. Alston provides an
account of how a practice can be reliable without having a regular
object behind it. I have attempted to provide an extension of his
account, suggesting that confirmation of some beliefs about non
regular objects may occur. Whether a given belief about a non
regular object is confirmed is an empirical question to be answered
by whether one has the appropriate experiences and forms the
needed beliefs.
I have suggested a new parity thesis between CP and unique
person practice. I have also suggested a sketch of how the begin
nings of a holistic framework for a defense of PTN could go, along
with a defense of PTN against two potential criticisms. In the final
chapter I suggest another holistic principle in which Christian be
liefs may find justification, and I provide a summary of the book's
argument.

Wodd-Ordering Power and Passionate Commitment

[

12

]

World-Ordering Power and
Passionate Commitment

There are two goals for this final chapter. The first is to suggest
another holistic principle by which Christian beliefs may be justi
fied, thus indirectly strengthening PT N· Although this by no
means provides a full account of holism vis-a-vis theistic belief, it
provides another small piece of the sketch of a map for further
exploration. The second goal is simply, by way of conclusion, to
summarize briefly the positions argued in this book.
I.

More on Holism

All that was suggested in Chapter I I about the holistic frame
work for defending PTN dealt with confirmation understood from
within the various epistemic practices. This was an attempt to meet
the internal consistency requirement that is typically taken to be
part and parcel of holist theories. But there is much more to holist
theories of rationality than mere confirmation and consistency.
There is also a comprehensiveness requirement. A holist theory of
rationality must include a description of how much of our experi
ence is taken account of by the set of beliefs taken to be justified.
The most comprehensive system is the rational one, other things
being equal. I say nothing further about this requirement vis-a-vis
showing CP to be rationally engaged in except this brief point. To
argue that CP is the most comprehensive system of religious be-
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liefs would be to argue that the internal support of CP is not only
equal but superior to that of other religious epistemic practices. So
arguing would be doing the work required to reply more fully to
the religious plurality challenge discussed in Chapter I I .
There is also what we can call the requirement of "coherence,"
that is, the supposed internal relatedness of beliefs in a holist sys
tem. This requirement is notorious in that it is very difficult to say
just what this relatedness comes to. Is it logical entailment, or a
kind of probabilistic relation, or explanatory power, or aesthetic
harmony? There is also the requirement of congruence, that is, the
ability of the system of beliefs to deal with empirical data, or, put
otherwise, the appropriateness of the interpretive scheme to expe
rience. I say nothing in detail of either of these. But I do say some
thing about one feature of our religious belief systems that is often
overlooked or at least not dealt with to any degree by epistemolo
gists. The issue touches to some degree on each of the require
ments listed here, but what I have to say is not meant to be a fully
developed thesis about holism.
2.

Belief, A cceptance, and Commitment

As is well known, the Bible commands Christians and Jews to
love the Lord their God with all their hearts, souls, and minds.
Some act on this command. One question to ask is this. When
they do, how is the resulting firm religious commitment epi
stemically acceptable, given what many, theists and nontheists
alike, see as the limited amount of evidence for theistic claims?
Before answering this question, I need to make some preliminary
distinctions.
We can identify at least four senses of the term "belief, " labeling
them as follows: (a) proposition, (b) belief, (c) acceptance, and (d)
commitment. In the remainder of this chapter, I mean by "propo
sition" what logicians sometimes do-that which is asserted by de
clarative utterances or that which is either true or false. The re
maining three senses of "belief' stand in relation to this first sense.
A proposition is that which is believed or accepted or that to which
one is committed. Thus, belief, acceptance, and commitment are
all propositional attitudes. I took note of some of Plantinga's com
ments about these distinctions in Chapter 6, but I said little of them
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save for calling attention to them. Returning to a few of his com
ments illustrates more fully what I have in mind.
Plantinga lists what he thinks should be given in an account of a
person's noetic structure. 1 In particular, he notes that one can dis
tinguish between belief and acceptance:
Consider a Christian beset by doubts. He has a hard time believing
certain crucial Christian claims-perhaps the teaching that God was
in Christ, reconciling the world to himsel( Upon calling that belief
to mind, he finds it cold, lifeless, without warmth or attractiveness.
Nonetheless he is committed to this belief; it is his position; if you
ask him what he thinks about it, he will unhesitatingly endorse it.
He has, so to speak, thrown in his lot with it. Let us say that he
accepts this proposition, even though when he is assailed by doubt,
he may fail to believe it-at any rate explicitly-to any appreciable
degree. His commitment to this proposition may be much stronger
than his explicit and occurrent belief in it; so these two-that is,
acceptance and belief-must be distinguished. 2
Plantinga says no more about this distinction. Nevertheless, we
can extract from his example that beliefs have warmth, attractive
ness, and liveliness whereas acceptances do not. Two things should
be noted here. First, these characteristics are surely metaphorical.
What exactly they come to, when stripped of the metaphor, is dif
ficult to say. Perhaps these characteristics just are the fact that one
believes rather than (merely) accepts. Second, whatever they come
to, these characteristics surely have more to do with the psychol
ogy of the one holding the belief than they do with the proposi
tions held.
Plantinga also seems to suggest that one can doubt that p is true
and yet accept it, whereas (employing the same notion of doubt)
one cannot doubt p and yet believe p. One can accept some propo
sition, in spite of its lack of warmth, liveliness, and attractiveness.
This may simply be an extension of the point above; perhaps
doubt simply is the absence of these phenomenological features,
just as belief is their presence. We have, thus, an intuitive picture of
belief and acceptance with which to work.
r. What follows is an incomplete list of Plantinga's suggestions; see his " Rea
son and Belief in God" for further information.

2. Ibid., p. 37·
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Plantinga also includes in his requirements for an account of a
person's noetic structure both an index of degree of belief and an
index of degree of acceptance. This brings us to the last sense of
"belief, " that is, commitment. Plantinga writes: "I believe both
that 2 + 1 = 3 and London, England, is north of Saskatoon, Sas
katchewan; but I believe the former more resolutely than the lat
ter. "3 Presumably he would say something similar about the index
of degree of acceptance. At any rate, here we have what I wish to
isolate as commitment. Commitment, as I understand the term,
has to do with the relative unwillingness of the epistemic subject to
give up a proposition. The more unwilling one is to give up a
proposition as true, the more firm one's commitment to that prop
osition is. So, we hold various propositions with different levels of
firmness. This is true whether they are held as beliefs or accep
tances; one can be more or less committed to a proposition in
terms of how firmly one believes it as well as in terms of how
firmly one accepts it. In short, one can be more or less strongly
committed to a proposition; thus, there are levels of commitment.
Furthermore, it appears that commitment of these two types
(belief- and acceptance-commitment) can be at odds with one an
other. In his example, Plantinga suggests that the Christian's com
mitment to the proposition he accepts (but has a hard time believ
ing) is greater than his occurrent belief in that proposition.
Although there are many questions one could ask of Plantinga's
example, it seems clear enough that there are various levels of
commitment to propositions, and this commitment is intimately
related to belief and acceptance, even when belief and acceptance
conflict.
Now, it is certain that the demands of the Judea-Christian tradi
tion involve passionate commitment. What kinds of epistemic con
straints is such commitment under?
3.

The Justification Maxim

Let us say that one requirement of commitment is expressed by
what I call the "justification maxim. " Roughly, the justification
maxim is that no proposition should be given more (or less) com3· Plantinga, "The Reformed Objection to Natural Theology, " p. 54·
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mitment than its (epistemic) justification can bear. More formally,
where PA is any propositional attitude,
Justification Maxim1 : The commitment allotted p by S,
via S's PA, ought to be commensurate with S's (epi
stemic) justification for p.
Note that, so described, the justification maxim is a normative
claim. Need it be? Perhaps not. Perhaps the thrust behind it could
be understood in Alston's evaluative sense. Thus, one might sug
gest that the justification maxim is better described as:
Justification Maxim2: It is a good thing, from the epi
stemic point of view, that the commitment allotted p by
S, via S's PA, is commensurate with S's (epistemic) justi
fication for p.
Whichever framework the justification maxim is best understood
in (I work with the evaluative version here, without defending it
explicitly), it suggests a certain kind of problem with theistic be
lief.
Theistic belief is often, if not typically, taken by the mature be
liever as seriously as, or more seriously than, any other belief. This
frequently means that, when other beliefs conflict with theistic be
lief, the others lose out: the competing beliefs are modified or re
jected in accordance with the demands of the theistic beliefs. This
signals the extraordinary firmness of the believer's commitment to
ward her theistic belief. The question on which I focus here is,
then, how such firm commitment is justified vis-a-vis what many
people, theist and nontheist alike, take to be the relative lack of
evidence for theistic beliefs.
My concern is not that theistic propositions lack evidence alto
gether; it seems clear enough that they do not. It is not, that is,
that theists are irrational in believing or accepting certain claims.
That, it seems to me, is the burden and the success of Reformed
epistemology. Rather, the problem is how to provide sufficient evi
dence for one's believings and acceptings in light of the very firm,
heartfelt commitment the theistic believer often has toward these
propositions. In suggesting a solution to this problem, the follow
ing discussion indicates another reason to move toward a holistic
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account of CP's epistemic status, as well as some principles with
which to begin the conversation. Conveniently enough, some of
Plantinga's claims are suggestive of a solution to the problem of
theistic commitment. Thus, I once again engage Plantinga's claims
directly, but that is not my primary aim. His work is simply a
good place to begin. I briefly review Plantinga's criticism of classi
cal foundationalism and then move on to a challenge to his posi
tion. I suggest a response and then use that response as a spring
board for further discussion.
4.

Plantinga's Criticism of Classical
Foundationalism Revisited

Plantinga's response to the evidentialist challenge, insofar as it is
rooted in classical foundationalism (see Chapter 6), is twofold. The
first claim is that the classical account of the criterion for a beliefs
being properly basic is self-referentially incoherent. The second as
pect of Plantinga's challenge is that the history of skepticism
teaches us that, rather than being a steady rock on which to rest
knowledge and rational belief, classical foundationalism has been
the rock on which knowledge and rational belief founder. Accord
ing to the skeptical tradition, classical foundationalism's criterion
does not allow many of our ordinary beliefs to be justified. That
Susan is in pain, or that there is a tree in front of us, are claims that
are not properly basic according to the classical criterion for proper
basicality (a belief is properly basic if and only if it is either self
evident, incorrigible, or evident to the senses) . Yet we have no
argument for these beliefs or their kind; we can give no discursive
account of them vis-a-vis the requirements of classical founda
tionalism. They are thus not properly nonbasic either, and skepti
cism is at the door. How can classical foundationalism remain a
viable theory when many of our widespread beliefs cannot be justi
fied in light of its demands? For Plantinga it is not viable and ought
to be rejected.
If classical foundationalism is not viable, then neither is eviden
tialism insofar as it grows out of classical foundationalism. Thus,
the evidentialist challenge to theistic belief is not viable either. As
we have seen, however, Plantinga has opened the door to another
theory of rationality that does not, he thinks, rule out the proper
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basicality of either our widespread beliefs or the religious believer's
theistic beliefs.
Since the classical criterion for proper basicality has been rejected
as too narrow, whatever replacement is suggested should be broad
enough to allow our widespread beliefs to be rational. In particu
lar, Plantinga mentions beliefs about other minds, beliefs about the
external world, and beliefs about the past. I do not think Plantinga
would be against adding to this list beliefs about how we discover
things about the world, specifically the principles of induction, de
duction, the scientific method, and the like. But I see no easy way
to capture such principles. Let us just say that those principles we
typically use to advance our knowledge ought not to be ruled out
by the replacement criterion.
With these restrictions on what we can take as an acceptable cri
terion, recall Plantinga's suggestion that we should use an induc
tive procedure to discover a criterion for proper basicality. Can this
approach be successful in producing the results Plantinga desires,
namely, allowing for the proper basicality of beliefs about God but
ruling out a too-narrow criterion? Why, for example, can the clas
sical foundationalist not argue that, since Plantinga's suggested
procedure is person- or community-relative, it may be possible to
find a group of classical foundationalists who hold the traditional
classical criterion for proper basicality and who find it to be self
evident? This is possible on Plantinga's own grounds, they might
say, for Plantinga suggests that self-evidence is a person-relative
notion.4
Suppose, then, that the classical foundationalists do some field
work, finding a group of epistemologists who have done Plan
tinga's suggested inductive procedure. Furthermore, suppose this
group finds the classical criterion to be self-evident. For these epis
temologists (call them the "entrenched classical foundationalists"),
since the classical criterion is self-evident, the self-referential criti
cism fails.
4· See Plantinga, "Is Belief in God Rational?" in Rationality and Religious Belief,
ed. C. F. Delaney (Notre Dame, Ind., University of Notre Dame Press, 1979),
where Plantinga discusses self-evidence at length. In a delightfully humorous
story, George Mavrodes, "The Stranger, " in Faith and Rationality, ed. Plantinga
and W olterstorff, pokes fun at the notion of self-evidence as described by Plan
tinga. In the story, a proof for God's existence begins with the self-evident premise
that Jesus Christ rose from the dead.
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Plantinga can retort as follows. First, by suggesting that self
evidence is person-relative, he never meant that just anything can
be taken to be self-evident. Generally, self-evident propositions are
person-relative only in the sense that, as one's knowledge of a field
grows, one's grasp of the truths in that field becomes deeper. For
example, some mathematical proposition that was self-evident for
Einstein is not for me. It might become self-evident for me if I
study enough mathematics, but it is not right now. Nevertheless,
it is unlikely that one's knowledge of epistemology will ever help
one come to grasp self-evidently a proposition as controversial as
the classical criterion. Unlike some mathematical propositions,
even if the classical criterion is explained to me I will never self
evidently "see" it. On this basis Plantinga might ask the entrenched
classical foundationalists if they . really find the classical criterion
self-evident or if they are only stretching to reach something that
protects their favorite theory.
Second, and more important, Plantinga can fall back on the
widespread belief criticism. Even if the classical criterion truly does
seem self-evident to entrenched classical foundationalists, accord
ing to classical foundationalism all one's beliefs must be justified.
This demand extends to principles by which we come to know
things. In addition to the classical criterion, there are the principles
of induction, for example. Yet the classical criterion seems to rule
out their legitimate use, since they are not self-evident, incorrig
ible, or evident to the senses. Nor do they follow from beliefs that
are. This problem has been a skeptical thorn in the classical founda
tionalist's flesh since Hume at least.
The entrenched classical foundationalists might suggest that in
ductive principles are themselves self-evident, but this move seems
to open the foundations to just about anything being self-evident.
Such a move would play into Plantinga's hands, for if that is what
one means by self-evidence, why not take theistic beliefs to be self
evident (and thus properly basic) as well? As an alternative, the
entrenched classical foundationalists may suggest that inductive
principles ought to be understood as part of a heuristic meta
epistemological framework. By definition, however, this move is
ruled out. Foundationalism requires that all rational beliefs be ei
ther properly basic or nonbasic. Belief in the principles of induc
tion cannot be outside one's noetic structure. How then are induc
tive principles to be justified?
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Plantinga's modified foundationalism fares better in answering
this question. Caution is needed, however, for if there is one thing
to be learned from the widespread belief criticism it is this: the
criteria for properly basic beliefs cannot be overly strong. But it is
simple enough to desire overly strong criteria. Plantinga seems to
do this himself in his response to the Great Pumpkin objection,
where he writes:
If belief in God is properly basic, why can't just any belief be prop
erly basic? Couldn't we say the same about any bizarre aberration
we can think of? What about voodoo or astrology? What about the
belief that the Great Pumpkin returns every Halloween? Could I
properly take that as basic? . . . If we say that belief in God is prop
erly basic, won't we be committed to holding that just anything, or
nearly anything, can properly be taken as basic, thus throwing wide
the gates to irrationalism and superstition?5
In his response, Plantinga makes it clear that not just any belief
can be properly basic but that a properly basic belief, although
lacking discursive evidence, does not lack grounding. Thus, some
beliefs are not properly basic for they lack grounding. Further,
Plantinga claims that arriving at the criterion for proper basicality
leads to charging belief in the Great Pumpkin with irrationality.
But why should the Great Pumpkinite accept this? Admittedly,
belief in the Great Pumpkin is not something I take to be rational,
but what if we come on some tribe that believes it is? Suppose this
tribe has read Plantinga, followed his inductive procedure, and
takes Great Pumpkin belief as properly basic? Suppose they even
specify their criterion for proper basicality and it does not lead to
incoherence? What is Plantinga to say?
Perhaps Plantinga's desire to rule out Great Pumpkin belief is
motivated by the fact that we do not have any natural inclination
to believe in the Great Pumpkin whereas we do have a natural
inclination to believe in God. Nevertheless, Plantinga qua theist
would surely admit the rationality of Great Pumpkin belief insofar
as such belief actually resembles theistic belief. But is this not just
to say that the force of Plantinga's response is derived from the
oddity of the example he chooses? Had he chosen Judaism, Islam,
s. Plantinga, "The Reformed Objection to Natural Theology , " p. 5 8 .
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or Hinduism perhaps the rejection o f the objection would not seem
to follow quite so quickly.
How would it be possible, once the inductive procedure is com
pleted, for Great Pumpkin belief to be rejected as irrational? First,
if no one ever had Great Pumpkin experiences and simply chose
arbitrarily to believe in the Great Pumpkin, no such belief would
be rational. It would not be grounded. Second, if one did have
Great Pumpkin experiences to ground such belief and Plantinga
still rejected the belief as irrational, he must mean that no Great
Pumpkinite's belief is rational. He must, in other words, have
some independent reason for rejecting Great Pumpkin belief,
namely, it fails to meet Plantinga's criterion. He must hold that the
criteria for proper basicality are quite strong-so strong as not to
be person- or community-relative. Plantinga seems to think this
way, at least part of the time; if one inductively arrives at P as the
criterion for proper basicality and P rules out Great Pumpkin be
lief, then no one's belief in the Great Pumpkin could be rational.
But, with respect to Plantinga, what if the Great Pumpkinite takes
his belief to be properly basic and thus arrives at a different crite
rion? Plantinga's response is inconsistent with his inductive pro
cedure and its potential results. To be consistent, he must allow for
such a potentiality. The Great Pumpkin objection, understood as
the demand for a very liberal openness to what might count as
properly basic, seems to stand against his theory, and thus Plan
tinga appears to be committed to a weaker sense of rationality than
some of his comments indicate.
Since Plantinga himself struggles with the status of the criterion
for proper basicality, one wonders about the proper way to under
stand it. We can say at least two things. First, any criterion must
itself be rationally justified. Second, inductive procedures can jus
tify some criteria. This latter point entails that the proposition ex
pressing a criterion is non basic, since the proposition (or rather its
belief or acceptance) is based on others. The principles of induc
tion, on the other hand, can be either basic or nonbasic. Either
way, the criterion must not be overly strong or the grounding of
the principles of induction becomes impossible. If the principles are
to be properly basic, the criterion cannot rule them out. If they are
to be nonbasic, there must be some properly basic belief (or set of
beliefs) to justify the principles of induction which is not itself
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ruled out by the criterion. For our purposes, given a sufficiently
weak criterion, the principles of induction can be properly basic.
The following sketch shows how.
Suppose we set out to discover which of our beliefs are properly
basic. We decide that, if anything is properly basic, beliefs A, B, C,
and the principles of induction are. Of course, at this time we do
not know the criterion for proper basicality. Intuitively, however,
we take these beliefs as basic and properly so. We discover induc
tively that these beliefs all share property P. Property P is thus the
criterion for proper basicality. The statement that expresses the fact
that P is the criterion for proper basicality can be based on at least
one other belief, specifically, one of the principles of induction.
Thus, the statement of the criterion is nonbasic, yet P functions as
a criterion for A, B, C, and the principles of induction. Induction
thus legitimately justifies P as the criterion. The principles of in
duction, however, need not be discursively justified but are
grounded, since they fall under the criterion discovered by the in
ductive approach. So, Plantinga's modified foundationalism can
fare well, potentially at least, on the issue of how inductive princi
ples are to be justified.
5.

Widespread Beliefs as Fundamental Assumptions
of Rationality

The above suggestions leave open the possibility of accounting
for our widespread belief in the principles of induction. In fact, on
the account sketched above these principles are important in dis
covering the replacement for the classical criterion for proper ba
sicality and yet do not lead to the kind of self-referential incoher
ence found in classical foundationalism. But what about other
widespread beliefs such as beliefs about other persons, the external
world, or the past? Do these fare as well? I believe they do, but I
do not take the time here to consider them individually. Instead, I
consider why these so-called widespread beliefs are important to
rationality.
It would be a mistake to think that the importance of these
widespread beliefs for rationality lies in the fact that most everyone
takes them to be true. First of all, it clearly does not follow from
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the fact that most people hold (versions of) the widespread beliefs
that the beliefs are indeed true. This is a variation of that infamous
freshman fallacy of the bandwagon. But even if they were all true,
their truth does not necessarily make them rational. What does?
Consider these propositions. "There are other people alive. "
"There are real trees (or rocks, or mountains, or the like) . " "I
remember yesterday's events accurately. " Such propositions,
whether held as beliefs or acceptances, are central in our lives. One
cannot imagine, at least with any seriousness, living life without
them (or at least their near relatives). Why do we take them so
seriously? Why do we take them as a necessary starting point for
any theory of rationality? Simply stated, I believe they have the
ability to greatly arrange and order our other beliefs and accep
tances.
There appears to be a hierarchy of beliefs and acceptances in our
noetic structures. Some we are willing to give up quite quickly;
others we are not. What I have been calling widespread beliefs fall
into the latter category. Another notion from Plantinga's work can
help us explore the importance of this observation. He claims that
in describing one's noetic structure one must include an index of
"depth of ingression":
Some of my beliefs are, we might say, on the periphery of my no
etic structure. I accept them, and may even accept them quite
firmly, but if I were to give them up, not much else in my noetic
structure would have to change. I believe there are some large boul
ders on the top of the Grand Teton. If l come to give up this belief,
however, . . . that change wouldn't have extensive reverberations
throughout the rest of my noetic structure; it could be accommo
dated with minimal alteration elsewhere. So its depth of ingression
into my noetic structure isn't great. On the other hand, if I were to
come to believe that there simply is no such thing as the Grand
Teton, or no such thing as the State of Wyoming, that would have
much greater reverberations. And if, per impossible, I were to come
to think there hadn' t been much of a past . . . or that there weren't
any other persons, that would have even greater reverberations;
these beliefs of mine have great depth of ingression into my noetic
structure. 6
6. Ibid. , p. 5 5 ·
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To give up some beliefs would radically alter one's noetic struc
ture. The connections between beliefs can be enormous in number
and complicated in kind. I suggest that the reason the so-called
widespread beliefs are so important to rationality is that they have,
to borrow Plantinga's phrase, the greatest depth of ingression. Per
haps more intuitive terminology would be helpful here. Let us say
that such beliefs have the greatest world-ordering power.
Before moving on, it is important to clarify exactly which beliefs
or acceptances have the status of being widespread, as well as the
relationships between the notion of world-ordering power and no
tions such as level of commitment, belief, and acceptance. Obvi
ously we cannot simply identify widespread beliefs as person-spe
cific beliefs. For example,
(1) I am writing at a brown desk

is not widespread. Since you are reading, rather than writing, (1) is
not one of your current beliefs. Neither, in all likelihood, is (1) a
belief many people have right now.
It is also not the case that
(2) There is an external world

is widely held in the sense that most people now believe it. Many
nonphilosophers have not even thought about it, let alone believe
it. In fact, it is not belief qua propositional attitude that is impor
tant at all. Instead we should consider beliefs qua propositions.
But it is not idiosyncratic propositions that are truly central ei
ther. Rather, it is the kind of proposition that is important. Here
the kind is picked out by the various contents of beliefs; there are
beliefs about physical objects, others about other persons, still
others about the past, and so forth. It is certain kinds of proposi
tion that are widely held, rather than any idiosyncratic proposition.
Everyone holds these kinds of proposition: physical object proposi
tions, other-mind propositions, and so forth. And although we are
willing to admit that we can be wrong about some individual
members of the various kinds, we are not typically willing to ad
mit that we can be wrong about the entire kind.
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So the terminology "widespread belief'' is misleading in two
ways. What is important for our discussion is not beliefs qua prop
ositional attitude. Nor is it belief qua idiosyncratic proposition.
What is important is rather that certain assumptions are made by
every person with ordinary beliefs. It is here, I believe, that the
distinction between beliefs and acceptances becomes important. As
noted, most people do not explicitly believe propositions such as
"There is an external world, " or "There are other minds, " and the
like. I have little doubt, however, that on inquiry most people
would admit that they at least accept such propositions as back
ground assumptions. These propositions are immediately entailed
by the ordinary kinds of propositions we all hold. Even though
many, if not most, people do not explicitly believe them (not ever
having really thought about them), they do believe propositions
that fall into the kinds "external world propositions," "other-mind
propositions, " and so forth. Our acceptance/assumption of propo
sitions such as "There is an external world" and "There are other
minds" simply expresses our commitment to our ordinary beliefs
being (generally) rational.
These acceptances are greatly world-ordering. They are parts of
the complex of speech and action that go into making up our
shared lives together. One cannot successfully ignore or question
these acceptances; questioning comes to an end. These acceptances
are so deeply embedded in our noetic structures and our human
culture that we simply cannot shake them off. Since we must start
somewhere in giving an account of rationality, we might just as
well begin with the paradigm cases that seem to be necessary for
human communication and culture. These acceptances, in a way,
are what make us rational.
If I am right about this, then the concerns of Plantinga' s "wide
spread belief criticism" turn out to be concerns about giving an
account of certain acceptances that all rational persons have. We all
accept certain propositions about reality. Any theory of rationality
that fails to explain them is to be rejected on the grounds that it
overlooks fundamental constituents of rationality. In light of all
this, let what I have been calling widespread beliefs now be re
ferred to as "fundamental assumptions of rationality. "
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6. World-Ordering Power and Fundamental
Assumptions of Rationality
I turn now to give an account of how fundamental assumptions
of rationality are related to commitment and world-ordering
power. First we need a more formal account of world-ordering
power:
World-Ordering Power: The ability of a (change in) belief
in, or acceptance of, a (given) proposition to adjust other
beliefs or acceptances in S's noetic structure.
All beliefs and acceptances have the power to make us adjust our
noetic structures. When we take on a new belief, we make other
changes as well. When we lose an acceptance, we make other ad
justments to go with the loss. What I wish to propose for consid
eration is that world-ordering power is connected to a principle of
rationality, namely, the justification maxim suggested earlier.
The justification maxim demands that no proposition be held
with greater commitment than that permitted by its justification.
Taking commitment to be the level of (un)willingness to give up
one's propositional attitude toward a proposition, one must find
some principle that connects one's commitment with one's justi
fication for the proposition. One possibility for linking commit
ment to epistemic justification is to make commitment a function
of world-ordering power. Let us call this the "principle of commit
ment. "
Principle of Commitment: It is a good thing, from the
epistemic point of view, if S's (belief or acceptance) com
mitment to a proposition p is commensurate with the
world-ordering power of p for S. 7
Accordingly, the more world-ordering power a belief or accep
tance has, the more epistemic justification it has. Thus the beliefs
7. There is also a normative account of the principle of commitment: S's (belief
or acceptance) commitment to a proposition p ought to be commensurate with the
world-ordering power of p for S. Again, the version one picks depends on other
considerations. Just as I elected to work with the evaluative version of the j ustifica
tion maxim, so I elect to work with the evaluative version of the principle of
commitment.
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or acceptances having the least world-ordering power are those to
which the least commitment accrues, and those having the greatest
world-ordering power are those with the greatest commitment, at
least in a rational noetic framework. 8 This raises the obvious ques
tion, what does the world-ordering power of a belief or acceptance
have to do with its epistemic justification?
A variety of answers could be given here. I limit my discussion
to two, rejecting the first. Return to the sketch in Section 4 where
Plantinga's inductive procedure was used to discover a criterion for
proper basicality while allowing the widespread belief in induction
to be rational. There it was suggested that some property P is
shared by all the beliefs we intuitively take to be properly basic.
Thus P is the criterion for proper basicality. My initial answer link
ing world-ordering power to justification is simply that P may be
the world-ordering power of the properly basic beliefs in question:
A, B, C, and the principles of induction all share the same level of
world-ordering power. What level? It seems that it would have to
be the greatest level of world-ordering power for S, for, according
to foundationalism, properly basic beliefs are to play a special role
in one's noetic structure.
Traditionally, foundationalists thought that one's properly basic
beliefs were beliefs without epistemic fault; in particular, they were
thought to carry a guarantee of truth. More recent versions of
foundationalism have given up the high goal of truth guarantee.
Nevertheless, the assumption that basic beliefs play a special role
remains. Plantinga, for example, writes: "From the foundationalist
point of view not just any kind of belief can be found in the foun
dations of a rational noetic structure; a belief to be properly basic
(that is, basic in a rational noetic structure) must meet certain con
ditions. It must be capable of functioning foundationally, capable
of bearing its share of the weight of the whole noetic structure. "9
What is it for a belief to be capable of functioning founda
tionally, to be able to bear its share of the weight? Well, on the
classical model of foundationalism, it was to be self-evident, incor
rigible, or evident to the senses. But, as we have seen, these sug8. This is contrary to the above quotation from Plantinga in which he indicates
that a belief can be firmly held but be on the periphery of one's noetic structure
(not greatly world-ordering).
9. Plantinga, "Reason and Belief in God, " p. 5 5 .
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gestions are problematic vis-a-vis the demands of classical founda
tionalism itself, as well as in giving an account of the fundamental
assumptions of rationality.
One suggestion is that to be foundational, and properly so, is to
have the greatest level of world-ordering power. One can see right
away, however, that this suggestion is problematic. One of the
most ob�ious difficulties is that beliefs such as "Susan is in pain"
and ''There is a tree over there" (examples of beliefs that are obvi
ously properly basic in the right conditions) do not have the great
est level of world-ordering power. One can give up one of these
idiosyncratic propositions without making much change in one's
noetic structure at all. Perhaps one is hallucinating, or perhaps
Susan is feigning pain for sympathy.
Recall that the propositions I identified earlier as being of the
most significance were not idiosyncratic propositions but rather the
fundamental assumptions of rationality. On the account given to
this point, only the fundamental assumptions of rationality turn
out to have the greatest world-ordering power, whereas other
cases of properly basic beliefs (such as "Susan is in pain") do not. It
seems clear enough, then, that aligning world-ordering power
with the criterion for proper basicality as a means to accounting for
commitment will not do.
Since the fundamental assumptions of rationality are the propo
sitions that have the greatest world-ordering power, it is important
to provide a theory of rational noetic structures that takes this into
account. My second answer linking world-ordering power to justi
fication is that the world-ordering power of a proposition within a
noetic structure is one of a number of coherence relations that hold
among one's beliefs and acceptances. With this suggestion we leave
a foundationalist account of rational noetic structures and move,
once again, to holism.
It has been said that foundationalism is the most attractive posi
tion vis-a-vis epistemic considerations for the theist. One reason
for this suggestion is the supposedly strong justification for prop
erly basic beliefs. When a basic belief is grounded, according to
foundationalism, there is a tie to the independently existing world;
the belief is justified independently of the system of beliefs. This
independent tie is often associated with a realist understanding,
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both in metaphysics and epistemology, a view attractive to theists
who typically believe that God created the world and that the
world therefore exists independently of human thought about it.
But if God is who the theist thinks he is, why could one not know
about God in the independent way foundationalism suggests? Thus
the attractiveness of foundationalism for theists.
With holism, however, one has no tie (or at least less of one) to
the independent world. Holist models of epistemic justification
tend to give little or minimal justification for a given belief.
Rather, a belief is only justified within a given noetic structure. In
fact, it is the structure that is justified rather than individual propo
sitions. The system relativity of holism and the lack of (or weak
ened) tie to the supposedly independently existing world are two
reasons for the theist to balk at holism.
Nevertheless, realism in metaphysics may have little to do with
epistemology. Some things may be real, and independently so, and
yet our access to them be limited. We may be, as finite humans,
trapped within our systems of beliefs. They may not reflect reality.
But if to give a holist account is the best we can do, so be it. Being
a theist does not clearly, or even naturally, lead to being a founda
tionalist.
Furthermore, I believe the present discussion gives some reason
to move to holism. Foundationalism, even Plantinga's relatively
weak version, does not provide much potential for providing an
account of passionate commitment or, for that matter, levels of
commitment that match our experience of how religious people act
vis-a-vis their religious beliefs. The account of the criterion for
proper basicality Plantinga provides may give us nondiscursive jus
tification for single, individual beliefs such as "I see a tree," but it
does little to account for the fundamental assumptions of ratio
nality. What is really important are not Plantinga's widespread be
liefs understood as individual beliefs but the fundamental assump
tions of rationality underlying them. These propositions, and our
attitudes toward them, are what are truly central for rationality. A
holist account of rationality that provides a means of accounting
for levels of commitment must include some principle of ratio
nality connecting commitment to something like world-ordering
power.

Wodd-Ordering Power and Passionate Commitment

Rationality and Theistic Belief
7·

The Justification Maxim and Theistic Belief

I have suggested that the justification maxim demands commit
ment commensurate with epistemic justification and that one po
tential principle that might provide a link between the two is the
principle of commitment. By way of conclusion, I wish to make
some observations about religious belief and its world-ordering
power.
I have said that the fundamental assumptions of rationality are
not in the typical case beliefs, but rather that they are closer to
acceptances. Most people do not explicitly believe that there is an
external world, or that there are other minds, and so forth. They
simply accept (often unconsciously) such propositions; the propo
sitions are fundamental assumptions of rationality. Nevertheless,
the commitment people have toward these propositions is great
indeed, a fact illustrated by the difficulties teachers of philosophy
have in convincing their students that the problem of the external
world is a real problem. Such assumptions are deeply embedded.
If this is true, then it may appear that my suggestions do not
apply to religion, or at least not to Christianity, and that the central
goal I set for this chapter-explaining how a theist can be firmly
and passionately committed to her beliefs in the face of what ap
pears to be insufficient evidence-are not met. Theism, after all,
involves beliefs. Christianity in particular calls for belief. One is to
"believe on the Lord Jesus Christ" to be saved. But if belief is
fundamental to theism, and yet the fundamental assumptions of
rationality qua acceptances have the greatest world-ordering
power, then how is it that radical, heartfelt theistic commitment
can be justified vis-a-vis the justification maxim and the argument
of the previous several sections?
This question can be more easily handled if broken down into
two questions. First, does religion involve fundamental assump
tions of rationality? The theist, and in particular the Christian the
ist, responds from within his or her system of belief. The answer,
given the truth of Christianity, is that yes, theistic beliefs and ac
ceptances are part and parcel of what it is to be rational. What
rational person would refuse the call and demands of God, the
Creator, in his or her life? The Christian may not be so bold as to
suggest that someone is irrational in not being a Christian, but it
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seems quite consistent to say that one is not fully rational if one
lacks Christian faith.
The second question is this. The fundamental assumptions of
rationality are closer to acceptances than they (typically) are to be
liefs. But theistic faith involves belief, not mere acceptance. How
can theistic belief then involve the great level of world-ordering
power that the other fundamental assumptions of rationality do,
but in particular those involving other human persons? A complete
answer to this question would take another long essay. Perhaps the
following suffices.
It is often noted that the nature of theistic belief is far more com
plicated than our more ordinary beliefs in propositions. Theistic
belief is much closer to trusting one's spouse or best friend than it
is merely to believing that there is a tree in the front yard. But
theistic faith is complicated in another way as well. It functions, at
least for the mature believer, as a grid through which other com
petitors for belief and acceptance are sifted. 10 I think these two
points are intimately connected. The following analogy aims our
thinking in the right direction.
I believe in my wife, much in the same way as I believe in God. I
love her, I react to her wants and de-sires, I listen to her, and so
forth. I do likewise with God. I love him, I move on (what I take
to be) his wants and desires, I listen to him, and so forth. But with
my wife I also evaluate my actions and thoughts through her con
cerns. This is not always conscious. Neither is it always done with
passionate belief There are things, for example, that I simply accept
about my wife, and that I do not necessarily believe, at least occur
rently. I accept that she will act in certain ways toward me, I accept
that her character will be more or less consistent over a period of
time, and so forth.
It seems to me that I have not always accepted these things.
Before my having come to accept them, I believed them. It was
much more important for me, in the relative immaturity of our
early relationship, to have these things before my mind's eye as
things to which I was attracted, as things that I found warm. But it
was when I moved from explicitly believing these things to acceptIO.

Nicholas Wolterstorff develops this theme in some detail in Reason within the
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ing them that the beginnings of real maturity in my marriage be
came possible. It was by my very acceptance of them that I began
to recognize my deep commitment to them and, by extension, to
her. This is not to say that I never have the propositional attitude
of belief toward these things. It is only to say that often I do not
and that the lack of belief does not adversely affect the good rela
tionship I have with my wife and, in fact, sometimes allows for an
increase in the maturity of the relationship.
Likewise with belief in God. The mature believer accepts certain
things about God, his nature, his character, and so forth. He or she
need not believe them in the explicit, conscious sense to which I
have made reference. This is why in Plantinga's example of the
doubting Christian the doubter has not lost his faith. He accepts
the problematic proposition; he has thrown in his lot with it. Thus
there are several important parallels between theistic belief and be
liefs about other individual human persons, that is, between CP
and unique person practice.
Be that as it may, there is an aspect of acceptance that was over
looked in the earlier description of the distinctions between belief
and acceptance. Some might think of acceptance as a less important
propositional attitude than belief. This, I suggest, is not the case, at
least not for all acceptances. That there is a material world, that
there are other persons, that we have some principles by which
knowledge can advance, are acceptances of which we are largely
not conscious; our propositional attitude toward them is not as ex
plicit as belief is. Yet we do not treat them lightly when they are
challenged. The religious believer in Plantinga's example still ac
cepts, although doubts, that God was in Christ reconciling the
world to himself. Belief may come and go; it waxes and wanes
with the times. But acceptance is something we do more out of a
sense of necessity-the necessity of making sense of our experience
of reality.
Religious faith does involve acceptances, and thus propositions
involved in such faith can be members of the fundamental assump
tions of rationality. As such, deep commitment given to theistic
propositions is justified, at least potentially, by the great level of
world-ordering power the propositions have for theists.
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8.

Summary and Conclusion

My objective in this book has been to explain, evaluate, and
defend what I have called the parity thesis. I conclude with a brief
summary of the points argued. First I explained and criticized PTA•
PTAs• and PT t The first and last of these founder on Alston's
failure to take into account a special role for background beliefs in
the generation and justification of Christian beliefs. PTAS• on the
other hand, fails to be true since it does not take into account the
special place for induction in the justifying argument for PP. Plan
tinga's basic parity thesis is PT PI, but the more narrow thesis, PT� ,
is the focus of my discussion, since showing the latter to be false
shows the former to be false. PT� is criticized by what I have
called the universality challenge. In defending Plantinga against
this challenge, I argued that Plantinga is committed to a kind of
arbitrariness because of, once again, a special role for background
beliefs in the generation and justification of theistic beliefs. I then
argued that Alston and Plantinga are more or less in the same epi
stemic boat vis-a-vis background beliefs.
In the course of these analyses, I introduced a distinction be
tween conceptual-reading and noninferential mediated practices.
The latter require, according to the position taken here, back
ground beliefs that need themselves to have justification. Thus I
introduced the notion of a holist aspect to the justification for both
unique person practice and CP, since both are noninferential medi
ated practices. In the process, I introduced a new parity thesis. Fi
nally, I developed the notion of comportment/nonpredictive con
firmation as one aspect of the holism, and, in response to what I
have called the problem of commitment I suggested a holist princi
ple connecting world-ordering power to epistemic commitment.
My initial goals were three. The first of these was to contribute
to the ongoing discussion of the rationality of belief in God. I hope
to have at least clarified some of the issues surrounding the parity
thesis and Reformed epistemology. The second was to provide an
account and analysis of various versions of the parity thesis. I have
considered several such accounts and found them all wanting,
more or less for the same reason-the role for background beliefs
in the justification of religious beliefs. The third and final was to
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introduce a new parity thesis that does not fall prey to the difficulty
of the others. I have sketched some of the parallels between CP
and unique person practice and attempted to argue that PTN does
�
not fall prey to the background belief challenge. To defend PTN
fully would require a complete and general account of holist epi
stemic justification. I cannot embark on that discussion here. Per
haps, however, we have now before us a few places from which to
launch the raft.
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